A Ranking Procedure with the Shapley Value

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10192)

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of electing candidates for a certain position based on ballots filled by voters. We suggest a voting procedure using cooperative game theory methods. For this, it is necessary to construct a characteristic function via the preference profile of voters. The Shapley value serves as the ranking method. The winner is the candidate having the maximum Shapley value. And finally, we explore the properties of the designed procedures.

Keywords

Tournament matrix Shapley value Preference aggregation rule Voting procedure Condorcet criterion Characteristic function 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Russian Academy of Sciences, Karelian Research Center, Institute of Applied Mathematical ResearchPetrozavodskRussia

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