Abstract
As the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) started to pose a growing threat to both Iraq in particular and the Middle East in general, new alliances, entities, formations, and actors have begun to shape the Iraqi political and security atmosphere. It has also triggered the emergence and/or the rise of other non-state armed actors. All of them have a direct impact on the security complex of the region in at least three ways: with their challenge to the state authority on whose soil they operate (intrastate), with their fight with other non-state armed actors (intergroup), and with the regional consequences of their fight, i.e., the actors which indirectly increased their influence or suffered from a loss of it in the region (regional level/interstate level). Moreover, they have posed serious challenges to some key concepts such as statehood, sovereignty, social cohesion, and territorial integrity; this paper particularly focuses on a highly controversial non-state armed actor (NSAA), namely al-Hashd al-Shaabi, and first investigates the dynamics which has led to the emergence of al-Hashd al-Shaabi.
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Notes
- 1.
For some key studies within this context, see Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001; Michael C. Williams, ed., Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations; Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World Politics”, International Organization 52:4, (Autumn 1998), pp:971–991; Fareed Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics”, International Security 17 (1992), pp: 177−198; William E. Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); Stephen Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism” in John A. Vasquez & Colin Elman, Realism and the Balance of Power: A New Debate (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2003); Jonathan Monten, “Thucydides and Modern Realism”, International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006), pp: 3–25 (Donnelly 2000; Carr 2001; Jervis 1998; Zakaria 1992; Scheuerman 2009; Walt 2003; Monten 2006).
- 2.
The People’s Mobilization Forces or Units, a major umbrella organization gathering more than 40 Shiite militia groups.
- 3.
See CFR’s backgrounders for a more detailed information about the emergence of the Hezbollah and the Quds Force via http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155 and http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-revolutionary-guards/p14324.
- 4.
Based on the interviews conducted during the field research in Iraq between December 2014 and March 2015.
- 5.
Based on the interviews conducted with anonymous sources during the field research in Iraq between December 2014 and March 2015.
- 6.
See Global Extremist Registry, Jamal Jaafar Ibrahimi a.k.a. Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes on http://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/jamal-jaafar-ibrahimi-aka-abu-mahdi-al-mohandes.
- 7.
Information received during a meeting with the Iraqi commanders that are assigned to al-Hashd al-Shaabi, Baghdad, March 2015.
- 8.
Based on the interviews conducted with anonymous sources during the field research in Iraq between December 2014 and March 2015.
- 9.
Haras Watani is based on the idea that each province should have its local protection forces. One of the biggest reasons for founding Haras Watani is the practices of the Iraqi army and security forces in Sunni regions and their inability to protect the people during the ISIS advance. As it is well known, after ISIS captured Mosul, the Iraqi security forces abandoned their posts and ISIS captured all the Sunni regions without a fight. In addition, after the emergence of al-Hashd al-Shaabi, the Iraqi government brought Haras Watani to the agenda, in order to nullify the reactions of Sunnis. The Iraqi government aims to include al-Hashd al-Shaabi within the umbrella of Haras Watani to appease the opposition; but debates continue regarding the structure and powers of Haras Watani.
- 10.
Abu Mehdi al-Mohandes is being held responsible for a series of assaults in Kuwait in the 1980s, with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps connection. He has close relations with Qasim Suleimani, commander of the Quds Army of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. He is alleged to have complicity in the bomb attacks against France and American embassies in Kuwait, vehicle bomb attacks against the Amir of Kuwait and plane hijacking.
- 11.
See the Global Coalition’s website for more information, www.theglobalcoalition.org. These are the countries that have joined the coalition: the USA, Albania, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, the UAE, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Greek Cypriot Administration, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Great Britain, Spain, Iceland, Iraq, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Somalia, Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey and Ukraine. In addition, the European Union and the Arab League support the coalition.
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Duman, B., Sönmez, G. (2018). An Influential Non-state Armed Actor in the Iraqi Context: Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi and the Implications of its Rising Influence. In: Yeşiltaş, M., Kardaş, T. (eds) Non-State Armed Actors in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55287-3_8
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