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User-friendly Legal Science pp 11–45Cite as

Core Concepts and Theory Building

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Abstract

All scientific research is theory based. A scientific discipline must be based on a theory that defines its characteristics. It must have a field, its own point of view, concepts and a way of applying scientific methods. The purpose of this chapter is to define the characteristics and core concepts of User-friendly Legal Science.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Popper K (2005), number 30.

  2. 2.

    Glaser BG, Strauss AL (1967), pp. 26–27 and 30.

  3. 3.

    Ibid, p. viii: “Not everyone can be equally skilled at discovering theory, but neither do they need to be a genius to generate useful theory.”

  4. 4.

    For theory as a prognosis, see Popper K (2005) number 85. One can define even other goals for scientific research. Ronkainen S, Suikkanen A, Kunnari M (2014), p 98.

  5. 5.

    For the assumptions crucial to the status of a model in financial research, see Ryan B, Scapens RW, Theobald M (1992), pp. 22–23.

  6. 6.

    Saurama E, Julkunen I (2012), p. 60.

  7. 7.

    Merton RK (1968). See Boudon R (1991).

  8. 8.

    Durkheim É (1894).

  9. 9.

    Friedman M (1953), p. 7: “The ultimate goal of a positive science is the development of ‘theory’ or ‘hypothesis’ that yields valid and meaningful … predictions about phenomena not yet observed.” National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine (1992), 2 Scientific Principles and Research Practices, pp. 36–39.

  10. 10.

    Ragin CC (1994), pp. 14 and 25.

  11. 11.

    Popper K (2005), number 4.

  12. 12.

    See Friedman M (1953), p. 4.

  13. 13.

    Weintraub ER (2002); Ryan B, Scapens RW, Theobald M (1992), p. 27.

  14. 14.

    Posner RA (1990), p. 363. See also Friedman M (1953), p. 9: “Factual evidence can never ‘prove’ a hypothesis; it can only fail to disprove it, which is what we generally mean when we say, somewhat inexactly, that the hypothesis has been ‘confirmed’ by experience.”

  15. 15.

    See Ryan B, Scapens RW, Theobald M (1992), p. 58. According to Friedman M (1953), it does not matter.

  16. 16.

    See, for example, Siems MM (2008); Boland LA (2003).

  17. 17.

    For the agency theory, see Ryan B, Scapens RW, Theobald M (1992), pp. 54–55.

  18. 18.

    Berglund L, Ney A (2015), p. 154.

  19. 19.

    Weber M (1922).

  20. 20.

    Becher T (1994); Auranen O (2014), p. 66. Svein Kyvik suggests that cognitive and social differences among disciplines have implications for publication practices. Kyvik S (1991); Auranen O (2014), p. 67.

  21. 21.

    Radnitzky G (1970).

  22. 22.

    Bohr N (1948).

  23. 23.

    See Husserl E (1962), §§ 2, 9(h) and 10.

  24. 24.

    See ibid, §§ 14–15.

  25. 25.

    Iggers GG (1984), p 45.

  26. 26.

    See, for example, Ryan B, Scapens RW, Theobald M (1992), p. 119: “[F]rom a holistic perspective, generalizations and general laws do not explain, only the specific circumstances of the case can be used to explain.”

  27. 27.

    Simon HA (1967), p. 14.

  28. 28.

    van Aken JE (2004), p. 224.

  29. 29.

    See, for example, Siems MM (2008); von Holderstein Holtermann J, Madsen MR (2015); Bartrum IC (2013), p. 262. See nevertheless Mæhle SS (2015), pp. 131–132. There was a similar problem in management accounting in the past. See Kasanen E, Lukka K, Siitonen A (1993), p. 251.

  30. 30.

    Sandgren C (2005), pp. 306 and 314; Engel C, Schön W (2007), p. IX.

  31. 31.

    Kant I (1783), § 1.

  32. 32.

    Kant I (1787), B XI–B XIII (on the language of geometry).

  33. 33.

    Wittgenstein L (1922), Vorwort: “Man könnte den ganzen Sinn des Buches etwa in die Worte fassen: Was sich überhaupt sagen lässt, lässt sich klar sagen; und wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muss man schweigen.” This was originally limited to the propositions of natural science and the meaningfulness of propositions. Ibid, 6.53. However, it can act as inspiration even here.

  34. 34.

    For legal history, see Duss V (2012), p. 987.

  35. 35.

