# On Revenue-Maximizing Walrasian Equilibria for Size-Interchangeable Bidders

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## Abstract

We study a market setting in which bidders are single-valued but size-interchangeable, and there exist multiple copies of heterogeneous goods. Our contributions are as follows: (1) providing polynomial-time algorithms for finding a *restricted* envy-free equilibrium with reserve prices (EFEr); (2) posing the problem of finding a revenue-maximizing EFEr, and running experiments to show that our algorithms perform well on the metrics of revenue, efficiency, and time, without incurring too many violations of the stronger Walrasian equilibrium with reserve (envy-free plus market clearance) conditions.

## Keywords

Reserve Price Market Maker Valuation Function Walrasian Equilibrium Feasible Allocation
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## References

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