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The United States: The Use and Determination of Foreign Law in Civil Litigation in the United States

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Treatment of Foreign Law - Dynamics towards Convergence?

Part of the book series: Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law ((GSCL,volume 26))

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Abstract

In the United States, federal and state courts do not consider the possible applicability of foreign law ex officio: unless a party raises the applicability of foreign law and proves its content, forum law applies. This article details the statutory and case law as well as the evolution to a solution that retains the initial burden on the parties but provides for cooperation between court and parties for the determination of the content of the foreign law and makes the court’s decision thereon appealable. Tables contain references to the law of each of the states of the United States.

Private International Law (“Conflicts Law”) is mainly the law of the individual states in the United States; there is no uniform rule or approach as to when foreign law applies. When foreign law is applicable, the determination of its content is a question of procedure, governed by each state’s procedural law and by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure when the case is pending in a federal court. State procedural rules differ and even the uniform federal rule has received different interpretations in the Federal Circuits. The common-law heritage and structure of American law explain two aspects shared by all procedural rules for the determination of the content of foreign law: the court does not make the determination ex officio; instead, the parties must raise the issue that foreign law may be applicable and then assist the court in determining its content. Furthermore, the adversarial character of American litigation requires notice to the opponent, an opportunity for the opponent to rebut, and perhaps even a limitation on the court to appoint experts or masters. This article discusses the scope and application of the Federal Rule and the divergent approaches in state courts, as well as current attempts in some states to adopt legislation limiting or proscribing recourse to foreign law. An appendix provides references to all state statutes and to principal state decisions.

L.Q.C. Lamar Professor of Law Emeritus, Emory University; Alumni Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Illinois; Universitätsprofessor emeritus, TU Dresden, Germany. The superb research of Daniel J. Levin, J.D. is gratefully acknowledged. This report was first published as an article in 62 Am.J.Comp.L. 213 (2014) and is reprinted here by permission of the Journal and the American Society of Comparative Law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Peter Hay, Law of the United States, at vii, 8 n.18 (3d ed. 2010).

  2. 2.

    Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Native American Reservations (“Indian country”), Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa.

  3. 3.

    See, e.g., Bank of Am.Nat’l Trust &Sav.Ass’n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1327 (5th Cir. 1985); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (few areas – only those in which there is a significant conflict between federal and state policies – are appropriate for federal common law), applied in Eli Lilly do Brasil, Ltda. v. Fed. Express Corp., 502 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2007) (air carrier’s liability for lost or damaged freight).

  4. 4.

    See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.§ 1346(b)(1); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1603, 1605 (district court will use the law of the state in which it sits to resolve all issues except questions of jurisdiction); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 759 n.6 (2004) (Ginsburg, J. joined by Breyer, J. concurring); Richard v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1962); Rayonier v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 389 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1474 (2011); Gould Elec., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 Duke L.J. 775, 823–24 (2012) (“[I]t is likely that some one thousand cases involving claims against foreign states are pending in national courts at any given time and that some 250 new cases are filed each year.”).

  5. 5.

    In an early decision, the U.S. Supreme Court invoked “comity” as the basis for giving (extraterritorial) effect to the law of foreign countries and sister-states alike. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 589 (1839).See also, Fisher v. Fielding, 34 A. 714, 715 (Conn. 1895) (the states of the United States are “independent and foreign sovereignties”).

  6. 6.

    Professor Symeon C. Symeonides prepares an annual survey of conflicts cases in American courts, with some commentary. This detailed survey appears in the American Journal of Comparative Law. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts: Twenty-Sixth Annual Survey, 61 Am. J. Comp. L. 217 (2013).

  7. 7.

    Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).

  8. 8.

    Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 205 (1st Cir. 1988). See also Trenwick Am. Reinsurance Corp. v. IRC, Inc., 764 F.Supp.2d 274, 302–03 (D. Mass. 2011); Leser v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139493, at *16–17, 2012 WL 4472025, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012) (court disregarded choice-of-law clause and applied N.Y. conflicts law when parties relied only on N.Y. law during the proceedings; moreover, one party later claimed not to have assented to the clause).

  9. 9.

    Peter Hay, Patrick J. Borchers, Symeon C. Symeonides, Conflict of Laws § 12.15 (5th ed. 2010) [hereinafter Hornbook]. A classic historical and comparative overview is Arthur Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 Yale L.J. 1018 (1941). For other early comments, see Peter Hay, Die Anwendung ausländischen Rechts im internationalen Privatrecht – Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika [Use of Foreign Law in Private International Law – United States of America], 10 Materialien zum ausländischen und internationalen Privatrecht [Materials on Conflict of Laws] 102 (1968); Stephen L. Sass, Foreign Law in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Survey, 16 Am. J. Comp. L. 332 (1968). Cf. Pan. Processes S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276, 294 n.82 (Okla. 1990). See generally Imre Zajtay, Die Lehre vom Tatsachencharakter und die Revisibilität ausländischen Rechts [The Doctrine of Foreign Law as Fact and Its Reviewability on Appeal], 10 Materialien zum ausländischen und internationalen Privatrecht 193 (Max-Planck-Institut, Hamburg, 1968). For a modern review of English law in comparison with Continental civil law, see Rainer Hausmann, Pleading and Proving Foreign Law – A Comparative Analysis, 2008 Eur. Legal F. I-1.

  10. 10.

    But see infra note 41, with respect to the court’s freedom (and perhaps readiness) to undertake independent research, thereby going beyond the information offered by the parties.

  11. 11.

    See, e.g., Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 14 (2d Cir. 1998); Carey, 864 F.2d at 205–06; Bresnahan v. Stride, 2012 Neb. App. LEXIS 227, at *14 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012); C.I.T. Corp. v. Edwards, 418 P.2d 685, 689 (Okla. 1966); Cherokee Pub.Serv. Co. v. Harby Cragin Lumber Co., 49 P.2d 723, 726 (Okla. 1935).For early comment, see Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1036 et seq. See also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 136 cmt. h (1971); Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1301, 1303 (1989); Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1237, 1260 n.110 (2011).

  12. 12.

    The result may be quite different when proof of the foreign law, determined to be applicable, fails altogether. See infra notes 17, 62.

  13. 13.

    This is so regardless of whether the suit is pending in state court or in a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Grupo Televisa, S.A. v. Telemundo Commc’ns Grp., 485 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2007). In that decision, both parties had raised the conflicts issue. It therefore overstates to say, in a general fashion, that “domestic conflict of laws rules may require the application of foreign law.” Matthew J. Wilson, Improving the Process: Transnational Litigation and the Application of Private Foreign Law, 45 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1111, 1119 n. 26 (2013). See also supra note 7 and infra note 16. For exceptions, see supra note 3.

