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Manifest and Latent Control on the Council by the European Council

Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics book series (PSEUP)

Abstract

The European Council (EUCO) is differentiated from the legislative institutions in the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, the EUCO influences legislative decision-making in practice. This chapter examines the EUCO’s control on the Council distinguishing between manifest and latent control. It suggests that the EUCO exerts control if proposals are conflictual within the Council and important for the heads of state or government. Two case studies illustrate the control mechanisms. The EUCO controlled the Council manifestly by changing the substance of the patent package. By contrast, it controlled the Council latently in the case of the relocation scheme for refugees. Anticipating a EUCO decision, the Council adopted the proposal by QMV. The chapter clarifies the concept of control and the EUCO’s role in legislative decision-making.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of KonstanzKonstanzGermany

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