Advertisement

Death

  • Michael Quante
Chapter
  • 309 Downloads
Part of the Philosophy and Medicine book series (PHME, volume 126)

Abstract

In Germany, during the run-up to the passing of the transplantation law in the early 1990s and in the context of actual discussions of ethical problems of transplantation medicine in the last years, a fierce dispute was conducted over so-called “brain death”. Johannes Hoff and Jürgen in der Schmitten, the editors of the anthology “When is the human being dead?”, for example, made it their expressed aim to expose as illusionary the notion that there is a social or scientific consensus about the definition of death. They view the brain death criterion as a new definition of death and fear that for pragmatic reasons the death of a human being is being newly defined for the purpose of maximally effectively winning organs for transplantation. The controversy within this dispute runs between the traditional “cardiovascular death” and the “whole-brain death”. Not as soon as the brain of a human has failed irrevocably, but only when the cardiovascular function has also failed can a human be regarded as dead in the eyes of these critics of the whole brain death criterion.

Keywords

Brain Death Human Organism Life Process Human Death High Brain Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Bibliography

  1. Ach, J.S. 1999. Leben für Leben. In Gene, Klone und Organe–Neue Perspektiven der Biomedizin, Hrsg. R. Paslack and H. Stolte, 125–140. Frankfurt a.M: Peter Lang.Google Scholar
  2. Ach, J.S., and M. Quante Hrsg. 1999. Hirntod und Organverpflanzung. Zweite, erweiterte Auflage, Stuttgart: Frommann-holz- boog.Google Scholar
  3. Ach, J.S., et al. 2000. Ethik der Organtransplantation. Erlangen: H. Fischer, cop.Google Scholar
  4. Bartlett, E.T., and S.J. Younger. 1988. Human death and the destruction of the neocortex. In Death: Beyond whole-brain criteria, ed. R.M. Zaner, 199–215. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Bayertz, K. 1999. Ethik, Tod und Technik. In Hirntod und Organverpflanzung, Hrsg. J.S. Ach and M. Quante, 75–99, Zweite, erweiterte Auflage, Stuttgart: Frommann-holz- boog.Google Scholar
  6. Beauchamp, T.L. 1999. The failure of theories of personhood. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9: 309–324.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Becker, L.C. 1981. Human being: The boundaries of the concept. In Medicine and moral philosophy, ed. M. Cohen et al., 23–48. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Birnbacher, D. 1994. Einige Gründe, das Hirntodkriterium zu akzeptieren. In Wann ist der Mensch tot? Hrsg. J. Hoff and J. In der Schmitten, 28–40, Reinbeck: Rowohlt- Verlag.Google Scholar
  9. Currie, B.S. 1978. The redefinition of death. In Organism, medicine, and metaphysics, ed. S.F. Spicker, 177–197. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Engelhardt, H.T. Jr. 1986. The foundations of bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Evans, M. 1994. Against the definition of brainstem death. In Death rites, ed. R. Lee and D. Morgan, 1–10. London: Europa Editions.Google Scholar
  12. Feldman, F. 1991. Some puzzles about the evil of death. Philosophical Review 100: 205–227.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. ———. 1992. Confrontations with the reaper. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Fischer, J.M., ed. 1993. The metaphysics of death. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
  15. Gervais, K.G. 1986. Redefining death. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  16. Green, M.B., and D. Wikler. 1981. Brain death and personal identity. In Medicine and moral philosophy, ed. M. Cohen et al., 49–77. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  17. Gutmann, Thomas. 2015. Donation after circulatory determination of death: Regelungsoptionen. In Hirntod und Organtransplantation – zum Stand der Diskussion, ed. U. Körtner and C. Kopetzki, 179–193. Wien: Verlag Österreich.Google Scholar
  18. Herrmann, M. 1995. Identität und Moral. Berlin: De Gruyter.Google Scholar
  19. Hoffman, J.C. 1979. Clarifying the debate on death. Soundings 62: 430–447.Google Scholar