    See nevertheless Mæhle SS (2015), p. 142 and Wendehorst CC (2008), p. 602 distinguishing between different forms of legal reasoning: “Legal reasoning can take four different basic perspectives, which may be described as the internal, the external, the sovereign, and the subordinate perspective. Each of them has its own goals, its own patterns of argumentation, and its own tools for coping with plural and fragmented sources.”

  36. 36.

    Luhmann N (2004), Chapter 10, I, p 383.

  37. 37.

    Mäntysaari P (2014).

  38. 38.

    Kelsen H (1934).

  39. 39.

    Compare Bourdieu P (1987), pp. 817 and 831: “The juridical field is the site of a competition for monopoly of the right to determine the law … The juridical field is a social space organized around the conversion of direct conflict between directly concerned parties into juridically regulated debate between professionals acting by proxy. It is also the space in which such debate functions.”

  40. 40.

    See, for example, Mäntysaari P (2012), pp. 17–18.

  41. 41.

    See, for example, Ross A (1958), p. 360: “Let us imagine two persons, A and B, both locked up in the same prison cell, both anxious to escape … To that extent their interests may be said to coincide.”

  42. 42.

    For a definition, see Ross A (1958), p. 360.

  43. 43.

    Weber M (1904), II: “[Sie sind] von hohem heuristischen Wert für die Forschung und hohem systematischen Wert für die Darstellung, wenn sie lediglich als begriffliche Mittel zur Vergleichung und Messung der Wirklichkeit an ihnen verwendet werden. In dieser Funktion sind sie geradezu unentbehrlich.” Weber M (1949), p. 43 (a translation of Weber M 1913): “Whatever the content of the ideal-type … it has only one function in an empirical investigation. Its function is the comparison with empirical reality in order to establish its divergences or similarities, to describe them with the most unambiguously intelligible concepts, and to understand and explain them causally. Rational juridical concepts supply this need for the empirical history of law …” See also Petersen J (2014), § 5 IV pp 120–121; Glaser BG, Strauss AL (1967), p. 23.

  44. 44.

    Friedman M (1953), p. 36: “The ideal types are not intended to be descriptive; they are designed to isolate the features that are crucial for a particular problem.”

  45. 45.

    Holmes OW (1897).

  46. 46.

    Durkheim É (1894), Chapter III.

  47. 47.

    Weber M (1904), II: “Es handelt sich um die Konstruktion von Zusammenhängen, welche unserer Phantasie als zulänglich motiviert und also »objektiv möglich«, unserem nomologischen Wissen als adäquat erscheinen.” Hydén H (2011), p. 121.

  48. 48.

    von Wright GH (1971), p. 96.

  49. 49.

    Compare Capra F, Mattei U (2015), p. 4: “In this book, we call for a profound change of legal paradigms, leading to a new ‘ecology of law.’ At the heart of this new ecological legal order lies a view of social reality not as being an aggregate of individual ‘building blocks’ but rather as being composed of social networks and communities. Law, in this view, is not an objective structure, but emerges from actively engaged citizen and legal communities as the legal embodiment of their self-organization.”

  50. 50.

    Glaser BG, Strauss AL (1967), pp. 32 and 79 distinguish between substantive and formal areas of sociological inquiry. While “patient care” is a substantive area of sociological inquiry, “social mobility” is a formal one.

  51. 51.

    Wesel U (1974), p. 348.

  52. 52.

    Different societies do not face similar needs and do not need similar institutions to meet the needs. Zweigert and Kötz represented the opposite view. See Michaels R (2008), p. 369.

  53. 53.

    For the organic development of law, see Berman HJ (1983), p. 5.

  54. 54.

    Weber M (1922), First Part, Chapter I, § 1, I, 3, pp. 3–4; Williamson OE (1985), p. 44; Dewey J (1938), Chapter 6; Joas H (1996).

  55. 55.

    For economics and finance, see Ryan B, Scapens RW, Theobald M (1992), p. 28.

  56. 56.

    Woodward J (1958); Schoonhoven CB (1981).

  57. 57.

    Andy Fastow, the former CFO of Enron, put it in the following way in a speech (Peter Elkind, The confessions of Andy Fastow, Fortune, July 1, 2013): “I thought: That’s how the game is played. You have a complex set of rules, and the objective is to use the rules to your advantage.”

  58. 58.

    For a romantic view on the role of law, see Capra F, Mattei U (2015), p. 12: “The legal order is the most important vehicle through which a worldview is enforced and transformed into social action, and thus human law is also the agency through which we may implement new ideas and values.”

