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Animal Research and the Political Theory of Animal Rights

Chapter

Abstract

In his chapter, Gardar Arnason argues that if we accept the citizenship framework of nonhuman animal rights, as it is presented by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka in Zoopolis (2011), then we cannot be abolitionist about nonhuman animal research. To show this, Arnason outlines three further implications of the citizenship framework: (1) the interests of nonhuman citizens must be taken into account in our science policy, (2) the moral constraints on the use of nonhuman animals for research must be on par with the moral constraints on the use of humans for research, and (3) in so far as there is a duty to participate in research, that duty will apply, perhaps indirectly, to nonhuman citizens as well.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Ethics and History of MedicineUniversity of TübingenTübingenGermany

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