Nonpublic Producers of Primary and Lower Secondary Education
,
13
In this section, we summarise the national private school policies of the three Scandinavian countries, drawing on the analytical government models from Table 3.1: direct, indirect and disconnected government
. Based on detailed analysis of national policy documents such as legislation, instructions, and guidelines (see Segaard 2015), we aim to identify some central similarities and differences in the distribution and coordination of ‘contracts’ in primary and lower secondary education in Denmark, Sweden and Norway.
The public sector traditionally plays the leading role in education in Norway
, Denmark and Sweden. A common feature is that the great majority of children in primary and lower secondary education
attend a municipal school. There are, however, some variations between the three countries regarding the distribution of children between public and private schools
. According to Eurostat (2012, 33), 95.6 percent of Norwegian school children attend a public school, whereas the corresponding figures for Denmark
and Sweden are 86.5 and 89.4 percent, respectively. Norway thus has a lower share of children in private schools than in either Denmark or Sweden.
The problem with these figures is that official statistics often do not distinguish between different categories of private schools, such as between for-profit and nonprofit schools. As we shall see, this distinction is crucial when education policies in the three countries are compared. In Sweden, private primary and lower secondary schools that receive public funding can be run on a commercial basis. This is not allowed in Norway and Denmark. Private schools in Sweden are basically fully financed by the public sector
, and the schools are not allowed to charge school fees. That is not the case in Denmark and Norway, where private schools are only partly funded by the state. Danish and Norwegian private schools
may thus charge school fees—and are in fact expected to do so. In both countries, it is also required that public funding be used exclusively for educational purposes. Moreover, in Denmark, private schools are by law
required to be run by nonprofit institutions
. It is obviously appealing to be a for-profit operator in the Swedish primary education
system, where schools are fully financed by the public sector, profits can be paid out to owners, and the authorities have in practice no right to examine the operator’s accounts. In other words, Swedish for-profit school owners operate under much freer conditions in economic terms, but are somewhat more restricted in terms of educational content than in either Denmark
or Norway
.
In all three countries, primary and lower secondary schools fall under the jurisdiction of the municipalities, as the municipalities are obliged to offer education to all children in this age group. Nevertheless, private schooling of children in this age group is subject to an approval system at the national level. A state institution is responsible for approving private schools
(the Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training, the Danish Ministry for Children, Education and Gender Equality, and the Swedish Schools Inspectorate). In primary and lower secondary education
, nonpublic actors thus apply for the right to run schools, and a national public-sector body gives (or refuses) them this right. This can be regarded as a ‘service concession’
according to the EU Public Procurement Directive. As mentioned above, this means that the provider is given the right to provide services and runs a real risk in exploiting this right in practice. The argument is that the provider only receives a partial payment from the public-sector body, while the rest is paid by the users, who are free to choose whether they will use this service. Accordingly, we assume that private schools can be said to be outside of the scope of the EU Directive on public procurement.
14
Contracts for private schools with public funding are awarded on the basis of a national authorisation system in all three countries, which ensures that the schools adhere to national regulations of the organisation and educational content. By means of this approval system, we consider national authorities to exercise indirect government
by defining requirements and conditions for approval. Moreover, this approval can be revoked if inspections
show that the schools have not adhered to these requirements and conditions. Accordingly, interaction between the authorities and private service providers is formalised in an agreement, with more or less detailed criteria for approval. This indicates the extent of formality (cf. Table 3.1).
The extent of national control and discretion given to each actor—both the authorities and the provider—vary substantially between the three countries. The focus of the regulations also differs. Danish private schools appear to enjoy more discretion regarding educational content as well as the values on which they are based. A central element of Danish school policy is that educational content should correspond to the basic values of the school, and that potential users must be informed of this. We suppose that the approval of Danish private schools is to a large extent performed on their own terms. This is evident because the regulations emphasise that the schools should be able to define their own teaching content and methods based on their own basic values and distinctive characters. In Norway, and perhaps even more in Sweden, the national authorities set forth detailed standards for education. Private schools must comply with the standards set for public-sector
schools. In other words, we consider national requirements for the content and organisation of teaching to be less strict in Denmark than in Norway
and Sweden. Whereas public-sector schools can be perceived as setting a minimum standard for primary and lower secondary education
, in Denmark
, public-sector schools in Sweden and Norway can be viewed as a template which private schools must follow. The fact that a single act governs both public and private schools in Sweden illustrates this point. In Norway
and Denmark, private schools
that receive public funding are regulated by a separate act.