  59. 59.

    See, for example, Maitland FW (1911), pp. 485–486: “Legal documents, documents of the most technical kind, are the best, often the only evidence that we have for social and economic history, for the history of morality, for the history of practical religion.” See also Novak WJ (2000), p. 109 on Hurst’s manuscript “Technology and the Law: The Automobile” (1949) and Hurst’s list of 119 “Derivative Effects of the Auto Upon the Law”.

  60. 60.

    In contrast, Ehrlich and Pound focused on somebody else’s norms. Likhovski A (2003), p. 628: “[T]here are intriguing similarities in Ehrlich’s and Pound’s thought: both were reacting against the excesses of late-nineteenth century formalist ‘legal science.’ Both wanted to expose the gap between formal and real-life ‘living’ law, and both saw law as the product of the people rather than the state. Both were, thus, interested in non-state norms of various sorts.”

  61. 61.

    See, for example, Mäntysaari P (2010a), Section 4.3.3.

  62. 62.

    Luhmann N (2004), Chapter 10, I, p 383.

  63. 63.

    See ibid, Chapter 10, III, p. 399.

  64. 64.

    For legal norms, see Weber M (1922), Second Part, Chapter VII, § 1, p 394: “Andererseits werden wir immer erneut auch sehen, daß die von intern rechtstechnischen und politischen Momenten bedingten Eigenschaften des Rechts stark auf die Gestaltung der Wirtschaft zurückwirken.”

  65. 65.

    See Luhmann N (2004), Chapter 10, I, p 381.

  66. 66.

    See Ehrlich E (1913), p. 31 and Berman HJ (1983), pp. 4–5 on “living law”.

  67. 67.

    Ross A (1958), p. 32.

  68. 68.

    Ibid, p. 33.

  69. 69.

    Ibid, p. 33.

  70. 70.

    Ibid, p. 34.

  71. 71.

    Compare the more sociological approaches of Ehrlich E (1913), pp. 405–406 on living law and Capra F, Mattei U (2015), p. 13 on the systemic, ecological paradigm of the law: “Law emerges from actively engaged citizens in self-organizing communities … Law is what is deemed to be law by civic and legal communities …”

  72. 72.

    Homicide was used as an example in Ross A (1958), p. 33.

  73. 73.

    Ibid, p. 35.

  74. 74.

    Ibid, p. 338.

  75. 75.

    Zweigert K, Kötz H (1996). For the functional method, see also Husa J (2003); Michaels R (2008); De Coninck J(2010).

  76. 76.

    The term “methodological individualism” was first used by Schumpeter J (1908). See, for example, Blaug M (1992), pp. 44–48; Udehn L (2001), p. 104; Udehn L (2002).

  77. 77.

    Johansson LG (2015), p. 160; Johansson LG (2015), p. 161.

  78. 78.

    Arrow KJ (1994), p. 1.

  79. 79.

    Eeasterby-Smith M, Thorpe R, Jackson PR (2015), Table 3.2, p 50.

  80. 80.

    User-friendly Legal Science is thus not part of Scandinavian Legal Realism. See Leiter B (2009): “[O]ne of H.L.A. Hart’s decisive achievements was to demonstrate the failure of the Scandinavian program to account for the perspective of actors within a legal system - such a perspective, Hart argued plausibly, being essential to account for the social phenomenon of law.”

  81. 81.

    Quine WV (1960), Chapter 2.

  82. 82.

    Watson A (1974).

  83. 83.

    Teubner G (1998).

  84. 84.

    See, for example, Weber M (1949), pp. 43–44: “Economic theory is an axiomatic discipline in a way which is logically very different from that of the systematic science of law. Its relationship to economic reality is very different from the relationship of jurisprudence to the phenomena treated by the history and sociology of law.” See also Grundmann S, Micklitz HW, Renner M (eds) (2015), p. 1.

  85. 85.

    For a case showing how economic theories can influence legislation, see Ferraro F, Pfeffer J, Sutton RI (2005); Kieser A (2004); André T Jr (1998).

  86. 86.

    Jensen MC, Meckling WH (1976); Fama EF (1980).

  87. 87.

    See, for example, Mäntysaari P (2005).

  88. 88.

    Mäntysaari P (2010a); Mäntysaari P (2012). For similar problems in accounting caused by “the positive accounting cult”, see Chambers RJ (1993).

  89. 89.

    For sociology, see Weber M (1922).

  90. 90.

    Weber M (1922), § 2.

