Skip to main content

Ethics, Economics and the Corporation

Part of the Virtues and Economics book series (VIEC,volume 1)

Abstract

The paper analyzes the capacity of corporation for moral agency and concludes that corporations do not have such capacity. Instead, morally unacceptable corporate propensities are better addressed by crafting legal rules that accord with the quiddity of the corporation. Unlike theories that find the source of this incapacity in the purported duty of corporations to maximize shareholder value , and unlike stakeholder theories, the paper proposes, that the incapacity has three sources. First, the interposition of the corporation between the individual or group actor destroys the unity of the actor and the act. Second, corporations, with their power to define roles through binding rules replace the moral self of the actor with the prescribed role. Third, the prevailing economic theory adopts the methodology of the natural sciences and condenses corporate decision making into the quantitative methodology of corporate finance with the result that the numerically expressible trumps qualitative judgment unless the latter is bolstered by binding legal rules.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Notes

  1. 1.

    French, Peter A. (1995) Corporate Ethics , Harcourt, Brace & Co. p. 36.

  2. 2.

    For an analysis of the doubtful legal foundations of the duty to maximise shareholder value see Stout, L. (2012) The Shareholder Value Myth, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., San Francisco; a contrary view is set out in Mansell, S. F. (2013) Capitali sm, Corporations and the Social Contract, Cambridge University Press; Vermaelen, T. (2009) “Maximizing Shareholder Value : An Ethical Responsibility?” in Smith, C. and Lenssen, G. (ed.) Mainstreaming Corporate Responsibility, Wiley, which, in turn, is thoroughly refuted in Mayer , C. (2013) Firm Commitment, Oxford University Press.

  3. 3.

    Freeman, R. Harrison, J. Wicks, A. Parmar, B. And de Colle, S. (2010) Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art. Cambridge University Press; Friedman, A. and Miles S. (2006) Stakeholder s: Theory and Practice. Oxford University Press

  4. 4.

    The extent to which quantitatively based techniques can be said to to be value free is, of course, doubtful. The contrast made here is between quantitatively expressed information that may be disputed, but cannot be amended by the recipient, and value based, descriptive information, that, by its nature, engages the recipient. For issues related to the separation of ‘fact’ and ‘value’ see Putnam, H. (2002) The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, Harvard University Press; Putnam, H. and Walsh, V. (2012) The End Of Value-free Economics. Palgrave.

  5. 5.

    Michael Bloomberg, founder and CEO formulated the axiom of the Bloomberg Corporation as follows: “You can only manage what you can measure.”

  6. 6.

    Berle, A. A. and Means, G. C. (1932) The Modern Corporation & Private Property, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

  7. 7.

    The unique features of the modern business corporation are recognised and analysed, among others, in Lawson, T. “The Modern Corporation: the Site of a Mechanism (of Global Social Change) that is Out-Of-Control” in Archer, M. (ed.), (2015) Social Morphogenesis: Generative Mechanisms Transforming Late Modernity, New York: Springer; Balkan, J. (2004), The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power, London: Constable and Robinson Ltd.; Corton, D. (1995) When Corporations Rule the World, San Francisco, Berrett-Koehler with Cumbrian Press.A contrary theory is set out in Goodpaster, K. E. (2007) Conscience and Corporate Culture, Blackwell Publishing.

  8. 8.

    For a detailed history see Johnson, P. (2010) Making the Market, Cambridge University Press; McQueen, R. (2009) A Social History of Company Law, Ashgate Publishing Limited; Taylor, J. (2006) Creating Capitalism, Royal Historical Society.

  9. 9.

    For a detailed analysis of the emergence and the effects of the market for corporate control, see Mayer , C. (2013) Firm Commitment, Oxford University Press.

  10. 10.

    The Law of Corporations: containing the Laws and Customs of All the Corporations and Inferior Courts of Record in England (1702) London, various authors.

  11. 11.

    A parallel move, conflating the virtuous with the useful is the hallmark of nineteenth century utilitarian ethics.

  12. 12.

    Hart, H.L.A. Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence” in (1954) 70 LQR 37; reprinted in Hart, H.L.A. (1983) Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy Oxford University Press. Sealy & Worthington in their Cases and Materials in Company Law (2013), tenth ed. Oxford University Press) find to the contrary that “A company is very easily defined. It is the kind of legal entity or corporate body which is brought into being by the registration procedures laid down by the Companies Act…”

  13. 13.

