Keywords

We have undertaken research at a unique and critical moment in the constitutional development of the UK. In the short period between the Scottish independence referendum (September 2014) and the UK general election (May 2015), the way in which the UK was governed changed in significant ways. It was a period marked by increased attention to constitutional and governance questions, which for a time became part of mainstream political debate. With a general election on the horizon, many researchers and commentators valuably focused their attention on the question of what outcomes might ultimately be delivered and what the consequences of various commitments might be for the electoral fortunes of the political parties. Our project aimed to supplement that with a focus on an (at least) equally important aspect of this period of change, namely the process of change itself. The development of proposals for constitutional change and governance reform is often cumbersome, slow and non-linear. Often such issues are pushed down the agenda. The period of our study however saw the coming together of 15 years of devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as the long-festering ‘English Question’. In this conclusion, we pull together some of our key themes and strands of arguments.

Scotland’s Referendum as a Catalyst?

As we discussed in Chapter 1, just hours after the Scottish independence result had become clear, David Cameron linked the question of further devolution to Scotland to the question of English Votes for English Laws (EVEL).Footnote 1 For the weeks and months that followed, considerable attention was paid to the potential package of further powers to be offered to Scotland and, likewise, to the development of EVEL proposals by William Hague.Footnote 2 Other parts of the UK received less attention, as Wales’ First Minister Carwyn Jones pointed out at the time.Footnote 3 When explicitly asked about the impact of the Scottish referendum, it is therefore unsurprising that people living in different parts of the UK perceived its impact very differently. Most obviously, 82% of Scottish respondents expressing a view agreed or strongly agreed that the referendum had a lasting impact on Scotland, but a majority of English respondents (52%) said the same for England.Footnote 4 On the contrary, only a minority in Northern Ireland and Wales felt that the events in Scotland would have a substantial and lasting impact on their countries (28% and 31% respectively).

Elites that we interviewed across the UK – in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and England – were broadly in agreement that Scotland’s independence referendum had a catalysing effect on questions of governance and constitutional change. However, it is equally important to note that elites were keen to stress the distinctiveness of their place and their projects. For example, politicians closely connected with the ‘Devo Manc’ deal observed that, although the pace of negotiations and agreement during the critical juncture of the summer of 2014 were influenced by the constitutional debate taking place in Scotland, the genesis of ‘Devo Manc’ had a deeper history and must be understood on its own terms.Footnote 5 Similarly, in Northern Ireland a senior civil servant at the Assembly was clear that the devolution settlement there was a product of a unique and distinctive history and that Northern Ireland politicians and civil servants were less concerned with mimicking the powers that would be handed to Scotland, and more concerned with getting the right package of powers for Northern Ireland.Footnote 6 Indeed, the preference for the devolution of corporation tax over income tax exemplifies that point.

Asked about the impact of the referendum, and the subsequent Smith Commission process, on the rest of the UK, our Scottish elites generally recognised that the UK had been dragged to a constitutional focal point. However, those same Scottish elites who were closely involved with the Smith Commission, either as members or civil servants supporting it, made it clear that Scotland could not throw on the brakes on 19 September and move at the pace of the slowest part of the UK.Footnote 7 Implicit in their remarks was the notion that Scotland had to move forward at its own pace, maintaining the momentum from the referendum and fulfilling the terms of the ‘Vow’. One of the interviewees specifically remarked that Wales, for example, ‘needed to start thinking for itself and answering the question “what is suitable for Wales?”…These calls for Wales to just get the same powers as Scotland gets are not very helpful or thoughtful’.Footnote 8

