A Ranking Procedure with the Shapley Value
This paper considers the problem of electing candidates for a certain position based on ballots filled by voters. We suggest a voting procedure using cooperative game theory methods. For this, it is necessary to construct a characteristic function via the preference profile of voters. The Shapley value serves as the ranking method. The winner is the candidate having the maximum Shapley value. And finally, we explore the properties of the designed procedures.
KeywordsTournament matrix Shapley value Preference aggregation rule Voting procedure Condorcet criterion Characteristic function
This work is supported by the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation (grant 15-02-00352_a) and the Russian Fund for Basic Research (project 16-51-55006 China_a).
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