  14. 14.

    With respect to the statutory law of Louisiana and Oregon, see infra note 19.

  15. 15.

    To the extent that factual issues determine the choice-of-law decision, their resolution is also a matter for the court. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F.Supp.2d 522, 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Reuter, 537 F.3d 733, 742–43 (7th Cir. 2008)).

  16. 16.

    See, e.g., Druck Corp. v. Marco Fund Ltd., 290 F. App’x 441 (2d Cir. 2008); Aon Fin. Prods., Inc. v. Société Générale, 476 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007); Jinro Am.Inc. v. Secure Invs., Inc., 266 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2001) (court determined foreign law with respect to some issues after parties failed to comply with court’s request for assistance); Pittway Corp. v. United States, 88 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 1996) (translations of French law provided by parties did not match, so the court, based on its own research, cited to “the authoritative French version”). Louise Ellen Teitz, Determining and Applying Foreign Law: The Increasing Need for Cross-Border Cooperation, 45 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1081, 1091–92 (2013) criticizes courts for “defaulting to U.S. law.” The criticism may be well taken when foreign law is in issue in the first place and courts resort too readily to forum law, thereby avoiding a genuine conflicts analysis. However, raising the applicability of foreign law rests initially with the parties, as Federal Rule 44.1 itself makes clear. See supra at notes 10 and 11: raising the applicability of foreign law and determining its content are two different matters.

  17. 17.

    In the older law, following the fact approach (supra note 9), the claim would be dismissed. See Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956). See also infra note 65. In modern cases, courts may still write that a claimed aspect of foreign law has not been “proved,” or that the party has failed to convince the court, but may also often reach the same result (non-acceptance of the asserted meaning of a foreign norm) after extensive analysis of their own. See, e.g., Nana Osei Bonsu v. Holder, 646 F.Supp.2d 273, 276 (D. Conn. 2009) (citing Walton, but reaching a result with respect to Ghanaian law contrary to the government’s position on the basis of its own review). For discussion of Walton, see William L. Reynolds, What Happens When Parties Fail to Prove Foreign Law?, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 775 (1997). For further discussion, see infra note 65.

  18. 18.

    Peter Hay, Flexibility versus Predictability and Uniformity in Choice of Law, Hague Academy, 226 Recueil des cours [Collected Courses] 281, 350–385 (1991-I) [hereinafter Flexibility]; Hay, supra note 1, at 105–08 (nos. 238–44). For a sampling of the case law employing the new approaches, not a comprehensive survey, see Peter Hay, Russell J. Weintraub, Patrick J. Borchers, Conflict of Laws – Cases and Materials 540–612 (14th ed. 2013) [hereinafter Casebook].

  19. 19.

    See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:6001 (2010); Symeon C. Symeonides, The Conflicts Book of the Louisiana Civil Code, 83 Tul. L. Rev. 1041(2009); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-100 – 81-135 (2002) (contracts); id. §§ 31-850 – 31-890 (torts). Both codifications contain mandatory rules providing for the application of forum law. See Hornbook, supra note 9, at § 2.25 nn.40 (contracts) and 49 (torts). For bibliographies on the Louisiana and Oregon codifications, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law Around the World 366 and 369 (2014).

  20. 20.

    David L. Nersessian, How Legislative Bans on Foreign and International Law Obstruct the Practice and Regulation of American Lawyers, 44 Ariz. St. L.J. 1647, 1653 et seq. (2012). For additional discussion, see infra note 104.

  21. 21.

    Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). Like many other such efforts, the Oklahoma amendment was intended, at least in major part, to guard against any influence of Sharia law. See Sarah M. Fallon, Justice for All: American Muslims, Sharia Law, and Maintaining Comity Within American Jurisprudence, 36 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 153 (2013).

  22. 22.

    Harold J. Berman, Is Conflict-of-Laws Becoming Passé? in Balancing of Interests – Liber Amicorum Peter Hay 43, 47 n.15 (Hans-Eric Rasmussen-Bonne et al., eds. 2005), with further references. See also Mario Bretone, Geschichte des römischen Rechts [History of Roman Law] 397 (German translation by Galsterer 1992).

  23. 23.

    For a survey of American case law, see Hornbook, supra note 9, §§ 17.39, 17.40 (to p. 898). Precursors to the European Union’s common-domicile rule (“Rome II” Regulation 864/2007, art. 4(2), 2007 J.O. (L 199/40) (EC)) can be found in a number of earlier European statutes. See Flexibility, supra note 18, at 366–67; Casebook, supra note 18, at 1143.

  24. 24.

    See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (still cited by Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604 (2005)).

  25. 25.

    Ghaleb Nassar Al-Bihani v. Barack Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). See also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715, 720 (2004) (even when a statute – in this case the Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1350) – refers to the “law of nations,” this is but a “modest” incorporation of international law, limited in the main to offenses recognized in 1789). But see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (“federal [subject matter] jurisdiction over cases involving international law is clear” (in this case, however, the federal Alien Tort Statute expressly referred to the law of nations)); Nersessian, supra note 20, at 1654 n.23 (“international law is federal law”). In view of the cases cited above, both of the foregoing assertions overstate. In the view of critics, the “‘idea that law must emanate from the power of a sovereign state’ … neglects the fact that transnational commercial contracts, for example, are usually governed by supranational customary law, the law merchant …” Berman, supra note 22, at 43 (citing Friedrich K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the New Law Merchant, 28 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 487, 490, 493 et seq. (1995). But see the case law cited above and Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1153 (2012).

  26. 26.

    Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 1491 (2008).

  27. 27.

    It must be remembered that in more than half of American states, judges are not civil servants, but are elected and must stand for re-election or confirmation. See Hay, supra note 1, at 59 (no. 117A).

  28. 28.

    The Kansas blocking statute already expressly extends to choice-of-law clauses. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5104 (West 2012). For further discussion, see infra note 104.

  29. 29.

    Both the Uniform Commercial Code (§ 1-301)(1) and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (§ 187(2)) require that the chosen law bear a reasonable relation to the transaction, with the Restatement section also contemplating another “reasonable basis.” An attempt to revise the UCC to permit the choice of an unrelated law in international transactions was abandoned in 2007.

  30. 30.

    For a survey, see Peter Hay, Forum-Selection and Choice-of-Law Clauses in American Conflicts Law, in Gedächtnisschrift für Michael Gruson [Legal Essays in Memory of Michael Gruson] 195 (Theodor Baums and Stephan Hutter, eds. 2009).

  31. 31.