    In fact, such conversion is not impossible. The series of propositions would specify the duties of the relevant officials to perform specified acts in aid of repayment.

  14. 14.

    Hazeltine, H.D.,Lapsey, G., Winfield, P,H. (ed.) (1936) Maitland, Selected Essays Cambridge University Press pp. 236–7.

  15. 15.

    Although the Supreme Court of the United States in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ruled that corporations enjoy freedom of speech much like individuals, it has yet to conclude that corporations could run for elected office. In Collins Steward Ltd. v. Financial Times Ltd. [2005] EWHC 262 (QB) the court held that a corporation cannot have hurt feelings.

  16. 16.

    Dewey, J. (1926) “The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality” Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXXV No. 6.

  17. 17.

    Crane, T. (2013) The Objects of Thought, Oxford University Press; Everett, A. (2013) The Nonexistent Oxford University Press; Priest, G. (2005) Towards Non-Being, Oxford University Press.

  18. 18.

    United States v. Bank of New England , 821 F.2nd 844. Cited in Hasnas, Ibid. p. 25.

  19. 19.

    It is, course, at least a question whether corporations ‘compartmentalise knowledge’ or organise specialised or ‘compartmentalised’ knowledge. The idea that the corporation somehow breaks up existing knowledge into compartmentalised components – an idea that provides the basis for the court’s ratio to the effect that the compartmentalised knowledge can be reassembled, and, once reassembled, attributed to the corporation – seems to be fanciful. The view espoused here is the exact opposite. Corporations assemble distinct disciplines and domains of knowledge, such knowledge often arising without any compartmentalisation or aggregation on the part of the corporation.

  20. 20.

    Ibid. at p. 856.

  21. 21.

    See below under ll. for the elaboration of this distinction.

  22. 22.

    For a survey of cases involving the attribution of criminal responsibility between individuals and their employer corporations see Fisse B. and Braithwaite, J. (1993) Corporations, Crime and Accountability, Cambridge University Press

  23. 23.

    Unless ‘fact’ is taken to mean the name of a corporeal object, we have an infinite regression under Hart’s theory where the putative fact cannot be defined without connecting it to some other ‘fact’. Apart from noting the mind- dependent nature of social facts, an exploration of fact formation is beyond the scope of this paper. For an interesting account of fact formation in science see Fleck, L. (1979) Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, The University of Chicago Press; Poovey, M. (1998)A History of the Modern Fact, The University of Chicago Press.

  24. 24.

    Lord Hoffmann ’s letter to the author interpreting Hart’s essay, cited above. See also Lord Hoffmann ’s advice for the Privy Council in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v Securities Commission (1995) UKPC 5 (1995) 2 AC 500.

  25. 25.

    Ibid.

  26. 26.

    Hansmann, H. and Kraakman. R.R. “The Essential Role of Organizational Law” (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal p. 387.

  27. 27.

    It is not clear if Hart intends to follow in its entirety Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations (1953) Basil Blackwell Ltd. to the effect that objects do not have a determinable existence outside of language, or just take the bit about understanding language through its usage rather than through a search for the meaning of words.

  28. 28.

    See below, and Pettit, P. (2008) Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. Princeton University Press.

  29. 29.

    For the opposite view see Hart, H.L.A. (1948) “The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights” The Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society 49, pp. 171–194.

  30. 30.

    Austin, J.L. (1962) How to do Things with Words, Second edition edited by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

  31. 31.

    It is hard to see what, if anything in Austin was not already set out by Hobbes.

  32. 32.

    The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary.

  33. 33.

    Pope Innocent lV was an eminent jurist. The decretal became a part of cannon law.

  34. 34.

    Eschman, T. (1946) “Studies on the Notion of Society in St. Thomas: St. Thomas and the Decretal of Innocent lV Romana Ecclesia, Ceterum” Medieval Studies 8: 1–42; cited in List, C. and Pettit, P. (2011) Group Agency, Oxford University Press.

  35. 35.

