Abstract
This chapter addresses the question whether the notion of ownedness or authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) in Being and Time can serve as a model for social change. To answer this question, I build on the late Dreyfus’s understanding of owned Dasein as a “world transformer”, Butler’s understanding of contingent foundations, and Kyle Stroh’s conception of owned Dasein in the plural, in order to develop a notion of social ownedness (soziale Eigentlichkeit). In my reading, ownedness concerns primarily the transparency (Durchsichtigkeit) of ontological structures on the part of the owned self (eigentliches Selbst), including a proper understanding of the role of the anyone (das Man). The owned self realizes that the anyone remains the foundation of intelligibility, but understands it as a contingent foundation and thereby contests its absolutization and the tendency of conformism. After an interpretation of Heidegger’s remarks on “nullity” (Nichtigkeit) and “abyss of ground “(Abgrund) in relation to Butler’s theory of post-foundationalism, and a discussion of “historicality” (Geschichtlichkeit) in relation to Butler’s notion of performativity as iterability, I offer a reinterpretation of the figure of the “world transformer” and end with a proposal on how to understand social ownedness.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Heidegger’s notion of ownedness or authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) has received growing attention in recent years (Boedecker 2001; Guignon 2004; Carman 2005; Luckner 2007; O’Brien 2011; Henschen 2012; Blattner 2013; Han-Pile 2013; Stroh 2015; and the contributions in McManus 2015). Before the interpretation of Eigentlichkeit became the topic of a specific debate, the issue had already been discussed in a number of classic interpretations of Being and Time (Haugeland 1982; Figal 1988; Thomä 1990; Dreyfus 1991; Mulhall 2013). Newer interpretations of Heidegger that contribute to the debate on Eigentlichkeit come from Carman (2003) and Crowell (2013).
- 3.
I use “deliberate” here for lack of a better term. It will become clear that I understand my proposal as an alternative to a deliberative model, which I find unrealistic.
- 4.
All quotations from Being and Time are based on the translation by Stambaugh (Heidegger 1996), but modified by me in accordance with the glossary of this volume.
- 5.
This is also the reason why I find it most adequate to translate Eigentlichkeit as ownedness, as it is able to convey the root own (eigen) and also contains the important connotation of owning. See also the Introduction to this volume and the contribution by Koo.
- 6.
In my view, Dreyfus’s original account is based on a misguided understanding of the role of norms in skilled coping, most importantly an ignorance of instrumental success. In his commentary of Division 1 of Being and Time, Dreyfus explains that the “very functioning of equipment is dependent upon social norms” (Dreyfus 1991, 153 f.) I think that this is neither an appropriate interpretation of Heidegger nor a convincing description of the phenomenon (Schmid 2009, 160 ff.; Thonhauser and Schmid forthcoming). Most importantly, it ignores the difference between goal-oriented action and norm-oriented action. We can see this most clearly when considering Dreyfus’s interpretation of the difference in the tool-use of human beings and apes: If a chimpanzee uses a stick to reach a banana, it does not matter how it is done – there is no right and wrong – all that matters is whether the activity is successful or not. Hence, Dreyfus does not oppose the idea that instrumental success is the decisive criterion for evaluating the actions of non-human animals. For human actions, however, he paints a different picture: If Dasein is confronted with the same task as the chimpanzee, it does not matter, at least not in the first place, whether the task is successful – reaching the banana –, what primarily matters is whether the stick is handled in the appropriate way, i.e. according to the social norms of stick usage. Dreyfus claims that in the case of human tool-use, the criterion for the evaluation of practical activity is not instrumental success, but social propriety; the question is not whether it is successful or not, but whether it is right or wrong according to the social norms of a given cultural context. This is implausible: On the one hand, practices can be instrumentally unsuccessful, even though they conform with established social norms. On the other hand, practices can be instrumentally successful without following the normative standards of appropriateness. These examples show that instrumental success and social appropriateness, at least sometimes, fall apart from each other. In such cases, it seems unreasonable to give social appropriateness the priority. It appears more plausible that the criterion of instrumental success will be a resource for the modification of social rules in cases where they diverge. Following such a reading, circumspective concern (umsichtiges Besorgen) should be interpreted as primarily guided by instrumental success, not social propriety.
- 7.
Dreyfus builds his reading on the following passage from Being and Time: “Situation is the there disclosed in resoluteness – as which the existing being is there. […] For the anyone, however, situation is essentially closed off. The anyone knows only the ‘general situation’.” (BT 299–300)
- 8.
Such an individualistic reading of ownedness is certainly in line with Being and Time. I take the step towards locating ownedness in plural Dasein to be a modification of what Heidegger said; but it is a modification that builds on the core of his theory and fixes a problem he ends up with.
- 9.
For a more detailed discussion of authentic and inauthentic role play see the contribution of Schmid to this volume.
- 10.
It is important to note that such an interpretation does not support an expressionist reading of authenticity (cf. Taylor 1992). Even on that reading, Eigentlichkeit does not mean finding and expressing one’s inner or true self in contrast to one’s social roles. Rather, Eigentlichkeit concerns the way in which one understands and relates to one’s factical self (Blattner 2013, 334).
- 11.
For more on this point, see the contribution of Beinsteiner to this volume.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the participants of the conference “Conventionalism. Heidegger’s ‘Anyone’ and Contemporary Social Theory” for three inspiring days of discussing Heidegger’s possible contribution to social theory and for helpful comments on my presentation. Moreover, I thank an anonymous reviewer for highly valuable suggestions to further develop and clarify the argument of this paper.
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Thonhauser, G. (2017). Transforming the World: A Butlerian Reading of Heidegger on Social Change?. In: Schmid, H., Thonhauser, G. (eds) From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 10. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_13
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