  91. 91.

    See, for example, Korobkin RB, Ulen TS (2000); Dewey J (2000); Dewey J (1938), Chapter 6 (purposeful action); Joas H (1996), pp. 4–6. Joas argues that “a third model of action should be added to the two predominant models of action”, the two models being rational action and normatively oriented action. The third model “emphasizes the creative character of human action”.

  92. 92.

    Williamson OE (1985), p. 44.

  93. 93.

    Heck P (1914).

  94. 94.

    Lamprecht K (1896), p. 5: “Sind nun aber Zweck und Kausalverknüpfung vollkommen voneinander geschiedene intellektuelle Vorgänge? Keineswegs! Sie sind nur verschiedene, unserem Denken gleich immanente Betrachtungsweisen eines und desselben Voganges. Denke ich mir die vorgestellte Wirkung irgend eines Geschehnisses als dessen Ursache, so wird dies Ursache zum Zweck.“ For the relevance of Lamprecht, see Iggers GG (1988).

  95. 95.

    See, for example, Lamprecht K (1896), pp. 6 and 13: “Die kausale Methode kann nirgends leichter gehandhabt werden als auf dem Gebiete der sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Erscheinungen.”

  96. 96.

    See, for example, Kusch M (2003), p. 350: “Natural events do have (Humean) causes, unlike human actions with which social sciences are concerned. This is why human action (and anything manifesting it) should not be causally explained but understood in terms of the reasons of the actors … Understanding is not dependent on reference to causes and general laws.”

  97. 97.

    Comte distinguished between the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive phase in the development of society.

  98. 98.

    von Wright GH (1971), p. 96. For a summary of the central claims of von Wright GH (1971) and von Wright’s modified position, see Kusch M (2003), p. 350.

  99. 99.

    Berglund L, Ney A (2015), p. 84.

  100. 100.

    For the main differences between description-driven and prescription-driven research programmes, see van Aken JE (2004), p. 236.

  101. 101.

    Compare van Aken JE (2004), p. 227: “[M]any prescriptions in a design science are of a heuristic nature. They can rather be described as ‘if you want to achieve Y in situation Z, then something like action X will help’.”

  102. 102.

    Berglund L, Ney A (2015), p. 87.

  103. 103.

    Ast DF (1808), pp. 179–180; Heidegger M (1926), § 63.

  104. 104.

    Firat AF (1987); Berglund L, Ney A (2015), pp. 121–126.

  105. 105.

    Popper K (2005), number 85.

  106. 106.

    Saurama E, Julkunen I (2012), p. 61. See also Harman G (1965); Niiniluoto I (1984); Magnani L (2001); Lipton P (1991); Walton D (2014).

  107. 107.

    Saurama E, Julkunen I (2012), p. 61. Induction was regarded as more important when the benchmark was positivism. See, for example, Lamprecht K (1896), p. 3: “Die Geschichtswissenschaft ist im Rahmen der für die Induktion geltenden erkenntnistheoretischen Kautelen und Ergänzungen eine induktive Wissenschaft; also kann nur der jeweilige Charakter des induktiven Beweisverfahrens und dessen verschiedenartige Auffassung wahrhaft wissenschaftliche Gegensätze und Strömungen in ihr begründen.“ See also Iggers GG (1984).

  108. 108.

    Peirce CS (1931–1935), 5.145: “Abduction consists in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them. Its only justification is that if we are ever to understand things at all, it must be in that way.”

  109. 109.

    Peirce CS (1931–1935), 5.172: “A man must be downright crazy to deny that science has made many true discoveries. But every single item of scientific theory which stands established today has been due to Abduction.”

  110. 110.

    Saurama E, Julkunen I (2012), p. 65.

  111. 111.

    Aristotle, Organon, Analytica priora, second book, chapter 25.

  112. 112.

    Peirce CS (1883), p. 108.

  113. 113.

    See Walton D (2014), p. xiii; Walton D (2001), p. 144.

  114. 114.

    Walton D (2001), p. 145.

  115. 115.

    Harman G (1965), pp. 88–89; Lipton P (1991).

  116. 116.

    Peirce CS (1931–1935), 5.171: “Deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows that something actually is operative; Abduction merely suggests that something may be.”

  117. 117.

    Aristotle, Organon, Analytica posteriora, first book, Chapters 13 and 34; Analytica priora, second book, Chapter 25; Niiniluoto I (1984), p. 33; Woods J (2014), p. 32.

  118. 118.