    The thirteenth century customary of Salisbury Cathedral tells the reader what to do when meeting a ‘persona’ (e.g. the Dean, the Treasurer or the Cantor, and its English version, ‘person’ meant someone important in the Church.) By the fourteenth century this meaning was captured in the word ‘parson’. I am grateful to Richard Conrad O.P. for the elucidation and history of these terms.

  36. 36.

    Hobbes, T. (first published in 1651) Leviathan Ed. E. Curley (1994) Hackett. Quoted in Pettit, P. (2008) Made with Words; Hobbes on Language, Mind and Politics. Princeton University Press.

  37. 37.

    Pettit, Ibid. p.56.

  38. 38.

    Murdoch, I. (1971) The Sovereignty of Good, Routledge, London.

  39. 39.

    Authorship of deontological ethics is commonly attributed to Kant, an attribution convincingly challenged by Barbara Herman in her The Practice of Moral Judgment (1993) Harvard University Press and her “On a Mismatch of Methods” in Parfit, D. (2011) On What Matters Vol. Two, Oxford University Press.

  40. 40.

    See for example Pettit, P. Group Agency, Ibid. and the bibliography cited therein.

  41. 41.

    Sententia Libri Ethicorum (Commentary on Aristotle ’s Nichomachean Ethics), 1271–2. For a detailed exposition of Aquinas’ social theory of groups and their actions see Finnis, J. (1998) Aquinas. Oxford University Press.

  42. 42.

    Moralis philosophia is one of the four types of Thomist order: (1) the sciences of matter and relationships unaffected by our thinking and studied by natural philosophy, (2) the sciences of the order with which we can sort our thinking, such as logic, (3) the sciences of the order we can bring into our deliberating, choosing and voluntary actions, called philosophia moralis, and (4) the sciences of the practical arts that bring order into matter.

  43. 43.

    Finnis, Ibid. p.27.

  44. 44.

    Aristotle De Anima 2, 4.41a16–22.

  45. 45.

    Aquinas Sententia Libri De Anima ll 6nn. 6–10, lll 14 n 9 (803).

  46. 46.

    Eschmann, Ibid.

  47. 47.

    Ryan, M. “Bartolus of Sassoferrato and Free Cities” in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society Sixth Series, X p. 84.

  48. 48.

    For a summary discussion of these encyclicals see Cortright, S. A. andNaughton, M. J. (ed.) Rethinking the Purpose of Business, University of Notre Dame Press.

  49. 49.

    Alford, H. O. P. and Naughton, M. J. “Beyond the Shareholder Model of the Firm: Working toward the Common Good of a Business” in Rethinking the Purpose of Business, Ibid.

  50. 50.

    Gaudium et spes (1965).

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    French, P. A. (1979) “The Corporation as a Moral Person.” American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 16, No. 3.

  53. 53.

    List, C. and Pettit, P. (2011) (Paperback edition 2013) Group Agency. Oxford University Press.

  54. 54.

    Jackson, F., Pettit, P. and Smith, M. (2004) Mind, Morality and Explanation: Selected Collaborations, Oxford University Press.

  55. 55.

    Ibid. p. 163 (Paperback edition).

  56. 56.

    Searle, J. R ., (1995) The Construction of Social Reality, Free Press.

  57. 57.

    Tollefsen, D. P. (2015) Groups as Agents, Polity Press.

  58. 58.

    Miller, S. (2001) Social Action, A Teleolog ical Account, Cambridge University Press.

  59. 59.

    Lawson, T. (2015) “The Nature of the Firm and Peculiarities of the Corporation”, Cambridge Journal of Economics 2015, 39, 1–32

  60. 60.

    List and Pettit recognise the difficulty and attempt to deal with it. A refutation of their attempt is beyond the scope of this paper.

  61. 61.

    Morgan, M.S. (2012) The World in the Model, Cambridge University Press

  62. 62.

    Ibid. p.

  63. 63.

    Mankiw, N. G. (2011) Principles of Economics, Cengage Learning 6th edition

  64. 64.

    Smith, A. (1910) The Wealth of Nations, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, p. 12.

  65. 65.

    Smith , A. (1978) Lectures on Jurisprudence, Oxford University Press p. 352. Cited in Rothschild, E. (2001) Economic Sentiments, Harvard University Press.

  66. 66.

