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Building Stones for a New Monetary World Order

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Part of the book series: Economic and Financial Law & Policy – Shifting Insights & Values ((EFLP,volume 1))

Abstract

As has been mentioned before, in this chapter of the current book, an attempt will be made to establish what a monetary system which would relinquish the principles of (neo-)Smithian selfishness and would, on the contrary, aim at establishing a more just (and more altruistic) economic order, could look like.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Ann Pettifor has phrased this as the necessity for a willingness:

    [to] move on beyond Adam Smith towards a fuller understanding of the public good that is credit. (See Pettifor 2014)

  2. 2.

    See e.g. Ingham (2005a), p. xxii; Ingham (2005b), pp. 222–224, especially p. 237.

    It needs no further saying that this approach is opposed to the principles of economic neo-liberalism which, on the contrary, holds that there is no such thing as “a general good” (or, by extension, as “public goods”) (see Rand 2008, p. 12).

  3. 3.

    Compare Van Steelandt (2014), pp. 20–24, especially 20.

  4. 4.

    In case mankind would ever be willing to consider implementing the ideas brought forward in these present chapter and Chap. 5 of this book, it will obviously be necessary to work said ideas out in more detail (for instance in the treaty (ies) and other rules and regulations dealing with the to-be-established “New Monetary World Order”).

  5. 5.

    Recently, this has even led to the questioning of the national state model itself (e.g. in the works of John Breuilly of the “London School of Economics”); see furthermore Mackenzie (2014), pp. 55–65.

    On the interaction between the national state model and the issue of (social and economic) globalization, see especially Stiglitz (2006), p. 19.

  6. 6.

    See e.g. Umbach and Wessels (2008), pp. 54–68.

  7. 7.

    A similar result as reached by means of a monetary union can be obtained when a country starts using the currency of another country. The IMF qualifies both systems as so-called “exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender”. (See e.g. International Monetary Fund 1999, p. 164.)

    See furthermore Fase and Vleminckx (1995), p. 156; Healey and Levine (1993), pp. 371–386, especially p. 372.

  8. 8.

    About the “genesis” of the EMU, see e.g. Bertaut and Iyigun (1999), pp. 655–666; Louis (1993), pp. 285–299; Bonneau (1999), p. 16, no 26 ; see also De economische en monetaire unie en België. In: Trefpunt Economie, (1999), pp. 3–5.

  9. 9.

    Compare Galbraith (1996), p. 128; Mateos y Lago et al. (2011), pp. 91–116.

  10. 10.

    Compare Stiglitz (2006), p. 21, and this author’s further arguments about the problematic nature of acquiring monetary reserves (at pp. 148–149 of the quoted book).

  11. 11.

    On the disastrous effects of an economy which is too much based on competition, see also Oxfam (2016), p. 16.

  12. 12.

    Financial institutions are among the most important players on the (international) exchange markets often practicing so-called “proprietary trading” (for their own account) (see Loizou 2012, p. 165).

  13. 13.

    Loizou (2012), p. 161 a.f., pointing out that at the time when he wrote his book, the daily trade of currencies, on average, amounted to 4 trillion USD (“4 biljoen USD”).

  14. 14.

    Quoted by Newman (2010).

    See also Mundell (1996), pp. 74–81; Mundell (2000), pp. 57–84; Pdoa-Schioppa (2011), pp. 51–73, especially p. 61.

  15. 15.

    DEY hereby stands for “dollar-euro-yen”.

  16. 16.

    The word “INTOR” is formed by a contraction of the words “international” and “or”, the latter itself being the French word for “gold”.

  17. 17.

    See Newman (2010). See also Stevenson (2009).

  18. 18.

    Pettifor (2014), deriving further arguments from the works of Keynes.

  19. 19.

    Such a global New Monetary Order will, of course, also imply free trade and free capital and free payment traffic.

  20. 20.

    Johnson (2014), pp. 79–103.

  21. 21.

    See also Johnson (2014), pp. 79–103, especially p. 87.

  22. 22.

    Johnson (2014), pp. 79–103, especially p. 87.

  23. 23.

    Harari (2014), pp. 372–373.

  24. 24.