    In contrast to European conflicts law (see, e.g., “Rome I” Regulation 593/2008, art. 9, 2008 O.J. (L 177/6) (EC) (Contractual Obligations); “Rome II” Regulation, supra note 23, at art. 16 (Non-Contractual Obligations)), American cases and commentators do not use the concept of (overriding) mandatory norms. Nonetheless, many cases can be explained on that basis. A good example is Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964) (with both California, the place of making and performance of the contract, and Oregon, the domicile of the defendant, favoring a pacta sunt servanda-policy, Oregon law, allowing trustees of people declared incompetent to avoid contracts, prevailed). A mandatory norm of forum law expresses an overriding local public policy that obviates any further inquiry into what law might (otherwise) apply. The traditional “public policy” exception provides a corrective mechanism after a choice of law has been made and the result proved unpalatable. See Peter Hay, Comments on Public Policy in Current American Conflicts Law, in Die richtige Ordnung– Festschrift für Kropholler [The Right Order – Festschrift for Kropholler] 89, 100–02 (Dietmar Baetge et al., eds. 2008).

  32. 32.

    See, e.g., supra note 28.

  33. 33.

    See Leary v. Gledhill, 84 A.2d 725 (N.J.1951); Sonnesen v. Pan.Transp. Co., 82 N.E.2d 569, 571 (N.Y. 1948); Pa. Life Ins. Co. v. Simoni, 641 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Iowa 2002) (a recent statement of the identity presumption). For a recent affirmation of the doctrine in Scotland, see Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v. Davidson, 2010 S.L.T. 92 at ¶ 17 (Court of Session, Outer House, 2009).

  34. 34.

    Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956) illustrates both points: while, in a prior case (Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1955)), the court had taken judicial notice of English law, it would be an “abuse of discretion” to do so, in the case of foreign law as unknown and perhaps different from American law as that of Saudi Arabia, without proof by the party relying on it. Likewise, without proof by the parties that Saudi Arabia was “uncivilized,” the court was not prepared to presume this to be the case. See Reynolds, supra note 17. For the role of presumptions in the post common-law era, see Edwin P. Carpenter, Presumptions as to Foreign Law: How They Are Affected by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, 10 Washburn L.J. 296 (1970–71).

  35. 35.

    Infra notes 66 and 51 et seq., respectively.

  36. 36.

    See, e.g., Ramsey Cnty.v. Yee Lee, 770 N.W.2d 572, 577 (Minn. Ct.App. 2009); Haltom v. Haltom, 2012 Neb.App.LEXIS 102, 2012 WL 1537839 (Neb.Ct.App. 2012).

  37. 37.

    Illinois seems to adhere to the common law fact approach, while Iowa follows a mixed approach. An Illinois appellate court stated as recently as 2002 that “in Illinois, the laws of foreign countries must be pled and proven as any other fact.” Bianchi v. Savino Del Bene Int’l Freight Forwarders, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 684, 695 (Ill.App. Ct. 2002). The Iowa Supreme Court noted that, while foreign statutory law may be judicially noticed, foreign decisional law must be pled and proved, i.e. “introduc[ed] into evidence.” Pa. Life Ins. Co. v. Simoni, 641 N.W.2d 807, 810–11 (Iowa 2002).

  38. 38.

    See, e.g., Roberts v. Locke, 304 P.3d 116, 121 (Wyo. 2013) (party to furnish texts of foreign statutes, if necessary in English translation, and to prove decisional law by means of presenting the books containing the decisions or by parol evidence).

  39. 39.

    But see infra note 86.

  40. 40.

    See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (“Pertamina”), 313 F.3d 70, 92 (2d Cir. 2002) (even foreign ministry’s amicus brief was only “entitled to substantial deference, but would not be taken as conclusive evidence”).

  41. 41.

    Philip D. Stacey, Foreign Law: Rule 44.1, Bodum USA v. La Cafetiere, and the Challenge of Determining Foreign Law, 6 Seventh Circuit Rev. 472, 494 (2011), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v6-2/stacey.pdf. See also Michael L. Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 Yale J. Int’l L. 81 (1994). Of course, the same can be true in reverse as well, for instance, when a civil law court concludes that reciprocity in judgment recognition is not assured because the common law jurisdiction has no statute to that effect, but only case law. For an example of the latter, see the 1909 decision of the German Reichsgericht: RGZ 70, 434 (1909).

  42. 42.

    Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., concurring).

  43. 43.

    Id. For further detail, see infra at notes 75–78. For discussion of the decision, see Stacey, supra note 41; Frederick Gaston Hall, Note, Not Everything is as Easy as a French Press: The Dangerous Reasoning of the Seventh Circuit on Proof of Foreign Law and a Possible Solution, 43 Geo. J. Int’l L. 1457 (2012). For the view that courts need not undertake an independent investigation, see Baker v. Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., 358 F. App’x 476 (4th Cir. 2009). It is probably true that the Federal Rule (infra section IV(B)) does not require the court to undertake an independent investigation. The Rule establishes no “hierarchy” (see Bodum, 621 F.3d at 638 (Wood, J. concurring)), but gives courts “substantial discretion” (see In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F.Supp.2d 522, 561 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)). Hence, it does not require one form of evidence or method of procuring it or another. By like token, it does not preclude what Judge Posner advocates in Bodum. See also infra note 76. For a view, not representative of the majority approach, that a court may have an obligation to determine the content of foreign law on its own, see Aurora Bewicke, The Court’s Duty to Conduct Independent Research Into Chinese Law: A Look At Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 And Beyond, 1 Chinese L.& Pol’y Rev. 97 (2005). For the view that the trial court may not conduct its own research, because inconsistent with the adversarial system, see Bianchi v. Savino Del Bene Int’l Freight Forwarders, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 684, 698–99 (Ill.App. Ct. 2002).

  44. 44.

    See Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 887, 932–933 (2011). With respect to court-appointed experts, see also id. at 927 et seq.; infra note 86.

  45. 45.

    For Germany, see Reinhold Geimer, Internationales Prozessrecht [International Civil Procedure] no. 2577 et seq. (6th ed. 2009); Reinhold Geimer, Zöller –Zivilprozessordnung [Civil Procedure] § 293, at no. 14 et seq. (Reinhold Geimer, et al. eds., 30th ed. 2014). Even here, the parties can be expected to assist the court even though they do not carry a “burden of proof” with attendant negative consequences for not meeting it. Id. at no. 2588 and § 293 no. 16, respectively.

  46. 46.