    Peirce CS (1883), pp. 127–128.

  119. 119.

    Niiniluoto I (1984), p. 33.

  120. 120.

    Peirce CS (1883), p. 127; Peirce CS (1931–1935), 2.712.

  121. 121.

    Peirce CS (1931–1935), 2.102: “Upon this subject, my doctrine has been immensely improved since my essay ‘A Theory of Probable Inference’ was published in 1883 … When, after repeated attempts, I finally succeeded in clearing the matter up, the fact shone out that probability proper had nothing to do with the validity of Abduction, unless in a doubly indirect manner.”

  122. 122.

    Peirce CS (1931–1935), 5.189. See also 2.712. Discussed, for example, in Niiniluoto I (1984), p. 33; Woods J (2014), pp. 32–33.

  123. 123.

    Reichertz J (2007), p. 219.

  124. 124.

    See, for example, Dubois A, Gadde LE (2014) and Dubois A, Gadde LE (2002) on business research.

  125. 125.

    Glaser BG, Strauss AL (1967).

  126. 126.

    Reichertz J (2007), p. 215: “[T]he Glaser–Strauss controversy can be characterized, at least in part, as one between induction and abduction.”

  127. 127.

    Glaser BG (1992); Strauss AL, Corbin JM (1990); Corbin J, Strauss AL (1990); Strauss AL, Corbin JM (1994).

  128. 128.

    Glaser BG (1992), p. 16.

  129. 129.

    Reichertz J (2007), p. 215: “Neither Strauss nor Strauss and Corbin have systematized this logic of abductive discovery, nor have they linked it to the considerations of Charles S. Peirce, the founder of abduction.”

  130. 130.

    Strauss AL, Corbin JM (1990), p. 73: “Every type of inquiry rests on the asking of effective questions.”

  131. 131.

    Reichertz J (2007), p. 216.

  132. 132.

    Strauss AL, Corbin JM (1990), p. 24.

  133. 133.

    Reichertz J (2007), p. 219.

  134. 134.

    Peirce CS (1931–1935), 5.145: “All the ideas of science come to it by the way of Abduction.”

  135. 135.

    van Aken JE (2004), p. 220.

  136. 136.

    Kasanen E, Lukka K, Siitonen A (1993), p. 244. See Elharidy AM, Nicholson B, Scapens RW (2008), p. 141: “[Interpretive management accounting research] is interested in studying real world practices, decisions and settings, with the objective of analysing, interpreting and understanding them: thereby identifying solutions to pragmatic problems.”

  137. 137.

    van Aken JE (2004), p. 221 (design sciences); Kasanen E, Lukka K, Siitonen A (1993), p. 245. For option pricing, see Black F, Scholes M (1973).

  138. 138.

    van Aken JE (2004), p. 224. Compare Sterling RR (1975). Sterling’s article shows how difficult it was to define accounting as a science before the constructive approach and the notion of a design science. There were traces of what became the constructive approach already in Chambers RJ (1956).

  139. 139.

    Kasanen E, Lukka K, Siitonen A (1993), p. 258.

  140. 140.

    von Wright GH (1971), p. 96.

  141. 141.

    Kasanen E, Lukka K, Siitonen A (1993), p. 258: “The possibility of checking the steps of a construction … linked with the criteria of objectivity, criticalness and autonomy, contributes to the issue that anybody can try out the construction and obtain results similar to the person who has made the original construction.”

  142. 142.

    Ibid, p. 253.

  143. 143.

    Ibid, p. 246: “The constructive approach may be characterized by dividing the research process into phases, the order of which may, of course, vary from case to case: 1. Find a practically relevant problem which also has research potential. 2. Obtain a general and comprehensive understanding of the topic. 3. Innovate, i.e., construct a solution idea. 4. Demonstrate that the solution works. 5. Show the theoretical connections and the research contribution of the solution concept. 6. Examine the scope of applicability of the solution.”

  144. 144.

    Ibid, p. 255.

  145. 145.

    Ibid, pp. 246–247.

  146. 146.

    van Aken JE (2004), p. 225.

  147. 147.

    Kasanen E, Lukka K, Siitonen A (1993), p. 259, referring to Peirce CS (1931–1935), 1.54.

  148. 148.

    Kasanen E, Lukka K, Siitonen A (1993), p. 246.

  149. 149.

    This applies to Anglo-American countries. For German law, see § 261 and § 244 StPO (penal law cases) and § 286 ZPO (civil law cases).

  150. 150.

    van Aken JE (2004), pp. 226–227.