In order to obtain a diverse educational system, Danish authorities also give private schools
considerable leeway. Danish private schools can reject applicants, even if they have room to admit more pupils. In this way, we believe that a school can cultivate its own distinctive image. The primary and lower secondary school system as a whole can thus become more diverse. In contrast, Swedish and Norwegian private schools generally cannot reject applicants if they have room to admit them. This can be seen as a way to secure free choice for users. In practice, the democratic right of users to free choice can thus undermine distinctive alternatives to public schools
and thereby reduce diversity within welfare services that the authorities in principle aim for. This is because the lack of opportunity to reject pupils also curtails the exercise of discretion on the part of the provider.
Although some differences exist, the users’ right to free choice is a basic entitlement in Norwegian, Swedish and Danish primary and lower secondary education. In light of our analytical framework, this means that the indirect national government is supplemented by a form of disconnected government
, because the market—the users, through their individual choices—takes part in shaping the educational system. However, the circumstances under which users can make an informed choice
vary between the three countries, at least in terms of national regulations
. Danish legislation and regulations, for instance, dictate that schools have a duty to inform users. The content of the information, as well as the channels through which information is conveyed, are fully outlined. Such regulations are largely absent in corresponding Norwegian and Swedish regulations.
Our opinion is that this statutory duty to inform users in Denmark highlights the importance of knowing which options to choose from and the consequences of each choice. Every choice certainly has consequences, especially with respect to the rights and obligations that pupils and their parents agree to accept. Denmark also stands out in this area. Parents of children in Danish private schools
are given formal duties and the responsibility to participate in the running of the schools. A group of parents at a private school in question (called the ‘circle of parents’) is given a formal obligation to supervise the school. More generally, this aspect of what we call collaborative governance
is evident in the Danish system for the supervision of private schools. Not only are the parents involved, but also the school itself can choose to assume an important role by means of self-evaluation. This is done on the basis of a template developed by a school association (a national organisation for private schools of a specific type, such as religious, German minority or Waldorf/Steiner education) and approved by the national Board of Supervision. The inclusion of parents and nonprofit organisations in supervising the schools is a striking example of how collaborative governance entails an aspect of self-regulation within a specific political and institutional framework at the national level (see Sørensen and Torfing 2008, 10). However, as Thøgersen points out in Chap. 5, there is little direct collaboration between nonprofit schools and the municipalities in which they are located. In other words, indirect government
through collaborative governance seems to be limited to the relationship between the private service provider and national public authorities (e.g., through the national system for supervision). The Danish supervision system contrasts sharply with the Swedish system, where it is difficult to detect any form of collaborative governance
. Swedish supervision is centralised and carried out by national authorities, and there is little involvement
by users or parents. Users and parents may be involved in the Norwegian case, but they are not given any formal rights or obligations comparable to the Danish situation.
To conclude, the basic government model for nonpublic actors within primary and lower secondary education
in all three countries appears to be indirect government. There are nevertheless substantial variations with regard to private service providers’ freedom to use their own discretion; therefore, the influence of such providers also varies widely. There are also elements of market-based government, where choices made by users determine the composition of the welfare mix
. In Denmark
, the arrangements for the supervision system also display strong elements of collaborative governance. In this sense, we presume that the government regime can be described as layered. However, the final authority rests with the national authorities who establish the national standards for approval and have the power to revoke this approval.
Nonpublic Producers of Institution-Based Elderly Care
15
In this section, we move on to policies on institution-based elderly care. Again, based on detailed analysis of national policy documents such as legislation, instructions, and guidelines and using the models from Table 3.1, we compare the three countries to show how contracts are awarded and coordinated in Denmark, Sweden and Norway
.
