Abstract
Side-channel analysis is a well-known and efficient hardware technique to recover embedded secrets in microprocessors. Countermeasures relying on random masking have been proven to be sound protections against such threats and are usually added to protect sensitive intermediate data during the algorithm process. However, Second-Order Side-Channel Analysis have proven to allow secret key recovery in the presence of random masking. In [4] an attack was introduced which exploits the information exchange at the cryptographic protocol level in order to disclose the secret key of the ISO/IEC 9797-1 MAC algorithm 3 using DES operations. A countermeasure suggestion was for a mask to be applied at the protocol level in order to protect all secret data. This paper extends the attack idea previously published to second order attacks on masked implementations of the ISO/IEC 9797-1 MAC algorithm 3 and shows that securing against such attacks must be done with care.
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Notes
- 1.
\(\oplus \) represents the bitwise exclusive OR operation.
- 2.
Regarding the standard deviation of the noise, a unit corresponds to the side-channel difference related to a one bit difference in the Hamming weight.
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Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Loic Thierry for the fruitful discussions we had on this subject in the past.
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Feix, B., Ricart, A., Timon, B., Tordella, L. (2017). Defeating Embedded Cryptographic Protocols by Combining Second-Order with Brute Force. In: Lemke-Rust, K., Tunstall, M. (eds) Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications. CARDIS 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10146. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54669-8_2
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