    Schelle, G. (Ed.) (1913) Oeuvres de Turgot et Documents le Concernants, Ed. P Alcan, Paris 1913, Vol. 3, p. 192.

  67. 67.

    Rosenberg, A. (1988) The Philosophy of Social Science, Westview Press, Boulder.

  68. 68.

    Searle , J. (2010) Making the Social World: the structure of human civilization, Oxford University Press. Searle goes on to note that “It is … a mistake to treat money and other such instruments as if they were natural phenomena like the phenomena studied in physics, chemistry, and biology. The recent economic crisis makes it clear that they are products of massive phantasy.”

  69. 69.

    An examination of the problems with the economist’s notion of “rationality ” is beyond the scope of this paper. The point being made here is that the usual assumption to the effect that that individual and corporate motivation spring from the same well is not defensible.

  70. 70.

    See for example McMahon, C. (1995) The moral Status of Organisations. Business Ethics Quarterly 5(3): 541–554; Donaldson, T.(1982) Corporations and Morality Prentice Hall, New Jersey; French, P. A. Collective and Corporate Responsibility Columbia University Press, New York.

  71. 71.

    In historical terms, the modern corporation is the fruit of two independent, and in a sense, contradictory sources. The first of these sees the corporation as chartered and therefore created by the State. The second as a particular example of the doctrine of free association. It is this legislative power of the corporation that is bestowed upon it by the State, and that cannot be derived from the doctrine of free association. See Donaldson, T. (1982) Corporations and Morality Prentice Hall.

  72. 72.

    See, for example, Rönnegard, D. (2015) The Fallacy of Corporate Agency. Springer.

  73. 73.

    French, P. A. Collective and Corporate Responsibility. Columbia University Press; Mansell, S. F. (2013) Capitalism, Corporations and the Social Contract, Cambridge University Press.

  74. 74.

    List, C. and Pettit, P. (2011), (2013 paperback edition) Group Agency Oxford University Press, p. 184.

  75. 75.

    French, P. A. “The Corporation as a Moral Person” American Philosophical Quarterly Vol.16, Number 3, July 1979.

  76. 76.

    Ibid. P.212.

  77. 77.

    Davidson, D. “Agency”, in Agent, Action, and Reason, ed. by Binkley, Bronaugh, and Marras (Toronto, 1971). It should be noted, that Davidson and French use the term ‘intentionality’ in a sense closer to the legal concept of mens rea than the sense found in Brentano, Anscombe, Crane or Priest.

  78. 78.

    The terms “intention” and “intentionality” are used throughout this paper in the sense developed by G. E. M. Anscombe (1957) Intention, Cornell University Press.

  79. 79.

    Important ideas for building trust in corporations typically end up with proposals for new rules for corporate governance. See, For example, Mayer , C. Firm Commitment, Ibid.

  80. 80.

    For a detailed analysis of of the mandatory nature of corporate finance see Ferran, E. and Ho, L. C. (2014) “Principles of Corporate Finance Law” (Second edition), Oxford University Press.

  81. 81.

    In many instances the end result may be quite similar, but the wilful arbitrariness of the Bank of New England case could be avoided.

  82. 82.

    Rylands v. Fletcher L.R. 3 H.L. (E. & I. App) 330 (1868).

  83. 83.

    2003 2 AC 366 (House of Lords).

  84. 84.

    Under this standard employers would be liable for accidents caused by employee drivers out on ‘a frolic of their own’, but that liability would not preclude a cause of action by the employer against the employee.

  85. 85.

    A similar but somewhat ambiguous attempt is set out in the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act of 2007.

  86. 86.

    Mayer , C. (2013), “Firm Commitment” Oxford University Press, p.8.

References

  • Alford, H., and M.J. Naughton. 2002. Beyond the Shareholder Model of the Firm: Working Toward the Common Good of Business. In Rethinking the Purpose of Business, ed. S.A. Cortright and M.J. Naughton. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957. Intention. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Austin, J.L. 1962. In How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed., ed. J. Urmson and M. Sbisa. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Balkan, J. 2004. The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power. London: Constable and Robinson Ltd..

    Google Scholar 

  • Berle, A.A., and G.C. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation & Private Property. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc..

