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Not As Preferential As You May Think: How Mega-Regionals Can Benefit Third Countries

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Mega-Regional Trade Agreements

Abstract

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are not as preferential as they used to be. Traditional PTAs mainly exchanged club goods, that is goods or tariff concessions that are non-rivalrous (use by one does not diminish their availability to others) but excludable (some can be excluded from use). Modern PTAs are increasingly providing public goods, i.e. goods or concessions that are non-rivalrous and non-excludable: they are available to everyone irrespective of whether one contributed to producing the good. More precisely, whereas most commitments in traditional PTAs (tariff concessions) were exclusive to PTA partners, many commitments in twenty-first century PTAs are—or ought to be—either de facto or de jure extended on a most-favored nation (MFN) basis to outsiders too, often unconditionally, sometimes conditionally. This contribution explains why this is the case with reference to recent PTAs of the United States and the European Union, especially those with South Korea. It also offers some thoughts on what this means for the global trading system and the World Trade Organization (WTO) moving forward, and why countries might be willing to offer public goods in bilateral and especially mega-regional trade agreements.

This contribution is an adapted and expanded version of Pauwelyn J (2015) Taking the Preferences out of Preferential Trade Agreements: TTIP as a Provider of Public Goods?. In: Morin JF, Novotna T, Ponjaert F et al. (eds) The Politics of Transatlantic Trade Negotiations: TTIP in a Globalized World. Ashgate, Farnham, 187–196.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996); Freund and Ornelas (2010).

  2. 2.

    Baldwin (2010).

  3. 3.

    WTO (2011), p. 64.

  4. 4.

    IFO Institut (2013), p. 3.

  5. 5.

    See for example, European Commission (2015).

  6. 6.

    Baldwin (2014).

  7. 7.

    Centre for Economic Policy Research (2013).

  8. 8.

    World Trade Institute (2014).

  9. 9.

    IFO Institut (2013).

  10. 10.

    Chen and Mattoo (2008).

  11. 11.

    For example, Articles 16.1 and 21.6 of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea (Korea–US FTA) (signed 30 June 2007, entered into force 15 Mar 2012). https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text. Accessed 6 Sept 2016.

  12. 12.

    For example, Articles 7.26 and 7.27–7.36 of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part (Korea–EU FTA) (signed 6 Oct 2010, entered into force 1 July 2011) OJ 2011 L 127/6.

  13. 13.

    Articles 18.3 and 18.4 Korea–US FTA.

  14. 14.

    Article 13.5 Korea–EU FTA.

  15. 15.

    Article 7.24 Korea–EU FTA.

  16. 16.

    See Article 21.2(b) Korea–US FTA committing to provide “interested persons”, not just “interested persons of the other Party”, a reasonable opportunity to comment on proposed measures.

  17. 17.

    See Articles 6.6 and 6.7 Korea–EU FTA.

  18. 18.

    Article 5.2 Korea–US FTA.

  19. 19.

    Article 15.4 Korea–US FTA.

  20. 20.

    Article 16.5 Korea–US FTA.

  21. 21.

    Articles 10.62–66 Korea–EU FTA.

  22. 22.

    Article 18.2.1 Korea–US FTA.

  23. 23.

    Article 2(1) Korea Trademark Act, as amended by Act No. 11113, 2 Dec 2011. English Version: http://www.kipo.go.kr/upload/en/download/TrademarkAct.pdf. Accessed 1 Sept 2016.

  24. 24.

    Article VII GATS, Article 4 SPS Agreement and Article 6 TBT Agreement.

  25. 25.

    Article 4.1 SPS Agreement.

  26. 26.

    Article VII:2 GATS.

  27. 27.

    Annex 7-A-4 of the Korea–EU FTA; Central Products Classification as set out in Statistical Office of the United Nations, Statistical Papers, Series M, No. 77, CPC ver. 1.0, 1998, Legal services CPC 861.

  28. 28.

    See, e.g. Article 34-2 Korean Foreign Legal Consultant Act, Act No. 9524, 25 Mar 2009, as amended by Act No. 10629, 19 May 2011. English Version: http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=24533&type=new&key=. Accessed 5 Sept 2016.

  29. 29.

    Article 4 of the US Model BIT (2012). http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/. Accessed 5 Sept 2016.

  30. 30.

    See Article 3(3) of the German Model BIT (2008). http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/. Accessed 5 Sept 2016.

  31. 31.

    European Commission (2014), p. 4.

  32. 32.

    Article 19 of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part (signed 15 Oct 2008, provisional application Dec 2008) OJ 2008 L 289/I/3.

  33. 33.

    Oettli and Hovius (2009).

  34. 34.

    Articles 7.8 and 7.14 Korea–EU FTA.

  35. 35.

    Article 5 Annex 2-C of the Korea–EU FTA.

  36. 36.

    Article 2.12 Korea–US FTA.

  37. 37.

    See Article XXVIII(f) GATS, Article 12.13 Korea–US FTA, Article 7.4(3)(a) Korea–EU FTA.

  38. 38.

    See Article XXVIII(m)(i) GATS; Articles 1.4 and 12.13 Korea–US FTA; and Article 7.2(f)(1) Korea–EU FTA, adding the requirement of having “its registered office, central administration or principal place of business” in the EU or Korea, the latter can even be sufficient, without local legal incorporation, if the entity “engages in substantive business operations” in the territory concerned. See also the same two-prong definition of “enterprise of a Party” in Article 11.28 Korea–US FTA (Chapter on Investment), qualified by the Denial of Benefits provision in Article 11.11 Korea–US FTA.

  39. 39.

    See Pauwelyn (2008).

  40. 40.

    Article X:9 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO Agreement).

  41. 41.

    WTO (2014).

  42. 42.

    Bodansky (2012), p. 653.

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Pauwelyn, J. (2017). Not As Preferential As You May Think: How Mega-Regionals Can Benefit Third Countries. In: Rensmann, T. (eds) Mega-Regional Trade Agreements. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56663-4_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56663-4_4

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