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A Deviation Index Proposal to Evaluate Group Decision Making Based on Equilibrium Solutions

  • Alexandre Bevilacqua LeonetiEmail author
  • Fernanda de Sessa
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing book series (LNBIP, volume 274)

Abstract

The equilibrium proposed by Nash provides a basis from which group decisions can be selected. This kind of choice establishes a situation in which none of the participants will have any incentive to change their strategy if they are acting rationally, which is the major assumption of game theory. Leoneti proposed a utility function that allows multi-criteria problems to be modeled as games in order to find alternatives that meet the Nash equilibrium conditions for solving conflicts in group decision-making process. The objective of this research was to propose a deviation index from the theoretical rational decision (the Nash equilibrium solution) and to discuss the use of this index as an indicator of the theoretical rationality deviation. In accordance with other results presented in the literature, it was found that the group might not always choose this alternative, deviating from the equilibrium solutions, measured here by a deviation index.

Keywords

Nash equilibrium Game theory Group-decision making 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the National Council of Technological and Scientific Development (CNPq) for Regular Research Grant (458511/2014-5), and the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) for the Scientific Initiation Scholarship (2014/09540-0) and for the grant for Paper Presentation (2016/03722-5). The authors also acknowledge the helpful comments of two anonymous referees.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ribeirão Preto School of Economics, Administration and AccountingUniversity of São PauloSão PauloBrazil

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