    Per definition: to accumulate the largest possible receivable position towards the flow of goods and services produced by the world economy.

  25. 25.

    See the statement of, for instance, Ayn Rand that there exists no such thing as “the general good” (see Rand 2008, p. 12).

  26. 26.

    Dawkins (2006), pp. 9–10 has stated this as follows:

    Recently there has been a reaction against racialism and patriotism, and a tendency to substitute the whole human species as the object of our fellow feeling. This humanist broadening of the target of our altruism has an interesting corollary, which again seems to buttress the ‘good of the species’ idea in evolution. The politically liberal, who are normally the most convinced spokesmen of the species ethic, now often have the greatest scorn for those who have gone a little further in widening their altruism, so that it includes other species. If I say that I am more interested in preventing the slaughter of large whales than I am in improving housing conditions for people, I am likely to shock some of my friends.

    (…)

    The muddle in human ethics over the level at which altruism is desirable – family, nation, race, species, or all living things – is mirrored by a parallel muddle in biology over the level at which altruism is to be expected according to the theory of evolution.

  27. 27.

    It is here not further explored to what extent this presentation of Smith’s works is based on a fully correct interpretation of all of these works (see above, at marg. 122 of Chap. 3 of this book). What matters more is how his works have influenced and inspired ages of capitalist practices, and how these themselves have shaped the world into the detrimental state it finds itself in today.

  28. 28.

    Defending the policy choice for selfishness and egoism has been explained in a so-called “rationalized” way, which comes as no surprise as, historically speaking, economic liberalism has itself emerged from the schools of enlightenment who aimed to explain all human behavior, including economic transactions, as the result of rational processes (see above, at Sect. 3.4.2 of Chap. 3 of this book) (compare Rand 2008, p. 19).

    Given the way the world looks like after only a few ages of such “rational” behavior while at the same time realizing that it already exist for ±4.5 billion years, having based human sciences on this extreme rationalization idea may have proven one of the biggest mistakes in the history of mankind.

    Moreover, under further reference to, for instance, Herbert Marcuse, one can even wonder whether the policy choices made under impulse of economic liberalism and economic neo-liberalism deserve to be qualified as truly “rational” given their detrimental consequences (see above, at marg. 169 of Chap. 3 of this book).

  29. 29.

    A further motivation for this can be borrowed from the works of the Belgian moral philosopher Jaap Kruithof, in his plea for an ethical world policy which would abandon “anthropocentrism” and would instead prioritize the care for the global eco-system (in an ultimate sense, this is earth with all its surroundings) (see in general Kruithof 1985), or also from the works of Emanuel Levinas, from which we can rephrase that “the self” does not only need to recognize the needs of “the Other” but, based upon an understanding of being responsible for “the Other”, also effectively needs to prioritize these needs (even above his own selfish needs; see above, under Sect. 3.6.4.2.2 of Chap. 3 of this book).

  30. 30.

    This insight is supported by the findings of (modern) biology itself:

    An entity, such as a baboon, is said to be altruistic if it behaves in such a way as to increase another such entity’s welfare at the expense of its own. Selfish behaviour has exactly the opposite effect. ‘Welfare’ is defined as ‘chances of survival’, even if the effect on actual life and death prospects is so small as to be negligible. (Dawkins 2006. pp. 9–10).

  31. 31.

    Rand (2008), p. 19.

  32. 32.

    According to Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mara_%28demon%29; last consulted on October 15th 2015), in Buddhism, Mara is the demon that tempted Gautama Buddha by trying to seduce him with the vision of beautiful women who, in various legends, are often said to be Mara’s daughters. In Buddhist cosmology, Mara personifies unwholesome impulses, unskillfulness, and the “death” of the spiritual life. Mara is hence a tempter, distracting humans from practicing the spiritual life by making mundane things alluring, or by making the negative seem positive.

    It does not need to surprise that this theme lies at the basis of masterpieces of world literature exploring the so-called “Faust”-theme, such as obviously Goethe’s “Faust” itself, in addition to, for instance, Thomas Mann’s masterwork “Doctor Faustus”.

    Compare these insights of Buddhism to the findings of Tim Kasser in his earlier quoted book “The high price of materialism”. (See above, Further Illustration 3.1 in Chap. 3 of this book.)