Whitehall civil servants did not especially entertain the notion of a comprehensive constitutional conversation in which the futures of Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, England’s cities and city-regions, and the question of EVEL might be considered together. One civil servant from the Treasury, in a very matter of fact way, pointed out: ‘that’s not how we do constitutional change. We either do things very slowly, and avoid major changes; I give you the House of Lords. Or we do things quickly and as a result quite poorly; I give you devolution’.Footnote 9 The notion that the pause button would be hit on 19 September and that Ed Miliband’s call for a comprehensive debate about how the UK governs itself – in the form of a constitutional convention – might have been answered was regarded as an unlikely prospect.Footnote 10 Most interesting is that, sometimes explicitly other times implicitly, many of the civil servants we spoke to saw Miliband’s suggestion as unlikely to be taken up but not because of party politics – indeed, a Conservative Prime Minister would not want to be seen to be following the lead of the Opposition Leader; rather, his ideas would be rejected because they were anathema to the ad-hoc, piecemeal way that the UK handles questions of governance and the constitution.Footnote 11 Politicians who we interviewed were prone to embrace the principle of a convention but quick to enter a caveat to that embrace with questions about how involved the public would truly wish to be with such a process.Footnote 12

An Informed and Engaged Public?

Our research demonstrated that, at least at the period when our survey was conducted, people across the UK were open to the possibility of talking more about how UK citizens govern themselves. Indeed, it was a minority of people in all four constituent parts of the UK (ranging from 25% in Wales to 29% in Northern Ireland) who felt that too much time was being spent discussing how the UK is governed. A potentially fair critique of those figures is that the survey was taken at a time of heightened awareness of constitutional and governance issues. Such questions had made their way to the top of the agenda, politicians were fully engaged with them, the media were covering them, and thus the public’s interest was unnaturally aroused. But it would be equally plausible to argue that the public might have been feeling saturated by all that discussion and wanting new topics and new issues to come along. Ultimately, only further survey evidence would be able to confirm whether such levels of interest have longevity or not.

Certainly at the point in time of the survey, the possibility of some form of constitutional convention could potentially have gained traction with the public. 60% or more of respondents in each of the four constituent parts of the UK either agreed or strongly agreed with the proposal for such a convention. Furthermore, the question we posed was clearly about a UK-wide constitutional convention, suggesting that although people in the constituent parts of the UK have distinctive views about their own devolution settlements, and the role of their country in the overall framework of the UK, a significant majority are prepared to engage with a process that is UK-wide and holistic. Not only that but, when asked how much of their own time they would be willing to contribute to such a convention, only around a quarter of people (24% in Scotland to 30% in Wales) responded ‘none at all’. The vast majority of people, at that particular moment in time, were prepared to contribute in some way to a constitutional convention that had the aim of thinking holistically about how the UK governs itself.

Beyond a general willingness to talk about the constitution and to engage with any process of change that government might propose, our survey revealed a public that was often very aware of political processes and able to accurately estimate the impact of such processes on their respective country, as well as their country’s role in, and importance to, the process. There also seems to be some congruence between the views of the public and the views of their political leaders. There was, for example, a distinct awareness of the relative degree of representation of different constituent parts of the UK in the constitutional change process. Welsh and Northern Irish respondents felt significantly less well represented than their English or Scottish counterparts, a feeling echoed by Wales’ First Minister. Such nuances in the data caution against overstating any uniform approach across the UK to constitutional change; people from different countries are starting with very different understandings of how the system represents them (or does not) and whether the system works for them (or does not). The constitutional change process seemed to be quite significantly accelerated in Scotland and England following the independence referendum but far less so in Wales, for example.

Understanding that there is not one singular public, but a variety of publics, is crucial if decision-makers want to ensure that the changes they organise become meaningful for, and accepted by, the people they affect. Importantly, the stratification in attitudes towards constitutional change does not solely relate to demographic characteristics, such as levels of education and age, but also to the constituent parts of the UK that people live in. In other words, the political context that people live in matters and is relevant in understanding the attitudes that they form. This sort of nuanced understanding of public attitudes was largely absent amongst most of the elites we interviewed for the project. The exceptions were some of the representatives of civic society.

Two Case Studies of Constitutional Change

Despite evidence of a public ready and willing to engage, the two case studies of actual constitutional or governance change that we explored in-depth were both disappointing processes, measured by the opportunities available for public engagement. But the cases did allow us to more clearly juxtapose the beliefs of elites about both the desirability and possibility of public engagement in such processes, with the attitudes of the public themselves. Public engagement in both the Smith Commission process (see Chapter 4) and ‘Devo Manc’ (not to mention other city and city-region devolution deals in England; see Chapter 6) took different forms although in all instances were rather limited.

