Abstract
As diplomatic crisis threatened to overwhelm the negotiations for an international regime on climate change, certain new theoretical climate policy models began to gain a foothold in international debate. Hypotheses for smaller scale negotiations based upon a reduced number of actors, as well as the idea of ‘minilateral’ clubs of cooperating countries taking the lead in acting against climate change, quickly spread among scholars and policy makers, leading several commentators to view them as possible ‘last stance’ solutions in case the international climate negotiations failed. The Paris Agreement breakthrough, hailed by most as the ultimate victory of ‘multilateralism’, eventually overtook any minilateral ambition, at least concerning the climate bargaining process. Nevertheless, the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the implementation of the Paris Agreement’s ambitious objectives may represent a window of opportunity for a specific category of ‘minilateral’ models, known as ‘transformational clubs’, to find their own significant space within the new international climate regime. While describing the general characteristics of climate clubs and the specific features of ‘transformational clubs’, this Chapter discusses to what extent these latter may effectively play a role in the future developments of the international debate on climate change.
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Notes
- 1.
In the context of this Chapter multilateral and international are meant as synonyms, encompassing the whole range of possibly involved actors.
- 2.
See also Chap. 2 of this book.
- 3.
Plurilateral is here meant as regimes smaller than the international one but encompassing more than two main actors.
- 4.
From now onwards the term ‘plurilateral’ is used as synonym of ‘minilateral’, as bilateral initiatives are not object of discussion of the book.
- 5.
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) is the most common Greenhouse Gas (GHG) and is often used as a reference unit to express levels of GHG emissions (expressed in CO2 equivalent, or CO2eq). In the context of this Chapter and, more in general, of this book the term carbon, expressing CO2, and the term GHG are synonyms, hence carbon is used as single term to express GHG.
- 6.
Such as: the G8, the G20, the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, or the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate.
- 7.
Such as: the LEDS Global Partnership, the REDD+ Partnership, or the Global Methane Initiative.
- 8.
See Articles 2 and 4 of the Paris Agreement.
- 9.
See Chap. 2 of this book.
- 10.
See Article 4 of the Paris Agreement.
- 11.
See Article 2 of the Paris Agreement.
- 12.
See also Chap. 5, for a wider discussion about the significance of the CBDR-RC within the PA and the present proposal.
- 13.
For a detailed analysis of the listed benefits, see Weischer et al. 2012, pp. 188–191.
- 14.
Quota is used in this Chapter and more in general in this book as synonym of ‘assigned share of mitigation burden’.
- 15.
Carbon leakage represents a significant uncertainty in climate clubs literature. It serves to state that carbon intensive industries will outsource their productions to areas external to the club and therefore not subject to the club’s mitigation burden. Carbon leakage is further discussed in Chaps. 5 and 8 of this book.
- 16.
Border tariffs adjustments concerning climate-related trade are commonly defined BCA and in such form are generally used in this book.
- 17.
See also Chap. 8 of this book.
- 18.
In the context of this chapter, and more in general of this book, the term ‘approach’ refers to any form of mitigation exchange.
- 19.
A more complete analysis of the direct and indirect approaches to markets’ reciprocal recognition is offered in Chap. 7 of this book.
- 20.
See Chap. 7 of this book.
- 21.
See Chap. 6 of this book.
- 22.
See especially Chap. 5 of this book.
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Stua, M. (2017). Climate Clubs and Their Relevance Within the Paris Agreement. In: From the Paris Agreement to a Low-Carbon Bretton Woods . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54699-5_3
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