Abstract
Elizabeth Anscombe took there to be three salient features of intentional objects: indeterminacy, sensitivity to the way in which they are described, and possible non-existence [1, pp. 159, 161, 171]. Relatedly, Tim Crane speaks of accuracy, aspect, and absence as features of intentional states [18, pp. 455–6]. In Edmund Husserl’s theory of intentional relations, these or similar features have been termed indeterminacy of characterization, conception-dependence, and existence-independence of intentional relations; cf. [113, pp. 11–7].
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Notes
- 1.
For an introductory discussion of intensional transitive verbs, see, e.g., Forbes [28].
- 2.
As noted in Sect. 2.4, formulas with n free variables can be viewed as intensional n-ary predicates.
- 3.
The proposition (content) expressed by the latter sentence is perfect in the sense of Kaplan [61, p. 503].
- 4.
Recall the convention about the use of the expression ‘the actual world’ agreed upon in footnote 23 in Sect. 1.4. This expression does not refer rigidly to any distinguished world. It refers to whatever world is considered as the circumstance of evaluation or the scenario in which an agent is located.
- 5.
- 6.
Fictional objects such as Sherlock Holmes are possible objects of intentional states. Therefore, they count as intentional objects. Priest analyzes fictional objects modally, in terms of worlds that ‘realize the way the agent represents things to be’: these are the worlds compatible with the agent’s representation. Similarly, intentional objects are in my account considered in relation to the set of worlds compatible with the agent’s intentional state. Non-existent intentional objects do not exist (are not realized) in the world \(w_0\) in which the agent having representations or intentional states is situated, but this fact does not render a modal analysis any less applicable. An intentional object is a world line realized over a set of worlds, whether the world \(w_0\) belongs to that set or not. In particular, intentional objects may be possible values of intentional quantifiers in \(w_0\) without being realized in \(w_0\).
- 7.
Formally the structure ‘of — as —’ of intentional states is reminiscent of Kant’s analysis of objects of cognition in terms of intuitions (representations through which objects are given to us) and concepts (through which we think about objects); cf. Gardner [32, pp. 43–4]. While people undeniably have conception-dependent object-directed intentional states, accepting them is at least prima facie compatible with realism about physical objects. For Kant, objects of cognition are of course conceptually conditioned in a much more fundamental way: objects of empirical knowledge are appearances given via intuitions and filtered through concepts, and nothing beyond these appearances is knowable. The concepts relevant for Kant’s analysis are ones like substance and causality; aspects under which an object is thought can be frying onions or listening to the radio.
- 8.
For these examples, see, e.g., Church [15, pp. 8–9], Kripke [72, Lecture III], Recanati [103, Chap. 13], and Crane [21, Sects. 1.3–4].
- 9.
Cf., however, the possibility of using informational independence to represent de objecto attitudes, as discussed in Rebuschi and Tulenheimo [102].
- 10.
I am not assuming that the content of an intentional state is always simply a propositional content. However, in Sects. 4.7 and 6.2, I will argue that all intentional states involve a propositional component (a world representation), while some intentional states involve world line components, as well (object representations). Propositional contents will be discussed in Sect. 6.4.
- 11.
Actually, if the content expressed by the sentence ‘It is raining’, when uttered in world w at time t in location s, is supposed not to be tensed and spatially indeterminate but temporally and spatially specific (that it rains at t in s), then even this content is not purely propositional but involves intentionally individuated temporal and spatial world lines: it requires the possibility of speaking of the same time and the same spatial location in relation to several worlds. For a discussion, cf. Sect. 3.6 and see Tulenheimo [119].
- 12.
It appears reasonable to think that the object of a hallucinatory experience must fail to be actually realized. Given that hallucinatory states lack a material object, it is, in any event, clear that a hallucinatory intentional object cannot share a realization with a physical object in the actual world. In Sect. 4.6, I consider in passing the possibility that an intentional object is actually realized without coinciding with the realization of any physical object, so that the intentional state lacks a material object. (This is possible if realizations of intentionally individuated world lines are wholes composed of realizations of physically individuated world lines and unrestricted world-internal composition of local objects is not assumed.) However, if there are such intentional states, they can presumably always be construed as cases of illusion rather than hallucination.
- 13.