  33. 33.

    See also Harari (2014), pp. 250–251.

  34. 34.

    About this question, see Habets and Gloudemans (2013), p. 23.

  35. 35.

    What Ayn Rand has basically upheld is, in biblical terms, that, faced with the choice between worshipping God or worshipping the mammon (see Luke 16, 13), man should choose for worshipping the mammon.

    See furthermore Rand (1982), pp. 27 a.f., where Ayn Rand has argued that altruism serves as a tool for the rationalization of all kinds of abuses, going from mass slaughters in Sovjet Russia, the legalized looting in the welfare state, the power lust of politicians seeking to serve the common good, the concept of common good itself, etc.

    See furthermore Rand (1982), p. 83, where Rand describes altruism as “the poison of death in the blood of western civilization”.

  36. 36.

    On the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies, see e.g. Galbraith (1973), pp. 38–39.

  37. 37.

    Even in the classical “Aristotelian” sense of the word, to be read as a world where no-one takes more, or receives less, of what is good than what is his ethical part (see above, at marg. 271–272 of Chap. 3 of this book).

  38. 38.

    One should also take into consideration the possible impact of a complete economic and financial failure in case mankind would continue to adhere to the opposite choice as has been made since the seventeenth century, namely the choice for an unbridled selfishness as the guiding principle of economy, which has also increasingly determined the operation of the current IMF over the past decades (albeit greed and selfishness had already earlier on in history determined economic choices, a fact against which prominent philosophers and religious leaders like Plato, Aristotle and Jesus Christ, had strongly protested).

    See furthermore Krugman (2004), p. 454; Stiglitz (2003), p. 196.

    Stiglitz has described the policy choices of the IMF as follows:

    We have an obvious problem: a public institution created to address certain failures in the market but currently run by economists who have both a high level of confidence in markets and little confidence in public institutions. (Stiglitz 2003, p. 196). See also Harvey (2010), p. 55.

  39. 39.

    Especially also in terms of life chances; see for this the so-called “condemned to stay poor-syndrome.

  40. 40.

    Compare Stiglitz’s appeal for stronger international institutions; see Stiglitz (2006), p. 21.

  41. 41.

    Whereby the cash reserves retained by the market players who are authorized to create private money, mainly private banks, normally is not taken into account when calculating the total amount of “chartal” or “cash” money that has been issued by the central monetary institution.

  42. 42.

    I.e. the total of claims on private banks, regardless of the fact that such claims are generated either as a counterclaim for an original cash deposit or for a scriptural payment transaction, or as the result of a commitment from a private bank to grant a credit.

  43. 43.

    And hence of a claim towards the bank such an account represents (which, from a contract law point of view, forms the counterpart of the scriptural obligation of the bank itself).

  44. 44.

    See e.g. De Grauwe (2014), p. 190.

    It should be pointed out that in classical economic writings, money forms have been further classified dependent on their long or short term convertibility into cash (“chartal”) money. However, from a more legal approach, the basic distinction is the one between “chartal” money (i.e. the cash money created by a central bank or similar (governmental) institution) and “scriptural” money (i.e. money created by a private bank or similar financial institution when it grants a private credit).

  45. 45.

    Harari (2014), pp. 198–199.

  46. 46.

    Martin has put this as follows:

    The vast majority of our national money – around 90 per cent in the US, for example, and 97 per cent in the UK – has no physical existence at all. It consists merely of our account balances at our banks. The only tangible apparatus employed in most monetary payments today is a plastic card and a keypad. (See Martin 2013, p. 13.)

    See also Deweirdt a.o. who explain the historical evolution of scriptural money creation in Belgium. These authors point out that scriptural money has steadily grown during the second half of the twentieth century. In the 1950s, scriptural money accounted for ±40% of the total amount of money in Belgium, a percentage which has in the 1990s already risen to ±70% (see Deweirdt et al. 1997, p. 33).

  47. 47.

    http://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/banknotes/circulation/html/index.nl.html (last consulted on September 23th 2014).

  48. 48.

    http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pdf/md/md1410.pdf (last consulted on November 27th 2014).