There is a long tradition of
public-sector elderly care in
Scandinavian welfare states
. The practice of elderly care has changed over time, for example, with regard to the balance between home-based and institution-based care. Likewise, attitudes towards the organisation of elderly care are gradually changing as well. For-profit providers of elderly care are no longer a distant possibility, but have become actual practice in many ‘marketised’ Scandinavian municipalities (Meagher and Szebehely 2012). Elderly care is a municipal responsibility, and each municipality decides how this task will be organised and carried out. The municipalities thus play a decisive role in shaping the welfare mix within elderly care (Ascoli and Ranci 2007). A nonpublic actor that wants to run a publicly financed nursing home
is largely reliant on choices
made by the municipality. This contrasts with schools, where municipalities have less influence over the welfare mix.
Unfortunately, comparable data on the welfare mix within elderly care
in Scandinavia are scarce. Nevertheless, Marta Szebehely and Gabrielle Meagher (2012, 244-245) presented some estimates, and Karl Henrik Sivesind (2016; Chapter 2 in this book) described the changes in the welfare mix in
Scandinavia based on different kinds of statistical data.
16
They all concluded that most care services are still provided by the public sector, but that there are some significant differences between each country: The nonprofit sector
plays an important role in elderly care in Denmark and, to a minor extent, in Norway; whereas Sweden stands out as having a more extensive for-profit sector
. In addition, in Sweden (and Finland), ‘the growth of its share has been faster and large corporations have a stronger position’, according to Szebehely and Meagher (2012, 242).
Individual municipalities usually enter into a contract with private service providers, but there are exceptions. In Denmark
, a private care provider can bypass the municipality and obtain the right to provide institution-based care services through a national approval system for so-called ‘independent nursing homes’
(Danish: friplejeboliger). Under this system, a private provider of independent nursing homes
acquires the right to offer a place to persons in need of nursing care. The provider must fulfil a number of predefined criteria in order to acquire this right. When the user’s need for care is assessed and warranted by the municipality, he or she can opt for a place in an independent nursing home. The municipality is then required to enter into a contract with the private provider. Accordingly, a Danish municipality cannot single-handedly decide the welfare mix within its boundaries. This arrangement resembles what we find in the school sector: National authorities define the criteria for being approved as a provider. We therefore state that indirect government
also exists in elderly care—in this case, a service concession
contract. On the basis of
in-house case law, Danish municipalities can also enter into agreements with
self-owning institutions, which are outside the scope of the Procurement Act and the EU Public Procurement Directive. They can also launch open calls for tenders on institution-based elderly care.
In both Norway
and Sweden, the municipalities themselves choose how institution-based elderly care
within their borders will be organised (Vabo 2012). In Sweden, a municipality can choose between implementing LOV (The Freedom of Choice Act), using open calls for tenders according to the LOU (Public Procurement
Act), or utilising the freedom of action provided by the in-house case law; a Swedish municipality can also choose a combination of these.
17
However, Swedish national guidelines nevertheless encourage the use of LOV.
18
In short, this means that users can freely choose between service providers approved by the municipality. The municipality must approve all providers that satisfy the requirements, which are formulated by the municipality itself. The money then follows the patient.
Norwegian national policy documents encourage open calls for tenders, but leave room for restricted competition
between nonprofit providers
. Norwegian municipalities can also implement free user choice
, but this choice
is restricted to those providers that have entered into a contract with the municipality on the basis of a framework agreement
or the ‘money follows the patient’ principle.
National policies on the organisation of elderly care and municipal freedom of action are just some of the aspects of our models of government. Another aspect is each actor’s discretionary power over the content of cooperation on elderly care. National authorities in all three countries express views on the requirements and conditions for entering into a contract. On the one hand, this includes formal procedures based on the EU Public Procurement Directive and adjacent national legislation. These are largely similar in the three countries. However, policy documents in Denmark—to a much greater extent than in the other two countries—stress that municipalities should find creative solutions. These documents emphasise that cooperation between public authorities and private providers can be organised according to a partnership model, rather than as a hierarchical customer–provider relationship (Udbudsportalen 2011, 16). We interpret this as a request for more collaborative governance
.
