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Theories of Personhood

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Identity, Personhood and the Law

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Law ((BRIEFSLAW))

Abstract

This chapter continues to explore the concept of personhood. It considers the use of the concept in the bioethical literature and provides a critique of the two leading conceptions of personhood: those relying on mental capabilities and those relying on membership of the human species.

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Correspondence to Charles Foster .

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Foster, C., Herring, J. (2017). Theories of Personhood. In: Identity, Personhood and the Law. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53459-6_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53459-6_2

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-53458-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-53459-6

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