  49. 49.

    http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pdf/md/md1410.pdf (last consulted on November 27th 2014).

  50. 50.

    http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pdf/md/md1410.pdf (last consulted on November 27th 2014).

  51. 51.

    http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/current/#t3tg1f3; last consulted on December 10th 2014.

  52. 52.

    http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/h6/discm3.htm; last consulted on December 10th 2014.

  53. 53.

    http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/20060316/; last consulted on December 10th 2014.

  54. 54.

    http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/current/; last consulted on December 10th 2014.

  55. 55.

    http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/money/ms/ms1411.pdf; last consulted on December 10th 2014.

  56. 56.

    http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/money/ms/ms1411.pdf; last consulted on December 10th 2014.

  57. 57.

    http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/euro/circulation/html/index.en.html (last consulted on April 1st, 2016).

  58. 58.

    https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pdf/md/md1602.pdf (last consulted on April 1st, 2016).

  59. 59.

    https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pdf/md/md1602.pdf (last consulted on April 1st, 2016).

  60. 60.

    https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pdf/md/md1602.pdf (last consulted on April 1st, 2016).

  61. 61.

    http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/current/#t5tg1f1 (last consulted on April 1st, 2016).

  62. 62.

    http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/current/#t5tg1f1 (last consulted on April 1st, 2016).

  63. 63.

    http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/money/ms/ms1602.pdf (last consulted on April 1st, 2016).

  64. 64.

    http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/money/ms/ms1602.pdf (last consulted on April 1st, 2016).

  65. 65.

    Of course, it is rather uncertain that such a hypothetical situation would actually occur. It needs, for instance, to be taken into consideration that the large fortunes of the “Forbes-top 10” members, are most probably not easily convertible in cash as they most probably consist of all kinds of goods not easily to be sold, and certainly not on the same moment, such as, spread over many countries, different types of tangible assets (real estate, all kinds of consumer goods, art, etc.), in addition to all types of financial instruments, among which shares held in the big enterprises the rich of the planet control, and probably also huge amounts of cash money and/or immediately available bank deposits. Needless to say that a (speedy) conversion of such fortunes would not be an easy task.

  66. 66.

    http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001&plugin=1 (last consulted on December 4th 2014).

  67. 67.

    See furthermore Galbraith (1990).

  68. 68.

    Galbraith (1975), p. 21.

  69. 69.

    See one of the main objectives of the I.M.F. laid down in article I. (ii) of the Articles of Agreement: “to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy” (at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/#art1; last consulted on March 30th 2016).

  70. 70.

    Who still would doubt this is advised to read Luyendijk (2015).

  71. 71.

    Vandewalle (1976), p. 101.

    On the Marxist ideas about money, see Mandel (1962), tII, pp. 252 a.f.

  72. 72.

    http://www.themoneymasters.com/the-money-masters/famous-quotations-on-banking/ (last consulted on November 28th 2014).

  73. 73.

    http://www.themoneymasters.com/the-money-masters/famous-quotations-on-banking/ (last consulted on November 28th 2014).

  74. 74.

    http://www.themoneymasters.com/the-money-masters/famous-quotations-on-banking/ (last consulted on November 28th 2014).

  75. 75.

    http://www.themoneymasters.com/the-money-masters/famous-quotations-on-banking/ (last consulted on November 28th 2014).

  76. 76.

    http://www.themoneymasters.com/the-money-masters/famous-quotations-on-banking/ (last consulted on November 28th 2014).

  77. 77.

    Pettifor (2014).

  78. 78.

    Treanor (2014).

  79. 79.

    This is the (false) promise of the so-called “trickle down-economics”.

  80. 80.

    One of the first economists to have pointed this out was John Kenneth Galbraith (see especially Galbraith 1974, 295 p.; see furthermore Lipton 2014).

    Galbraith has in this regard also pointed out that, because of this, modern man barely does not dispose of any real free time for doing anything else than providing labor to capital.