    The Memorandum of Understanding can be found at http://www.lawlink.nws.gov.au/practice_notes/nswes_pc.nfs/pages/538. For brief description, see J. J. Spigelman, Proof of Foreign Law by Reference to the Foreign Court, 127 L.Q.R. 208, 215 (2011).The text of the Memorandum does not require “the litigants’ consent,” as Matthew J. Wilson suggests: supra note 13, at 1137. The memorandum establishes a mechanism for the courts to inform themselves, once the parties have put the applicability of foreign law in issue. See supra at notes 10–17.

  47. 47.

    Spigelman, supra note 46, at 216. This issue has also arisen under the American Interstate Uniform Certification of Law Act, with state court decisions taking conflicting positions. See id.at 214 n.46.

  48. 48.

    See Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, 9 U.L.A. 399 (1951) (withdrawn 1966), Commissioners’ Prefatory Note, at 399–400. Section 1 of the Uniform Act, id. at 401, provided, “Every court of this state shall take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United States.”

  49. 49.

    For such a provision in current law, see, e.g., Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10–501 (West 1974) (“Every court of this State shall take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory, and other jurisdiction of the United States, and of every other jurisdiction having a system of law based on the common law of England.”).

  50. 50.

    See supra note 8. A 1942 New Jersey statutory formulation makes this very clear: “Whenever … law of any State … is pleaded in an action …, the court shall take judicial notice thereof. In the absence of such pleading, it shall be presumed that the common law of such State … is the same as the common law as interpreted by the courts of this State.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2:98-28 (1942). See also Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1021.

  51. 51.

    See Uniform Act, supra note 48, §§ 2–3. For a (not very helpful) definition of “judicial notice,” see City of Aztec v. Gurule, 228 P.3d 477, 480 (N.M. 2010).

  52. 52.

    So-called “uniform acts” are proposed for country-wide adoption by The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws [http://www.uniformlaws.org/], but are adopted as individual statutes, with or without changes, by participating states. Interpretation and application of a uniform act by the various individual state supreme courts may therefore diverge. See Hay, supra note 1 at 9 (no. 18).

  53. 53.

    Supra note 48.

  54. 54.

    An insufficient statement of the applicable law could be a ground for dismissal. See, e.g., Int’l Film Distribution Establishment v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 155 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1956).

  55. 55.

    See Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, 13 U.L.A. 459 (1980) (withdrawn in 1977), Commissioners’ Comments to § 4.01, at 495–96. On pleading as the “passive approach” for the court’s determination, see also Shaheeza Lalani, Establishing the Content of Foreign Law: A Comparative Study, 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 75 (2013). But see supra note 37 for Illinois and Iowa.

  56. 56.

    Commissioners’ Comment, supra note 55. The rule is the same in federal courts. See, e.g., DP Aviation v. Smiths Indus. Aerospace & Def. Sys.Ltd., 268 F.3d 829, 846 (9th Cir. 2001).

  57. 57.

    Conn. Gen. Stat, § 52–164 (2013).

  58. 58.

    Reardon v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Darien, 2012 Conn. Super.LEXIS 523, at *16, 2012 WL 802121, at *4 (Conn. Super.Ct. 2012). See also Pagliaro v. Jones, 817 A.2d 756 (Conn. App. 2003); Paramount Pictures, supra note 54.

  59. 59.

    N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4511(b) (Consol. 2013). See Butler v. Stagecoach Grp., PLC, 900 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).

  60. 60.

    Tex. R. Evid. 203. See also supra note 37.

  61. 61.

    See, e.g.,PennWell Corp. v. Ken Assocs., 123 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App. 2003), reh’g denied, 2004 Tex. LEXIS 836 (Tex. Sept. 10, 2004) (notice was proper, but evidence was sufficient for only one of two issues of foreign law; even though the court could have conducted its own research, it applied Texas law to the foreign law issue for lack of sufficient evidence from the propounding party). See also San Pedro Impulsora De Inmuebles Especiales, S.A. de C.V. v. Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d 27, 35 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).

  62. 62.

    The Appendix provides information about state law on a state-by-state basis.

  63. 63.

    See supra notes 2–3.

  64. 64.

    Supra note 7.

  65. 65.

    Supra note 20. For further discussion, see infra note 102 et seq.

  66. 66.

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1.

  67. 67.

    Decisions differ as to how late a party may still give notice. The Ninth Circuit has permitted notice to be given after entry of a summary judgment when the issue related to attorneys’ fees, but not when the issue concerned prejudgment interest. Compare APL Co. Pte.Ltd. v. UK Aerosols Ltd., 582 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2009) with DP Aviation v. Smiths Indus. Aerospace & Def. Sys. Ltd., 268 F.3d 829, 849 (9th Cir. 2001), both critically noted by Mark T. Cramer, Conquering Legal Xenophobia: Tips for Presenting and Proving the Laws of Foreign Countries in Federal Courts, 1 Bloomberg Law Reports – Litigation No. 1 (2011). A suggested rule-of-thumb may be to say that notice of intent to invoke foreign law must be raised when the issue first arises (e.g., attorneys’ fees after judgment has been recovered), although opinions may differ on when the issue “first arises,” could have been expected to be raised, or becomes relevant. See Cramer, supra. Alternative pleading of the choice-of-law issue satisfies the notice requirement of Fed. R Civ. P. 44.1. Rationis Enters. Inc. of Pan.v. Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co., 426 F.3d 580 (2d Cir. 2005). For another liberal view of the notice requirement, see In re Griffin Trading Co., 683 F.3d 819 (7th Cir.), reh’g denied, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17019 (2012) (numerous and known foreign contacts were enough to suggest implication of foreign law), cited with approval in SEC v. Jackson, 908 F.Supp.2d 834, 858 n.15 (S.D. Tex. 2012).

    An unusual approach was taken in Priyanto v. M/S Amsterdam, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40873 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Neither party had given notice of foreign law, but foreign law issues were raised in a motion for partial summary judgment. The court noted the presumption that when foreign law is not raised, parties are taken to have waived their right to application of any law but forum law. Id. at 2057. See also supra note 8. When a party moving for summary judgment has not sustained its burden, the litigation should ordinarily be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Ibid. But under what law? The obvious answer, in light of the foregoing, would have been under forum law. However, the court declined to resolve the issue “until and unless the lawyers do their jobs.” Id. at 2058. It dismissed the motion without prejudice, thereby affording the moving party (and its opponent) the opportunity to comply with Rule 44.1. See also In re Tyson, 433 B.R. 68, 78–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (on appeal from bankruptcy court, reviewed de novo conclusions concerning English law, as well as submissions of the parties on appeal, when the parties had made no prior submissions nor offered information on applicable foreign law).

  68. 68.