A very rapid process of public consultation was part of the Smith Commission process; any member of the public could submit their views in written form via the Commission’s website and many thousands did. The civil servants who provided secretariat support to the Commission combed through the submissions, digesting each one and producing summary documents, in what was a major feat of information processing.Footnote 13 Yet, ultimately, we were told by those involved in the process that public submissions of evidence ultimately made little difference to the course of the negotiations. Insofar as they were used at all by the politicians in the negotiations, they were used as grist to predefined mills. They did not change minds as much as they were used to reinforce arguments that were already in the minds of the politicians around the table. Even the submissions from civil society organisations had a fairly limited impact, a function of the lack of time available for such organisations to develop more fully formed proposals and for a genuine dialogue-based consultation process to be undertaken.

The civil servants we interviewed about the Smith Commission were largely uncritical of the process, viewing it as technically successful because it reached an agreement to an agreed timetable. The politicians felt that, in the aftermath of the independence referendum and an intense period of discussion about Scotland’s possible constitutional futures, little could be learned from a more comprehensive exercise of public engagement. There was a sense that after the high stakes debates on the independence referendum, levels of public interest would fall away once attention turned to technical questions of taxation and welfare devolution. These arguments were blended with the pragmatic arguments voiced by the civil servants – that time was of the essence and an agreement was needed in short order – to justify a cursory effort at public engagement. The process was thus entirely driven, and the outcome determined, by elites.

The ‘Devo Manc’ process was even less engaging of the public than the Smith Commission. Local political leaders and local government officials articulated similar pragmatic concerns to the elites we interviewed in Scotland in connection with Smith. They stressed that the deal was done over a short space of time in the summer of 2014. They assumed an absence of interest on the part of the public in what they perceived to be technical questions of devolution. What was different in ‘Devo Manc’ was an embrace of the secrecy of the negotiations, a justification of the process not only as the most pragmatic way forward, but as the only way to secure a deal at all. The concern articulated by local politicians and local government officials was that public engagement could potentially derail the ‘Devo Manc’ deal. The shadow of Labour’s unsuccessful 2004 regional assembly referendum hung over the process and local leaders in Greater Manchester were determined to secure a package of powers from the UK government and then ‘sell’ the deal to their public, rather than engage their public upfront and risk public opposition to the deal.

What unifies the elite attitudes in both case studies is a presumption that public attitudes are known. In the case of the Smith Commission, the attitude was that nothing could be learned from further engagement. Politicians were confident that they were delivering a package of powers that, broadly speaking, aligned with public opinion. In the case of ‘Devo Manc’, the key figures felt that what they were negotiating might be instinctively opposed by the public and thus chose to proceed in secret and win over the public at a later date. Both were also unified by a sense that public engagement would be at best limited, given the technical nature of the policy discussions in both cases. The survey evidence we have presented calls the second assumption into question. Whilst we did not ask for specific policy preferences regarding further devolution to Scotland, we did ask people in England about various options for new governance arrangements, both for England as a whole, and within England. Our findings suggest a public that is open-minded to many potential developments in English governance, including city-region devolution deals.

Multiple Answers to Multiple English Questions?

That opinion in England about potential developments regarding the governance of England is nuanced was our final major finding. Our survey makes clear that there is no single, simple answer to the ‘English Question’. While approval for EVEL was strong across the English regions, for example, other propositions, such as regional assemblies and devolution to city-regions also found approval in most regions of England. These alternatives are not, of course, mutually exclusive. The idea that there are simple and easy fixes through a technical change to the procedures at Westminster is thus highly questionable. Our findings highlight repeatedly that both the structures and the processes of constitutional change matter if our aim is to understand how public attitudes are shaped. Approval for particular constitutional options in public opinion surveys should not be mistaken for evidence that such changes would consequently alter public perceptions in a lasting manner.

