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Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness in South Africa and Ghana

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Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies

Abstract

Looking at South Africa and Ghana, this chapter compares two cases of relative success in regard to democratization and the establishment of civilian control in sub-Saharan Africa. While both countries have created comprehensive frameworks for civilian control after their democratization in the 1990s, the setup and performance of oversight institutions differ to some extent. Institutions in South Africa are somewhat stronger and are more democratically balanced than in Ghana, where the military enjoys a certain amount of autonomy. However, both military organizations can be regarded as rather effective, despite financial, personal, and technical constraints. The chapter further focuses on the countries respective involvement in peacekeeping activities on the continent. By comparing their performance, conceptual shortcomings about the meaning of military effectiveness become obvious.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The insurgence was driven by various opposition parties and their aligned guerrilla forces, the most important of which were “Umkhonto we Sizwe” (MK) of the African National Congress (ANC) the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) of the Pan-African Congress (PAC). Another group was the Kwa Zulu Self Protection Force (KZSPF) of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) (Licklider 2014, 122; Sisk 1995, 61–64).

  2. 2.

    Furthermore, as some authors argue, the willingness of the military to accept change was influenced by the fact that after years of international sanctions and budget cuts, most equipment was outdated and the SANDF was eager to replace it (Ferreira and Liebenberg 2004, 61–63).

  3. 3.

    Problems consisted of inadequate and incomplete registers of the personnel from the non-statutory forces, deficient facilities, and disagreements, which in some cases led to protests among recruits (Cawthra 2003, 42; Licklider 2014, 125f). These were further aggravated by racial tensions, which in some instances led to outbreaks of violence (Mashike 2007, 613–17; Heinecken 2005a, 84).

  4. 4.

    Loyalties continue to lie with the ANC and less with civilian institutions per se (Esterhuyse 2015a). Yet, in the hegemonic party system, the lines between party and state are by no means clear-cut (Southall 2013, 134f, 166).

  5. 5.

    Allegations of corruption involved military and civilian actors, among them high-ranking figures such as Jacob Zuma, Thabo Mbeki, and then-Defense Minister Joe Modise (Griffiths 2008, 238). Initially, strong efforts by parliament and the judiciary to investigate the matter were watered down through the mobilization of party loyalties in various institutions that were trying to shed light on the matter. Though some actors were convicted of corruption—Toni Yengeni, chairperson of the JSCD, among others—the matter has not been conclusively resolved yet (Southall 2013, 158–64).

  6. 6.

    Other more recent scandals affecting the armed forces involve the illegal use of a military air base by a family with close ties to Zuma, fuelling rumors of a larger complex of corruption (BBC 2015).

  7. 7.

    With this, South Africa does rank among the top-ten troop contributing countries for UN missions, but is behind smaller countries such as Ghana (Coning and Lotze 2013, 378).

  8. 8.

    For more detail see (Vines 2010, 60; Burger 2012; Coning and Lotze 2013, 386, 393).

  9. 9.

    Such as the National Office for the Coordination of Peacekeeping Missions in the Department for International Relations and Cooperation (Coning and Lotze 2013, 380f).

  10. 10.

    Such as the Border Management Agency (PMG 2015a).

  11. 11.

    Of particular concern was the 64th Regiment, which was founded by Rawlings and served as a presidential “protective shield”. It was better-equipped, did not come under military command, and was not subordinated to civilian control. Rawlings used the 64th Regiment to repress political opponents. It was the main culprit for the governmental offenses that happened during Rawlings’ rule (Agyeman-Duah 2002, 9f).

  12. 12.

    In 2006, the institution of a competing Minister of National Security was established, whose role and mandate, however, have not yet been clarified (Aning and Lartey 2009, 5).

  13. 13.

    For example, in 2012, the Defense Budget committee made three inspections for monitoring the budget spending and met over 70 times (Ministry of Defense 2012, 9).

  14. 14.

    A 2006 survey showed that MPs know the least about military activities in comparison to other executing state agencies. More than 70% of the respondents stated that they receive information about the military first by the media (Wyjad 2006).

  15. 15.

    Another source reports an overall strength of the GAF of 10,000 and a deployment of 25% to peacekeeping operations in 2010 (Aning and Aubyn 2013, 289).

  16. 16.

    Allegations about an unfair and corrupt selection process exist but were not confirmed so far (Aning and Aubyn 2013, 283).

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Correspondence to Anne-Marie Parth or Susanne Schneider .

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Parth, AM., Schneider, S. (2017). Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness in South Africa and Ghana. In: Croissant, A., Kuehn, D. (eds) Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53189-2_6

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