    Stephen L. Sass, Foreign Law in Federal Courts, 29 Am. J. Comp. L. 97, 98 (1981), as quoted by Roger M. Michalski, Pleading and Proving Foreign Law in the Age of Plausibility Pleading, 59 Buff. L. Rev. 1207, 1211 n.20 (2011). For an extensive bibliography, see id.at 1208 n.7. For earlier comment, see also Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 613 (1967); Zatjay, supra note 9, at 197–201; Wolfgang Lauterbach, Diskussion, 10 Materialien zum ausländischen und internationalen Privatrecht 214 (1968) (foreign law as “a procedural tertium genus,” author’s translation); John G. Sparkling & George R. Lanyi, Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts,19 Stan. J. Int’l L. 3 (1983); John R. Brown, 44.1 Ways to Prove Foreign Law, 9 Tul.Mar.L.J. 179 (1984).

  69. 69.

    Sparkling & Lanyi, supra note 68, at 63. With regard to state law practice, they cite four California decisions that arrived at inconsistent conclusions as to whether Americans could inherit under German law for purposes of the requirement of reciprocity under California law. Id. at n.376. The decisions are reviewed and analyzed in an Oregon Supreme Court decision – In re Estate of Krachler, 263 P.2d 769 (Or. 1953) – which states that, apparently, California superior courts can “independently” rule with respect to these issues, id. at 472–73 and 780, respectively, so that the binding effect of California Supreme Court decisions (in the cases cited) perhaps was not in issue.

  70. 70.

    Supra at Section II. See also Committee on International Commercial Dispute Resolution, Proof of Foreign Law after Four Decades with Rule 44.1 FRCP and CPLR 4511, 61 The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 49 (2006); Cramer, supra note 67; Charles R. Richey & Jerry E. Smith, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 44.1, Determining Foreign Law, in 9 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 44.1 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2013).

  71. 71.

    See In re Petrol Shipping Corp., 37 F.R.D. 437 (1965), aff’d, 360 F.2d 103, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Hornbook, supranote 9, at 119–21. For the narrow definition of “judicial notice” in this context, see supra note 51.

  72. 72.

    Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).

  73. 73.

    See supra Section II.

  74. 74.

    Jinro Am. Inc. v. Secure Invs., Inc., 266 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2001); Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2446 (3d ed. 2011). For an earlier statement, see Milton Pollack, Proof of Foreign Law, 26 Am. J. Comp. L. 470, 471 (1978).

  75. 75.

    Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2010).

  76. 76.

    Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto Culver Co., 586 F.3d 487, 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3287 (2010).

  77. 77.

    Stacey, supra note 41, at 501. Circuit Judge Wood expressed the same view in her separate concurring opinion in Bodum, 621 F.3d at 639.

  78. 78.

    Bodum, id. (Wood, J. concurring). Stacey, supra note 41, at 500 n.168, also points to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 in support of his criticism. That Rule mandates construction and administration of the Federal Rules in a manner designed to achieve their underlying purpose, namely, to bring about a “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of disputes.” “[R]elying nearly exclusively on written sources … [may not] lead to accurate and consistent decisions in foreign law cases.” Stacey at 501. It may be too easy to say “it is not necessary for courts to master foreign law. In this area of global commerce, it is not incredibly difficult for federal courts to apply foreign law. In fact, it is much easier now than ever before given the fact of expert witnesses as well as burgeoning print and electronic materials.” Wilson, supra note 44, at 894. The availability of (party-designated) expert witnesses does not solve all problems and the availability of print and electronic materials does not automatically make them understandable from an American perspective. See supra note 41. With respect to the possible use of special masters, see infra note 85.

  79. 79.

    Jinro Am., Inc. v. Secure Invs., Inc., 266 F.3d 993, 1001–09 (9th Cir. 2001). This decision was followed in United States v. Boyajian, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116492, at *44, 2013 WL 4189649, at *15 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (expert unqualified to comment on Vietnamese culture).

  80. 80.

    Yeazel v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36299, at *26 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (expert unqualified to give opinion on Chinese law).

  81. 81.

    See supra note 43.

  82. 82.

    See, e.g., Banco de Credito Industrial, S.A. v. Tesoreria General de la Seguridad Social de España, 990 F.2d 827, 838 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994); Inmobilaria Axial, S.A. de C.V. v. Robles Int’l Servs., Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74042, at *10–11, 2010 WL 2900991, at * 3–4 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 2010).

  83. 83.

    Universe Sales Co., Ltd. v. Silver Castle, Ltd., 182 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999).

  84. 84.

    Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 292 F.3d 1209, 1216 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Here, we have reviewed the Philippine statute at issue and have conducted our own research into Philippine law. Having considered these sources, we are satisfied that …”). For the main proposition (i.e., rejection of unrebutted expert conclusions on the basis of the court’s independent research), see Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 917 (2000).

  85. 85.

    730 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2013). The case involved an appeal from an adverse decision of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), i.e. not a matter to which Rule 44.1 technically applies, and the court did not refer to the Rule. However, as in Paszcoguin, supra note 84 (whether the use of marihuana constituted a criminal offense under foreign law), the court undertook the same de novo review of the question of foreign law as under the Rule, noting (as a single distinguishing feature) that it owed no (or less) deference to the administrative agency (the DNS) than it would to a lower court, citing to its own decision in Bustamenta-Barrera v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2006). The court undertook a detailed analysis of the civil code of Tamaulipas, Mexico, considered Library of Congress reports on legitimacy law of Tamaulipas and of Mexican paternity law in general, and assigned controlling importance to the effect under Mexican law – for instance, for purposes of inheritance – of acknowledgment and registration of a child’s birth in the official local register in Mexico. The “filial rights” under Mexican law were decisive. “[I]t is the substance that matters, not the legal label. … [T]here is no legal or logical basis for a holding that a mere textual distinction between ‘acknowledgment’ and ‘legitimation’ in the foreign law should be controlling, when the rights granted to the children are the same. … No immigration purpose is advanced through such a distinction.” Saldana Iracheta, 730 F.3d at 426.

  86. 86.

    See Sparkling & Lanyi, supra note 68, at 55–57. Federal Rule of Evidence 706 provides the authority for such appointments. But see Douglas H. Ginsburg, Appellate Courts and Independent Experts, 60 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 303, 314 (2010) (considering appointment of independent experts by the court to be “antithetical to the adversary process of our common law legal system”).

  87. 87.

