Abstract
This essay will examine the position of those ethicists who interpret the moral act using an intentionalist approach. This approach focusses on the “intention ,” which the intentionalist understands as “what one means by what one is doing,” as the criterion for determining the morality of a human act. This approach is at odds with traditional ways of viewing the role of intention, viz., what one chooses to do, when one acts. These two ways of looking at the moral act have recently been deployed in the case of maternal-fetal conflict, which occurs when the continued presence of the unborn child immediately poses a threat to the mother’s life, and one cannot save both the mother and the unborn. Intentionalists argue that a doctor may directly kill the unborn child, if that is the only way to save the mother’s life, because the doctor’s “intention ” is to save the mother’s life and not to kill the unborn child. I challenge this claim, contending that the traditional approach offers a more realistic assessment of actors and activities in vital conflict situations. The intentionalist methodologies I examine are, in my view, deficient in their attempts to justify a termination of pregnancy in vital conflict situations. There is too little congruence between what is done and what they claim they are doing. I fear that accepting these other methodologies will blur the lines between indirect abortions and therapeutic abortions.
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Notes
- 1.
The principle of double-effect is used in cases where in the process of doing good an evil occurs. The evil can be tolerated in such cases when the following four principles are observed: (1) the action in question is not intrinsically evil or is neutral; (2) one intends only the good effect of the action in question and does not intend the harmful side effects; (3) the evil consequence of the action is not the means by which the good consequence is achieved; (4) the harmful consequences of the action do not exceed the good consequences, or there is a proportionate reason for permitting the evil consequences.
- 2.
Praeter intentionem means “outside the intention.” This refers to the third principle of PDE. Consider the case of a pregnant woman with a cancerous uterus: the cancerous uterus may be removed even though the fetus is not viable. The good consequence is the removal of a pathology; the evil consequence is the foreseen death of the non-viable fetus. The fetus’ death is praeter intentionem since his death is not means by which the mother’s life is saved; rather, it is the removal of the cancerous uterus that saves her. See Aquinas , Summa theologiae (ST), IIa-IIae, q. 64, a. 7.
- 3.
See DS 3258/--(the 1889 decree) which refers to a previous, similar decree, confirmed by the pope (Acta apostolicae sedis 17 [1884] 556); DS 3298/1890a (confirmed by the pope on July 25, 1895).
- 4.
- 5.
ERD n. 45 of the 4th edition states: “Abortion (that is, the directly intended destruction of a viable fetus) is never permitted. Every procedure whose sole immediate effect is the termination of pregnancy before viability is an abortion, which, in the moral context, includes the interval between conception and implantation of the embryo. Catholic health care institutions are not to provide abortion services, even based upon the principle of material cooperation . In this context, Catholic health care institutions need to be concerned about the danger of scandal in any association with abortion providers.”
- 6.
For this information, see “D&C Abortion ” at http://www.choicetolivewith.com.page-46.html (accessed 1 March 2016).
- 7.
For this description, see Pro-Life Action League, “About Abortion ” at http://prolifeaction.org/faq/abortion/php (accessed 1 March 2016).
- 8.
- 9.
Even though Lysaught uses Rhonheimer in her analysis, Rhonheimer himself claims that he does not agree with her position. “I concede,” he writes, that “Lysaught’s general idea about ‘vital conflicts ’ comes from my book; but not the concrete application to this case, and neither her account of what a moral object is and how humans act are morally specified.” He further explains, “Please notice that I have not given any judgment about the Phoenix case […] I distance myself from Lysaught’s analysis in one crucial point. I write: ‘According to my understanding … it is wrong to distinguish the “proximate end” (deliberately chosen by the will) from the “exterior act” as if it were a formal part added to it; rather the object and thus the proximate end is precisely the exterior act, but as a “good understood and ordered by reason.”’ The formal aspect of the object is not something added to the exterior act, but rather included in its rational comprehension and ordering. This is why the object can never be reduced to ‘intention’ as something distinct from the exterior act; the basic intentionality which is part of the object is part of reason’s understanding and ordering of the exterior act. This is the crucial point.” These comments were sent to this author via email by Nicanor Austriaco, who had received them from Rhonheimer as comments on a chapter of former’s doctoral dissertation.
- 10.
Cf. John Paul II, Veritatis splendor [VS], n. 96.
- 11.
- 12.
E.g., “Therefore, by the authority which Christ conferred upon Peter and his Successors, and in communion with the Bishops of the Catholic Church, I confirm that the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral” (EV n. 57).
- 13.
In what follows, I am indebted to Brock (2008).
- 14.
Cf. VS 74. See Brock (2008, p. 5).
- 15.
Brock’s communication to the author, August 4, 2012.
- 16.
See Brock (2008, p. 7). Aquinas spells this out quite clearly in ST Ia-IIae, q. 18, a. 2 ad 1; ST IIa-IIae q. 58, a. 3 ad 3; and Quaestiones disputatae de malo,q. 2, a. 5.
- 17.
See Aquinas , ST Ia-IIae, q. 18, a. 4 ad 3.
- 18.
- 19.
See, for example, Colloquium Organized by Ascension Health (2014).
- 20.
A fear I share with Austriaco (2011, pp. 512–13).
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Guevin, B.M. (2017). Moral Methodology in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts. In: Eberl, J. (eds) Contemporary Controversies in Catholic Bioethics. Philosophy and Medicine(), vol 127. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55766-3_9
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