On the other hand, national policies in all three countries also contain essential goals for elderly care
. The emphasis on values such as self-determination, dignity and respect for the individual user, which supports the overall aim of active citizenship
in welfare services through empowerment and the free choice of the user, constitutes a basic similarity between the three countries. There is nevertheless considerable variation when these values are translated into concrete regulations
; that is to say, into ‘tools of government’. The extent of discretionary power that rests with the provider clearly varies. In Sweden, so-called ‘national evaluation’ criteria include very detailed indicators, which are used as a starting point for national supervision of municipal care. National authorities also recommend that municipalities use these indicators in their supervision and specification of requirements for private providers.
All three countries have systems for the national supervision of institution-based care, covering all types of providers—public as well as private. The purpose is to ensure that care is carried out in accordance with legislation and other national regulations. This type of national supervision is supplemented by tasks that are assigned to municipalities and providers. The providers, for example, are required to have internal control systems.
The major difference between the countries is the role of the users and their relatives in supervision. Swedish national guidelines seem to devote less attention to these user groups as active citizens than do their Danish and Norwegian counterparts. National authorities in Sweden put much less emphasis on the institutionalised influence, participation
and empowerment of users (e.g., user boards). Instead, Swedish guidelines tend to focus on informal day-to-day influence: for example, on the daily routines in nursing homes
. Furthermore, there are no concrete recommendations on providing information to users, even though this topic has received considerable attention in many of the reports issued by Swedish national authorities. Only Danish municipalities and providers have a statutory obligation to inform potential users. Norwegian guidelines emphasise user involvement, but little is said about the information on which this involvement
should be based. Norwegian municipalities are not obliged to provide easy access to relevant information in a way comparable to Danish requirements.
Generally speaking, we find that Scandinavian national authorities do not lay down clear regulations on the organisation of elderly care or the conditions for private providers. Thus, on the one hand, municipalities have considerable leeway in determining the welfare mix
. On the other hand, national authorities express quite detailed expectations through legislation, regulations and supervision. In the case of Norway, Signy Vabo found that national steering of elderly care has increased over time. However, this steering focuses on processes instead of content or results. The increased steering is relatively ‘soft’ and does not interfere in any major way with municipal priorities (Vabo 2012, 122). This indicates a relatively large degree of discretion.
In light of the analytical models listed in Table 3.1, we assume several options to be available for the organisation of public–private collaboration on elderly care
in the three countries. First, Danish and Swedish municipalities can practise direct government
on the basis of
in-house case law. Second, municipalities can practise indirect government
through specifications in their call for tenders (all countries) and LOV announcements (Sweden). Third, Danish users (and Norwegian and Swedish users, if their municipalities allow it) can also exercise influence by choosing from among the approved providers.
19
In this respect, there is also an element of market-based organisation in the governing of elderly care.
In our discussion of the analytical framework, we pointed out that the use of different models of government within a single policy area can be described as
layered government
, meaning that the welfare mix is organised through several steps. In both Denmark and Sweden (but less so in Norway), the national authorities encourage municipalities to facilitate the free choice
of users between pre-selected service providers. In this way, the idea of market-based organisation is combined with elements of direct or indirect government: The public sector facilitates consumer empowerment
by means of contracts with or the approval of certain service providers. However, the organisation of areas of welfare service may also reflect parallel government regimes. That is to say, we find that national policy allows welfare mix to be organised in several distinct ways, implying that private service providers may have more than one alternative to become providers of publicly funded welfare services. This is seen in the Danish case, where private providers of independent nursing homes
can be approved at the national level—bypassing the municipalities—and then enter the municipal welfare mix
through user choice. This is also seen in Sweden, where it can be argued that the LOV has created parallel systems. Furthermore, private providers find yet another way into the municipal welfare mix in Denmark
and Sweden: The municipality can enter into an agreement with a private provider based on the criterion of
contracting entity and the criterion of control. This can be described as an extended form of in-house service production. Here, public authorities can supervise the private providers on equal terms with municipal providers.