    See Sparkling & Lanyi, supra note 68, at 73–75. A classic example is Corporacion Salvaderena de Calzado, S.A. v. Injection Footwear Corp., 533 F.Supp. 290 (S.D.Fla. 1982), noting, however, that the appointment of special masters is an exceptional practice. Id. at 293. In this case, the court followed the special master’s recommendation, that a judgment of El Salvador be denied recognition because of lack of reciprocity on the part of that country. The authority for the appointment of special masters is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, which the U.S. Supreme Court defined in the leading decision of La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, reh’g denied, 352 U.S. 1019 (1957), emphasizing that the master is not to replace the court. 352 U.S. at 256. Rule 53 was revised and liberalized in 2003, no longer requiring exceptional circumstances to justify the appointment of a special master to perform any function if the parties consent. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 347 (2008). For historical discussion, see Linda J. Silberman, Masters and Magistrates, Parts I and II, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1071 and 1297, respectively (1975). For discussion of the La Buy decision, see Silberman II at 1354. For a very early decision using a special master, see Heiberg v. Hasler, 45 F.Supp. 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1942) (French workers’ compensation law), decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in La Buy, and before the revision of Rule 53.

  88. 88.

    See, e.g., Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters: Administrative Agencies for the Courts, 2 Wid. L. Symp. J. 235 (1997). For the view of a state court, that involvement in the determination of foreign law by the court itself (and, by definition, of experts or masters appointed by it) is incompatible with the American adversarial system of litigation, see Bianchi v. Savino Del Bene Int’l Freight Forwarders, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 684, 698–99 (Ill.App. Ct. 2002). It is important to note, however, that Illinois still follows the fact approach. See supra note 22.

  89. 89.

    Supra note 32.

  90. 90.

    Supra notes 2–3, 7.

  91. 91.

    But see supranote 19.

  92. 92.

    See, e.g., Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 12 (2d Cir. 1998); Nat’l Oil Well Maint. Co. v. Fortune Oil & Gas Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8896, 2005 WL 1123735 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). See also Abdelhamid v. Altria Grp., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33938, 2007 WL 1346657 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Refco Inc. Secs. Litig., 892 F.Supp.2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (true conflict with regard to Bermuda law; court considered parties’ filings, testimony of Bermuda law experts, and reviewed Bermuda case law).

  93. 93.

    E.g., Darby v. Societe des Hotels Meridien, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9744, 1999 WL 459816 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

  94. 94.

    See, e.g., Eli Lilly do BrasilLTDA v. Fed. Express Corp., 502 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007) (deciding an international shipping contract case under federal common law, the court determined that New York had a greater interest than Brazil in the application of its law because the latter’s validation principle would better comport with party expectations).

  95. 95.

    For discussion of the forum non conveniens doctrine, see Hornbook, supra note 9, at §§ 11.8–11.13.

  96. 96.

    757 F.Supp.2d 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).See also Langsam v. Vallarta Gardens, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52597, 2009 WL 8631353 (S.D.NY. 2009) (Mexican law); In re Air Crash near Peixoto de Azeveda, Brazil, 574 F.Supp.2d 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Brazilian law); BlackRock, Inc. v. Schroders PLC, 2007 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 39279, 2007 WL 1573933 (S.D.NY. 2007) (Brazilian law). For true conflict cases in which the court undertook a foreign-law analysis, see also Pegasus Aviation IV, Inc. v. Aerolineas Austral Chile, S.A., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39319, 2012 WL 967301 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Argentine law).

  97. 97.

    Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), reh’g denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).

  98. 98.

    See, e.g., Yao-Wen Chang v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 599 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2010). For discussion, see Hornbook, supranote 9, at § 11.10.

  99. 99.

    Peter Hay, supra note 31, at 102–03. See also Peter Hay, Favoring Local Interests, in Festschrift von Hoffmann 634, 642–45 (Herbert Kronke and Karsten Thorn, eds. 2011); Peter Hay, Reviewing Foreign Judgments in American Practice – Conclusiveness, Public Policy, and révision au fond, in Festschrift für Kaissis 365 (Reinhold Geimer & Rolf A. Schütze, eds. 2012).

  100. 100.

    Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257, at *15,1999 WL 673347, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 12 (2d Cir. 1998)) (no violation found), distinguished in Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 143–45 (2d Cir. 2010). For another decision finding no violation of forum public policy, see Wultz v. Bank of China, Ltd., 811 F.Supp.2d 841, 852–853 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

  101. 101.

    389 Fed.App’x38 (2d Cir. 2010). For an American interstate decision that mixes together interest analysis for choice of law, mandatory norms of forum law, and public policy, see Brenner v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 44 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2006), discussed in Hay, supra note 31, at 100–02.

  102. 102.

    Supra note 20.

  103. 103.

    28 U.S.C.S. § 4102 (Lexis 2010). For critical discussion, see Peter Hay, Favoring Local Interests, in Festschrift von Hoffmann 634, 642–46 (Kronke and Thorn, eds. 2011).

  104. 104.

    See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:6001(b) (2013) (courts and others “shall not enforce a foreign law if doing so would violate a right guaranteed by the constitution of this state or of the United States”). The statutory provision adopts the model language provided by the initiative “American Laws for American Courts” (ALMAC), drafted by the American Public Policy Alliance. See its website at http://publicpolicyalliance.org/. Language similar to the above has been introduced in many state legislatures (see Nersessian, supra note 20), in several of them multiple times. Statutes similar to Louisiana’s, quoted above, are now in force in Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12–3103 (LexisNexis 2013)), Kansas (Kan.Stat. Ann. § 60-5103-5115 (2012)), and Tennessee (Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-15-102 (2013)) and, in the form of a state constitutional amendment, in Alabama (2014).

    An Oklahoma state constitutional amendment aimed to bar courts from considering or applying any Sharia-based law; it was held to be unconstitutional. Supra note 21. See Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First Amendment Analysis of Anti-Sharia Initiatives, 10 First Amend. L. Rev. 363 (2012). One state, however, has adopted such a law but, by framing it more generally, has attempted to shield it against attack on constitutional grounds: “No court … may enforce any provisions of any religious code.” S.D. Codified Laws § 19-8-7 (2012). A Louisiana statutory provision is more limited: La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:705 concerning registration of securities requires information in its Sec. C(1)(p) on whether the “security is subject to, bound by or otherwise controlled by a religious law, ethic, or practice” and, if so, then sets out specific information that must be furnished.

  105. 105.

    Spencer A. Gard, Robert C. Casad & Lumen N. Mulligan, Annotation, 5 Kan. Law &Prac.Code of Civ. Proc. Anno. § 60-5101 (5th ed. 2013), emphasis added. As the authors mention, the Kansas statute also extends expressly to contractual choice-of-law clauses. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5104 (2012). They also note that such sweeping interpretation and application will be well-nigh impossible in practice when, for instance, Kansas law expressly refers to the law “of the country in which [a marriage] was contracted” to determine its validity. Gard, et al. at 3. Apparently anticipating a potentially negative impact of the statute on Kansas (interstate and international) business interests, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5108 exempts corporate entities from this law. The “exemption … seems rife for an equal protection challenge.” Ibid. Some other states’ laws – for instance, the Alabama constitutional amendment (preceding note) contain similar exemptions.

