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Conclusion. Opportunities and Challenges for the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union

Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics book series (PSEUP)

Abstract

This chapter examines whether the principal–agent model will mature by accommodating the new empirical reality or whether it will become outdated as the practical challenges narrow the researcher’s focus to the simplest of hierarchical relations. We address this question by covering the three main components of the research process. We distinguish (1) the formulation of research questions; (2) the contribution one can deliver to the existing literature; and (3) the required methodology. Each section questions the opportunities that are to be gleaned from applying the principal–agent model to an ever-more complex setting, and confronts it with practical challenges that may emerge in the research process. In so doing, we derive guidelines that may help to ensure the contemporary relevance of the principal–agent model.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Maastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Université catholique de LouvainLouvain-la-NeuveBelgium

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