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Convenient Organizational Opportunity

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CEOs and White-Collar Crime

Abstract

CEOs have access to resources that enable white-collar crime in convenient ways. White-collar offenders have access to resources to commit financial crime in convenient ways. Furthermore, they have access to resources to conceal crime as well as to prevent prosecution if they are detected. Resource-based theory postulates that differences in individuals’ opportunities can be explained by the extent of resource access and the ability to combine and exploit resources. A resource is an enabler that is used to satisfy human needs. A resource has utility and limited availability.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Leadership and Organizational Behaviour, BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway

    Petter Gottschalk

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  1. Petter Gottschalk
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Correspondence to Petter Gottschalk .

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Gottschalk, P. (2017). Convenient Organizational Opportunity. In: CEOs and White-Collar Crime. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55935-3_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55935-3_5

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-55934-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-55935-3

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

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