  20. Hurley, S.L. 1998. Consciousness in action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  21. Johnston, M. 1987. Human beings. Journal of Philosophy 84: 59–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Jonas, H. 1985. Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp.Google Scholar
  23. Kim, J. 1993. Supervenience and mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Kurthen, M., and D.B. Linke. 1994. Vom Hirntod zum Teilhirntod. In Wann ist der Mensch tot? Hrsg. J. Hoff & J. In der Schmitten, 82–94. Reinbeck: Rowohlt- Verlag.Google Scholar
  25. Kurthen, M., et al. 1989. Teilhirntod und Ethik. Ethik in der Medizin 1: 134–142.Google Scholar
  26. Lamb, D. 1985. Death, brain death and ethics. Albany: State University of New York Press.Google Scholar
  27. Linke, D.B. 1993. Hirnverpflanzung. Reinbeck: Rowohlt.Google Scholar
  28. Lockwood, M. 1985. When does a life begin? In Moral dilemmas in modern medicine, ed. M. Lockwood, 9–31. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.Google Scholar
  29. Lowe, E.J. 1989. Kinds of being. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.Google Scholar
  30. Martin, R. 1993. Having the experience: The next best thing to being there. Philosophical Studies 70: 305–321.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. ———. 1998. Self-concern. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  32. McCullagh, P. 1993. Brain dead, brain absent, brain donors. Chichester: Wiley.Google Scholar
  33. Olson, E.T. 1997. The human animal. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  34. Parfit, D. 1989. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  35. President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 1981. Defining death. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.Google Scholar
  36. Quante, M. 1995b. “Wann ist ein Mensch tot?” Zum Streit um den menschlichen Tod. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 49: 167–193.Google Scholar
  37. ———. 2007a. The social nature of personal identity, In: Journal of Consciousness Studies 14: 56–76.Google Scholar
  38. ———. 2012. Person. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, zweite Auflage.Google Scholar
  39. Rapp, C. 1995. Identität, Persistenz und Substantialität. Freiburg: Karl Alber.Google Scholar
  40. Rosenberg, J.F. 1983. Thinking clearly about death. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
  41. Spittler, J.F. 1999. Krankheitsbedingte Bewußtseinsstörungen. Fortschritte der Neurologie und Psychiatrie 67: 37–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Steigleder, K. 1994. Die Unterscheidung zwischen dem ‚Tod der Person‘ und dem ‚Tod des Organismus‘ und ihre Relevanz für die Frage nach dem Tod des Menschen. In Wann ist der Mensch tot? Hrsg. J. Hoff & J. In der Schmitten, 95–118, Reinbeck: Rowohlt- Verlag.Google Scholar
  43. Stoecker, R. 1999. Der Hirntod. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber.Google Scholar
  44. Unger, P. 1990. Identity, consciousness, and value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  45. Veatch, R.M. 1976. Death, dying, and the biological revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  46. ———. 1988. Whole-brain, neocortical, and higher brain related concepts. In Death: Beyond whole-brain criteria, ed. R.M. Zaner, 171–186. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Walton, D. 1979. On defining death. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.Google Scholar
  48. ———. 1980. Brain death. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.Google Scholar
  49. Wartofsky, M.W. 1988. Beyond a whole-brain definition of death: Reconsidering the metaphysics of death. In Death: Beyond whole-brain criteria, ed. R.M. Zaner, 219–228. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. Wiggins, D. 1980. Sameness and substance. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.Google Scholar
  51. Wilkes, K.V. 1988. Real people. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  52. Wils, J.P. 1994 Person und Leib. In Wann ist der Mensch tot? Hrsg. J. Hoff and J. In der Schmitten, 119–149. Reinbeck: Rowohlt- Verlag.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Quante
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MünsterMünsterGermany

Personalised recommendations