If the people of England were to be properly engaged in a constitutional debate by their political leaders, our survey suggests that regional assemblies, city-regions, EVEL and indeed perhaps other ideas we did not think to ask about, could all be met with a receptive ear. It is vital not to over-claim on the back of a public attitudes survey and claim that issues as sociologically complex as the ‘English Question’ can be solved simply.Footnote 14 Our data tell us little about the intensity of people’s preferences, but it does tell us that the public are open-minded and ready to discuss these difficult questions.

Understanding Publics, Elites and their Interactions

An understanding of both publics and elites in relation not just to preferences, but also perceptions relating to processes, is crucial if we want to identify ways for these two groups to interact and to understand how greater congruence can be forged between changes in how the UK and its parts are governed and the attitudes of the people affected. To achieve this, it is imperative that the often lamented disengagement of publics from certain classic, representative forms of political engagement are not mistaken for an agnostic or apathetic position that people have towards how they are governed. While a considerable amount of careful research will need to be undertaken to explore the exact mechanisms that underlay it, it is likely that such misconceptions will be part of the story as we begin to understand the reasons that led to a majority of UK voters to choose to leave the EU on 23 June 2016.

Likewise, but in the other direction, a similarly complex consideration may explain why, in that same referendum, majorities of voters in Scotland and in Northern Ireland preferred that the UK should remain in the EU. It would not be enough to infer that people in these areas are less sceptical of the EU than voters in Wales or England. It may well have been, for example, that the difference of Scotland from England arose because enough Scottish voters who had voted in 2014 for Scottish independence saw a divergent Scottish result as a political lever to force yet further devolution of power from the UK state. That kind of political manoeuvring is quite consistent with indifference or scepticism towards the EU. And it would suggest that Scottish voters, after many years of constitutional debate, are as skilled as any elites at extracting concessions.

Our research suggests that there is not only a responsibility for decision-makers to engage more comprehensively with the attitudes of the people they represent but also for researchers to more explicitly consider the interplay between elite and mass opinion. Many projects tend to only refer to one while making many assumptions about the other. However, both the influences on individuals’ decision-forming processes and the reasons why elites take certain actions are complex. Research that emphasises one, but only engages in very simplistic ways with the other, does not deepen understanding but might actually deepen existing misconceptions. That does not mean that every research project has to address every possible actor’s conceptions, but there is space to conduct more work that aims to extend our comprehension of how public and elite perceptions relate to each other.

The specific insights from studying the changed voter franchise in Scotland by allowing 16-year olds to vote are very encouraging in showing that voters engaged with politics. A change in the constitutional setup, coupled with changed processes of engagement, in particular through schools (alongside other channels) seems to have had positive effects on the civic attitudes of this age group, and their political engagement beyond the Scottish independence referendum itself. These changes clearly affected the general population – with a majority of Scots now approving of earlier enfranchisement – and also resulted in certain political actors changing their views on young people’s political engagement, most notably the Conservative party group in the Scottish Parliament. Further moments of constitutional change that enable us to tap into the willingness and ability of citizens to engage, especially those who currently feel less well represented, could help to alter some of the existing discrepancies between elite and public attitudes.

We have seen in our findings that there is a potential for states such as the UK to engage with citizens to a much greater extent than they currently do. Citizens demonstrate a willingness to discuss how they are governed and to contribute to organised forms of deliberation. Recent political events have sometimes been cited as showing that democracy is in crisis, that a revolt of the disengaged against the elites who rule them threatens the stability of democratic systems. UK voters choosing to leave the EU, or US voters choosing the demagogic outsider Donald Trump against the supremely elite insider Hillary Clinton, have been interpreted as rebelling against the governing system itself. Our research suggests a more optimistic view of voters’ propensity to engage. The people who responded to our survey had well-developed views on the range of complex options that are available for reforming how the UK is governed. Our findings do not suggest a society of nihilists. The problems for democracy may arise when we consider the main conclusion from the other aspect of our findings – the deliberate remoteness from public engagement of the elites who were taking decisions about constitutional maters. So our final conclusion is that if the elites will talk to people, they will find, not unreasoned anger, but ready partners in dialogue.