Kant took negated concepts to be derived from positive ones [A 575/B 603]: he had his reasons for speaking of contradictorily opposed pairs rather than using negation applied to predications. Yet, the task of delineating the relevant positive/negative distinction is rather desperate, and even if it was manageable, the problem of delineating the analytic/non-analytic distinction would remain.
- 14.
According to Husserl, intentional acts pertaining to a physical object—e.g., perception—are necessarily indeterminate. Any conception under which a physical object is ‘intended’ captures only a small part of all that is actually true of it; cf. [113, p. 16].
- 15.
If distinct worlds can indeed be internally indistinguishable, the notion of ‘same world’ cannot be understood in terms of (atomic) predicates distributed over local objects in these worlds or in terms of propositions true in these worlds. I do not wish to base this notion on structural considerations either—i.e., on possible differences in how the worlds are related to other worlds in terms of accessibility relations or how their local objects are related to local objects of other worlds in terms of world lines. Rather, I take it to be a consequence of the nature of local objects that they are partitioned into cells such that elements of any one cell can be compared in terms of numerical identity but elements coming from distinct cells cannot. The relation of numerical identity among local objects gives rise to the notion of ‘same world’: worlds are distinct when their local objects cannot be compared in terms of numerical identity.
- 16.
As hinted at in footnote 12 in Sect. 3.5, the notion of logical form is not well behaved in L. Strictly speaking, we must resort to a schematic version \(S_L\) of this language to obtain a notion of logical form that behaves in the expected way; see Sect. 5.6 for details. Intensional constructions, such as think of, are discussed in more detail in Sects. 6.6–6.7.
- 17.
More generally, it could be assumed that world lines of neither type need have local objects as their realizations. This could, then, be implemented either by letting arbitrary realizations to be wholes composed of local objects or by dispensing with local objects altogether, letting realizations be atomless wholes. Instead of wholes in the sense of traditional mereology, we could alternatively consider rigid embodiments in the sense of Fine: in this way, realizations of physical and intentional world lines would themselves be, in effect, world lines defined over local objects (first option) or over portions of ‘stuff’ (second option). For a metaphysics of stuff, see, e.g., Prior [97, p. 174], [98, p. 80], [100, pp. 181–6] and Jubien [58].
- 18.
Cf. footnote 13 in Sect. 3.5.
- 19.
Beliefs, for example, have the direction of fit mind-to-world (one’s beliefs are intended as fitting the world), whereas desires have the direction of fit world-to-mind (it is intended that the world fits one’s desires). For the notion of direction of fit, see Searle [110] and Humberstone [54].
- 20.
- 21.
In Crane’s analysis, only what exists can be an entity, and existent intentional objects are ordinary physical objects. In my analysis, we may only quantify over physical objects in worlds in which they exist. It is a separate question, not to be addressed in this book, whether past individuals qualify as entities or whether we should think of them as intentional objects.
- 22.
Earlier in this book, we have encountered overlapping world lines, of which one is intentionally and the other is physically individuated (the notion of material object of an intentional state). Further, I have assumed that no two physically individuated world lines share a realization.
- 23.
Since, in (19), the predicates S and P are existence-entailing, the formula
entails 
. That is, if (19) is true and the values of x and y are, respectively, the witnesses of 
and 
, then the reason why these values satisfy 
cannot be that at least one of them fails to be realized in an accessible world. - 24.
Hintikka does not phrase his example using two types of quantifiers but simply in terms of splitting world lines. (For splitting, see Sect. 5.2.) In reality, we need two types of world lines: we have two intentional objects of visual experience that pertain to one and the same physical thing.
- 25.
For a further discussion of this point, see the end of Sect. 6.4.
- 26.
In this book, I have taken it to be sufficient for the veridicality of perceptual experience that it is a factive intentional state (Sects. 2.3, 4.4). There is, then, no guarantee that object-directed perceptual states that are veridical in this sense actually represent a physical object. If one wishes to qualify only such object-directed perceptual experiences ‘veridical’ that indeed represent a physical object, then it should be noted that the condition under which propositional experiences are veridical is much weaker and much easier to formulate than the condition under which an object-directed experience is veridical.
entails 
. That is, if (19) is true and the values of x and y are, respectively, the witnesses of 
and 
, then the reason why these values satisfy 
cannot be that at least one of them fails to be realized in an accessible world.Author information
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Tulenheimo, T. (2017). Intentional Objects as World Lines. In: Objects and Modalities. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 41. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53119-9_4
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