  151. 151.

    Economics faces similar challenges in this respect. Friedman M (1953), p. 15: “To put this point less paradoxically, the relevant question to ask about the ‘assumptions’ of a theory is not whether they are descriptively ‘realistic,’ for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question can be answered only by seeing whether the theory works, which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions.”

  152. 152.

    See also Sandgren C (2005), pp. 310–311.

  153. 153.

    Popper K (2005), number 35; Popper K (2002), pp. 77, 189, 259–260 and 319; Aroney N (2013), p. 6.

  154. 154.

    Popper K (2005), number 43.

  155. 155.

    Popper K (2005), number 35; Popper K (2002), pp. 77, 189, 259–60, 319; Glaser BG, Strauss AL (1967), p. 24; Aroney N (2013), p. 6.

  156. 156.

    Popper K (2005), numbers 36, 38 and 43.

  157. 157.

    Aroney N (2013), p. 2.

  158. 158.

    Ibid, p. 10.

  159. 159.

    Mæhle SS (2015), p. 148: “En enkel teori vil derfor ja flere åpenbare pedagogiske kvaliteter enn en utførlig og intrikat modell …”.

  160. 160.

    Aroney N (2013). p. 10.

  161. 161.

    For the terminology, see Ryan B, Scapens RW, Theobald M (1992), p. 119. The “pattern model of explanation” and description seem to be the same thing.

  162. 162.

    According to Friedman M (1953), p. 36, theories based on ideal types cannot even be descriptive: “The ideal types are not intended to be descriptive; they are designed to isolate the features that are crucial for a particular problem.”

  163. 163.

    Durkheim É (1894), Chapter III (on normal and pathological behaviour).

  164. 164.

    Woodward J (1958), Schoonhoven CB (1981). According to the contingency theory, there is no one right way to organise a firm.

  165. 165.

    Friedman M (1953), p. 9: “The hypothesis is rejected if its predictions are contradicted (‘frequently’ or more often than predictions from an alternative hypothesis); it is accepted if its predictions are not contradicted; great confidence is attached to it if it has survived many opportunities for contradiction. Factual evidence can never ‘prove’ a hypothesis; it can only fail to disprove it …” Glaser BG, Strauss AL (1967), p. 24: “In short, the discovered theoretical category lives on until proven theoretically defunct for any class of data, while the life of the accurate evidence that indicated the category may be short.” Compare van Aken JE (2004), p. 235: “The effectivenes for distinguishing academic research results from the prescriptions found in ‘Heathrow-literature’, is justification. The effectiveness of an algorithmic technological rule (applied as recipe) can be proven in deterministic or stochastic terms. But the indeterminate nature of heuristic rules—and most tehnological rules in the field of management will be heuristic—makes it impossible to provide such proof. However, through multiple case-studies one can accumulate supporting evidence which can continue until ‘theoretical saturation’ [Eisenhardt KM (1989a] has been obtained.” For legal history, see Stolleis M (2008), pp. 31–32.

  166. 166.

    Friedman M (1953), p. 9; National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine (1992) 2 Scientific Principles and Research Practices, p 38: “But as theories survive more tests, they are regarded with higher levels of confidence.”

  167. 167.

    Lakatos I (1970).

  168. 168.

    Peirce CS (1931–1935), 5.145, 5.162 and 5.171 (about abduction): “Its only justification is that from its suggestion deduction can draw a prediction which can be tested by induction, and that, if we are ever to learn anything or to understand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that this is to be brought about.”

  169. 169.

    Ibid, 5.197.

  170. 170.

    Reichertz J (2007), p. 222: “When faced with surprising facts, abduction leads us to look for meaning-creating rules, for a possibly valid or fitting explanation that eliminates what is surprising about the facts. The end-point of this search is a (verbal) hypothesis. Once this is found, a multi-stage process of checking begins. If the first step in the process of scientific discovery consists of the finding of a hypothesis by means of abduction, then the second step consists of the derivation of predictions from the hypothesis, which is deduction, and the third step consists of the search for facts that will ‘verify’ the assumptions, which is induction. If the facts cannot be found the process begins again, and this is repeated as often as necessary until ‘fitting’ facts are reached.”

  171. 171.

    Eisenhardt KM, Graebner ME (2007), p. 26.

  172. 172.

    Mäntysaari P (2012), Chapter 5.

  173. 173.

    Ibid, Chapter 10.

  174. 174.

    See, for example, Williamson OE (1985).

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