  106. 106.

    States in which bills to this effect were introduced, but so far failed to legislative committees or chambers, include Arizona, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. In Idaho, the state legislature passed a resolution requesting the U.S. Congress to prohibit the use of foreign law in U.S. courts. 2010 Idaho Sess. Laws 972, H.R.C. 44 (2010).

  107. 107.

    Such statutes would, of course, require disregard of any party choice of foreign law. See supra at notes 29–31. Complete exclusion of foreign law might also raise constitutional problems if the consequence is application of forum law in cases not related to the forum. See Hornbook, supra note 9, at § 3.20–3.23, 3.26–3.29. A dismissal for forum non conveniens, in turn, may not serve the interests of a local plaintiff when jurisdiction exists but contacts are insufficient for the application of local law.

  108. 108.

    Supra note 7.

  109. 109.

    Supra note 68.

  110. 110.

    See supra notes 43, 77.

  111. 111.

    See supra note 46 for the New York – New South Wales Agreement. A number of ways have been suggested to facilitate access to reliable information about the content of foreign law, among them the adoption of a “transnational certification” procedure or the establishment of a “Foreign Law Institute” or “Comparative Law Center”. Matthew J. Wilson, supra note 13, at 1135, 1142. It seems unlikely that a certification procedure can and will be established, for the reasons noted earlier. Institutes and research centers now exist at a number of universities, but there is no tradition on the part of the courts of consulting them, for instance in ways that European institutes assist courts. Similarly in favor of finding new ways for cooperation: Louise Ellen Teitz, supra note 16, at 1101, who also discusses Hague Conference mechanisms.

  112. 112.

    Supra note 108. For blocking statutes, see supra note 102 et seq. Given the homeward trend in some American conflicts law, federal courts in such a state also need to apply forum law.

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  1. Emory University School of Law, Atlanta, GA, 30322-2770, USA

    Peter Hay (Professor)

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    Yuko Nishitani

Appendix: Determining the Content of Foreign Law in State Courts

Appendix: Determining the Content of Foreign Law in State Courts

The following table provides information on the law and procedures applicable in the states of the United States for determining the content of foreign law. The uniform federal procedural rules are described in the text. In most civil cases in both federal and state courts, it is the law of the individual state that determines whether, as a matter of conflicts law, foreign law might be applicable in the first place.

The table contains references to the applicable state laws, as well as citations to recent relevant decisional law in each state. Almost all states have a notice requirement, so the table contains no specific mention of this. If a judicial decision is mentioned in the main text, the relevant footnote is cited. Note that some of the cases concern sister-state and not-foreign country law; however, they are phrased so broadly as to encompass the latter. In some cases, the decisions are quite old and their continued validity is therefore uncertain.

Jurisdiction

Can court determine foreign law sua sponte?

Law or fact

Based on U.L.A.

Parallels F.R.C.P.44.1

Statute(s)

Is there a blocking statute?

Recent relevant judicial decisions

Alabama

No

Law

No

Yes

Ala. R. Civ. P. 44.1

Yes

Brotherhood’s Relief & Compensation Fund v. Rafferty, 91 So. 3d 693 (Ala. 2011) (sister-state law).

Alaska

Yes

Law

No

No

Alaska R. Evid. 202

No

No recent info.

Arizona

Yes

Law

No

Yes

Az. R. Civ. P. 44.1

Yes

Kadota v. Hosogai, 608 P.2d 68 (Ariz. 1980).

Arkansas

No

Law

No

Yes

Ark. R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

Greene v. State, 977 S.W.2d 192 (Ark. 1998).

California

Yes

Lawa

No

No

Cal. Evid. Code § 450et seq. (West 2013)b

No

In re Marriage of Nurie, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).

Colorado

No recent info.

Law

Yes

Yes

Colo. R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

No recent info.

Connecticut

Yes

Law

Yes

Yes

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-163a (West 2013), Conn. Evid. Code § 2-2

No

Ritcher v. Childers, 478 A.2d 613 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984).

Delaware

No

Law

No

Yes

Del. R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

Vichi v. Koninklijke PhilipsElecs. N.V., 62 A.3d 26 (Del. Ch. 2012); Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochem. Co., Inc., 866 A.2d 1 (Del. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 936 (Oct. 11, 2005).

Del. R. Evid. 202(e)

District of Columbia

No

Law

No

Yes

D.C. R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63 (D.C. 2003).

Florida

Yesc

Law

Yes

No

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.202 (4)

Yes

Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A. v. De Brenes, 625 So.2d 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Mills v. Barker, 664 So.2d 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).

Georgia

No

Law

No

Yes

Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-43 (West 2013)

No

Kensington Partners, LLC v. Beal Bank Nevada, 715 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (sister-state law).

Guam

No recent info.

Law

No

Yes

Guam R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

No recent info.

Hawaii

No

Law

No

Yes

Haw. R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d 1209 (Haw. 1998).

Haw. R. Evid. 202

Idaho

No

Law

No

No

Idaho R. Civ. P. 44(d)

No

Barrett v. Barrett, 232 P.3d 799 (Idaho 2010).

Illinois

No

Hybridd

Yes

No

735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-1007 (West 2013)

No

Bianchi v. Savino Del Bene Int’l Freight Forwarders, 329 Ill. App. 3d 908 (Ill. Ct. App. 2002).e

Indiana

No

Factd

Yes

Yes

In. St. Trial P. R. 44.1

No

Suyemasa v. Myers, 420 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).

Ind. Code § 34-38-4 et seq.

Iowa

No

Factd

No

No

Iowa Code §§ 622.59, 622.61

No

Doan Thi Hoang Anh v. Nelson, 245 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1976).

Kansas

No

Law

No

No

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5101 et seq. (West 2012)

Yes

No recent info.

Kentucky

No recent information.

Louisiana

Yes

Law

No

No

La. Code. Evid. Ann. art. 202 (2012)

Yes

Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So.2d 731 (La. Ct. App. 2008).

Maine

No

Law

Yes

Yes

Me. R. Civ. P. 44A

No

In re Estate of Wright, 637 A.2d 106 (Me. 1994).

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 401 et seq. (2013)

Maryland

Yes

Law

Yes

No

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-501 et seq. (West 2013)

No

Moustafa v. Moustafa, 888 A.2d 1230 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).