    Google Scholar 

  • Corton, D. 1995. When Corporations Rule the World. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler with Cambrian Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crane, T. 2013. The Objects of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dewey, J. 1926. The Historic Background of Cororate Legal Personality. Yale Law Journal XXXV(6): 655.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donaldson, T. 1982. Corporations and Morality. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eschman, T. 1946. Studies on the Notion of Society in St. Thomas and the Decretal of Innocent lV, Romana Ecclesia, Ceterum. Mediaeval Studies 8: 1–42.

    Google Scholar 

  • Everett, A. 2013. The Nonexistent. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferran, E., and L.C. Ho. 2014. Principles of Corporate Finance Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Finnis, J. 1998. Aquinas. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fisse, B., and J. Braithwaite. 1993. Corporations, Crime and Accountability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freeman, R., et al. 2010. Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • French, P.A. 1979. The Corporation as a Moral Person. American Philosophical Quarterly 16(3): 207.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1995. Corporate Ethics. Fort Worth: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, A., and S. Miles. 2006. Stakeholder Theory and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaudium et spes (1965) Second Vatican Council, Holy See

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodpaster, K.E. 2007. Conscience and Corporate Culture. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansmann, H., and R.R. Kraakman. 2002. The Essential Role of Organizational Law. Yale Law Journal 110: 387.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart, H.L.A. 1948. The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights. The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49: 171.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1954. Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence. Law Quarterly Review 70: 37; reprinted in Hart, H. L. A. (1983) Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haseltine, H.D., G. Lapsey, and P.H. Winfield, ed. 1936. Maitland, Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Herman, B. 1993. The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2011. On a mismatch of methods. In On What Matters, ed. D. Parfait, Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hobbes, T. (fist published in 1651) Leviathan. Curley, E. (Ed.) (1994) Hackett.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, F., P. Pettit, and M. Smith. 2004. Mind, Morality and Explanation: Selected Collaborations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, P. 2010. Making the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lawson, T. 2015a. The Modern Corporation: The Site of a Mechanism (of Global Change) That Is Out of Control. In Social Morphogenesis: Generative Mechanisms Transforming Late Modernity, ed. M. Archer. New York: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2015b. The Nature of the Firm and Peculiarities of the Corporation. Cambridge Journal of Economics 2015(39): 1–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mankiw, N.G. 2011. Principles of Economics. 6th ed. Cengage Lerning

    Google Scholar 

  • Mansell, S.F. 2013. Capitalism, Corporations and the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayer, C. 2013. Firm Commitment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McMahon, C. 1995. The Moral Status of Business Organizations. Business Ethics Quarterly 5(3): 541–554.

    Google Scholar 

  • McQueen, R. 2009. A Social History of Company Law. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, S. 2001. Social Action, a Teleological Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morgan, M.S. 2012. The World in the Model. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murdoch, I. 1971. The Sovereignty of Good. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pettit, P. 2008. Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind and Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Priest, G. 2005. Towards Non-being. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. 2002. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H., and V. Walsh. 2012. The End of Value-Free Economics. London: Palgrave.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ronnegard, D. 2015. The Fallacy of Corporate Agency. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenberg, A. 1988. The Philosophy of Social Science. Boulder: Westview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothschild, E. 2001. Economic Sentiment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryan, M. Bartolus of Sassoferrato and Free Cities. Transactions of the Royal Historical Society X: 65.Sixth Series

    Google Scholar 

  • Sealy, L.S., and S. Worthington. 2013. Cases and Materials in Company Law. 10th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J.R. 1995. The Constitution of Social Reality. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, A. 1910. The Wealth of Nations. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1978. Lectures on Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stout, L. 2012. The Shareholder Value Myth. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, J. 2006. Creating Capitalism. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc..

    Google Scholar 

  • The Law of Corporations and Inferior Courts of Record in England. 1702. London, various authors.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tollefsen, D.P. 2015. Groups as Agents. Malden: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vermeulen, T. 2009. Maximizing Shareholder Value: An Ethical Responsibility? In ed. Smith, C. and Lensen, G. Wiley, which is thoroughly refuted in Mayer, C. (2013) Firm Commitment, Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Peter Rona .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Rona, P. (2017). Ethics, Economics and the Corporation. In: Rona, P., Zsolnai, L. (eds) Economics as a Moral Science. Virtues and Economics, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53291-2_10

Download citation