Massachusetts

Yes

Law

No

Yes

Mass. Gen Laws Ann.ch. 233, § 70 (West 2013)

No

Berman v. Alexander, 782 N.E.2d 14 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).

Mass. R. Civ. P. 44.1

Michigan

Yes

Law

No

Yes

Mich. R. Evid. 202

No

In re Estate of Crane, 2010 WL 935651, 2010 Mich. App. LEXIS 503 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 600.2114a (West 2013)

Minnesota

No

Law

Yes

No

2013 Minn. Stat. Ann.§§ 599.01, 599.02, 599.08, 599.11 (West)

No

Ramsey Cnty. V. Yee Lee, 770 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).f

Mississippi

Yes

Law

No

No

Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-149 (West 2013)

No

Kountouris v. Varvaris, 476 So.2d 599 (Miss. 1985); Matter of Estate of Varvaris, 528 So.2d 800 (Miss. 1988).

Missouri

No

Law

Yes

No

Mo. Ann. Stat.§ 490.120 (West 2013)

No

James v. James, 45 S.W.3d 458 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).

Montana

Yes

Law

Yes

Yes

Mont. R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

No recent info.

Mont. R. Evid. 202(b)(8)

Nebraska

No

Law

Yes

No

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-12, 101 et seq. (2012)

No

Haltom v. Haltom, 2012 WL 1537839, 2012 Neb. App. LEXIS 102 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012).f

Nevada

Yes

Law

No

Yes

Nev. R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

Dahya v. Second Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cnty.of Washoe, 19 P.3d 239 (Nev. 2001).

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 47.140 et seq. (West 2012)

New Hampshire

Yes

Law

No

No

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 519:32 (2013)

No

Brentwood Volunteer Fireman’s Ass’n v. Musso, 986 A.2d 588 (N.H. 2009).

N.H. R. Evid. 201

New Jersey

Yes

Law

No

No

N.J. R. Evid. 201

No

Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 168 A.2d 851 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1961).

New Mexico

No

Law

No

Yes

N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-044

No

Bayer v. Bayer, 800 P.2d 216 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).

New York

Yes

Law

No

No

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3016, 4511 (McKinney 2013)

No

Ponnambalam v. Ponnambalam, 35 A.D.3d 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Warin v. Wildenstein & Co., Inc., 746 N.Y.S.2d 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).

North Carolina

Yes

Law

No

Yes

N.C. R. Civ. P. 44.1

Yes

Speedway Motorsports Int’l, Ltd. v. Bronwen Energy Trading, Ltd., 2009 NCBC 3, 2009 NCBC LEXIS 17 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2009), aff’d, 706 S.E.2d 262 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), review denied, 720 S.E.2d 668 (N.C. 2012).

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-4 (2013)

North Dakota

No

Law

No

Yes

N.D. R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

Haggard v. First Nat’l Bank of Mandan, 8 N.W.2d 5 (N.D. 1942).

N.D. Cent. Code. Ann.§ 31-10-04 et seq. (West 2011)

Ohio

No

Law

No

Yes

Ohio R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

EnQuip Techs. Grp. Inc. v. TyconTechnoglassS.R.l, 986 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012); Verma v. Verma, 903 N.E.2d 343 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

Oklahoma

No

Law

Yes

No

12 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2201 et seq. (West 2013)

No

Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1990).g

Oregon

Yes

Law

Yes

No

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 40.060 et seq. (West 2013)

No

Elliott v. Oregon Int’l Mining Co., 654 P.2d 663 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).

Pennsylvania

No

Law

Yes

No

42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 5327 (West 2013)

No

Maya v. Benefit Risk Mgt., 2013 WL 663158 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2013) (Trial Order).

Puerto Rico

No

Law

No

No

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, Ap. IV, Rule 11 (2010)

No

Marrero Reyes v. Garcia Ramirez, 105 D.P.R. 90 (P.R. 1976).

Rhode Island

No

Law

Yes

Yes

R.I. R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

Harodite Indus., Inc. v. Warren Elec. Corp., 24 A.3d 514 (R.I. 2011); Barger v. Pratt & Whitney, 2006 WL 2988458, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 138 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2006).

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann.§ 9-19-3 et seq. (West 2013)

South Carolina

No

Law

Yes

Yes

S.C. R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

No recent info.

S.C. Code Ann. § 19-3-110 (2012)

South Dakota

No

Law

Yes

Yes

S.D. Codified Laws §§ 15-6-44.1, 19-8-1 et seq. (2012)

Yes

Varga v. Woods, 381 N.W.2d 247 (S.D. 1986).

Tennessee

No

Law

Yes

No

Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-15-101 et seq. (West 2013)

Yes

No recent info.

Texas

No

Law

No

No

Tex. R. Evid. 203

No

Gerdes v. Kennamer, 155 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. App. 2004).

Utah

No

Law

No

No

Utah R. Civ. P. 44

No

Lamberth v. Lamberth, 550 P.2d 200 (Utah 1976).

Vermont

No

Law

No

Yes

Vt. R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

Fishbein v. Guerra, 309 A.2d 922 (Vt. 1973) (sister-state law).

Virgin Islands

No

Law

Yes

Yes

V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 4926 (2012)

No

Fabrica de Tejidos La Bellota S.A. v. M/V MAR, 799 F. Supp. 546(V.I. Dist. Ct. 1992).

Virginia

Yes

No recent info.

No

No

Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-386 (West 2013)

No

No recent info.

Washington

No

Law

Yes

Yes

Wa. R. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 9(k), 44.1

No

Mulcahy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 95 P.3d 313 (Wash. 2004).

West Virginia

Yes

Law

No

Yes

W.V. R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

No recent info.

W.V. R. Evid. 202

Wisconsin

No

Law

Yes

No

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 902.02 (West 2013)

No

Griffin v. Mark Travel Corp., 724 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).

Wyoming

No

Law

Yes

Yes

Wyo. R. Civ. P. 44.1

No

Roberts v. Locke, 304 P.3d 116 (Wyo. 2013).h

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-301 et seq. (West 2013)

  1. a See Cal. Evid. Code § 310 (West 2013)
  2. bEspecially see § 452(f)
  3. c See Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 90.204 (1)
  4. d But see supra section III, at 8-9
  5. e See supra notes 37, 43, 88
  6. f See supra note 36
  7. g See supra note 9
  8. h See supra note 38

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Hay, P. (2017). The United States: The Use and Determination of Foreign Law in Civil Litigation in the United States. In: Nishitani, Y. (eds) Treatment of Foreign Law - Dynamics towards Convergence?. Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law, vol 26. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56574-3_19

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