    As elaborated before (see above, under Sects. 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 of Chap. 3 of this book), banking discipline has furthermore almost disappeared over the past years, also and especially at the level of private money creation, which was favored, particularly from the end of 1980s, both by the liberalization and the de-regularization of the credit and financial system, as well as by implementing new financial techniques, such as securitization of claims and comparable techniques, which have allowed banks to divest their credit portfolio’s into separate vehicles the financing of which is left to third party depositors and/or investors (and, because of this, the estimated solvency of the borrowers has become secondary for banks, as under these conditions the credit risk is ultimately passed on to third parties).

  81. 81.

    One may, furthermore, refer to a saying of William Paterson (1658–1719), one of the founders of the “Bank of England” in 1694: “The bank hath benefit of interest on all moneys which it creates out of nothing.” (See http://www.themoneymasters.com/the-money-masters/famous-quotations-on-banking/ (last consulted on November 28th 2014.)

  82. 82.

    See Luyendijk (2015).

  83. 83.

    As has already been pointed out before; see above, Further Illustration 3.6.

  84. 84.

    Once again, reference can be made to Galbraith (1990).

  85. 85.

    Kruithof (1985), p. 84.

    And in case one would be inclined to doubt the vision of Kruithof, reference can even be made to the quotes mentioned earlier in this treatise of, for instance, Henry Ford and the Rothschild-brothers (see above, at marg. 3 of Chap. 3 of this book), in addition to the similar views shared by the most diverse historical figures, such as Karl Marx and some of the “founding fathers” and early presidents of the USA itself (see above, at marg. 29 of this chapter).

    Pettifor (2014) has phrased this concern as follows:

    The challenge now facing the world is this: can democratic states regain control over “the fate of currencies, social systems, public infrastructures, private savings etc.” – or are we forever beholden and victim to unseen and unaccountable ‘creditor-gods’?

    Are the world’s people, their social and political organisations, their small and large businesses going to tolerate regular financial and economic crises, in which the ‘creditor-gods’ make all the gains, raid the balance sheets of taxpayer-backed central banks, while real incomes of taxpayers fall, governments remain supine, opportunities for this and future generations diminish, and social and political breakdown threaten? Or is it inevitable that people will mobilise – behind reactionary as well as democratic political organisations – to resist such onslaughts on their taxes and living standards?

    Given the challenge posed to Haute Finance by right-wing and fascist political parties in for example the Euro area, and given the weakness of more progressive political organisations, my own prognosis is pessimistic.

  86. 86.

    See already Hoefnagels (1975), pp. 12 a.f.

  87. 87.

    See furthermore Gore (2013a), p. 37 (also: Gore 2013b, p. 59).

  88. 88.

    See especially Galbraith (1990).

  89. 89.

    And moreover based upon an ideology (namely “economic neo-liberalism”) which opposes any kind of support to the benefit of the poor and the deprived, under the argument that such support would stimulate laziness.

  90. 90.

    A.o. by having bought bank shares and by simultaneously having bought, guaranteed or insured toxic banks assets (see Skidelsky 2010, p. 17).

  91. 91.

    See McDonald and Robinson (2009), p. 308; see also Smithers (2013), p. 87; Krugman (2012), p. 114.

  92. 92.

    Engelen (2011), pp. 28–29. See also Geysels (2014), pp. 11–59, especially pp. 20–21; Streeck (2015), p. 85.

  93. 93.

    Compare Claerhout (2014a), p. 6; Claerhout (2014b), pp. 36–38 (containing an interview with Sheila Bair, former president of the US “Financial Stability Board”).

  94. 94.

    Compare Boccara et al. (2011), pp. 207–221, especially p. 218.

  95. 95.

    Galbraith (1987), p. 12.

  96. 96.

    One could even think of credits against negative interests (i.e. basically credits which would not be reimbursable in full). This could, for instance, be the case for student loans, credits to the (very) poor, etc.

  97. 97.

    See also Galbraith (1992), p. 93, who has pointed that (high) interest charging has been devastating for the modal man.

  98. 98.

    In this way, government policy becomes very “paradoxal”: governments that accumulate their financial means mainly through taxing the lower and middle classes, decide to use these means to reward the rich classes by subsidizing big enterprises (owned by these rich classes). As a result, it is made possible for such big enterprises to make even more profits (which are hardly taxed themselves), while, at the same time, the big enterprises threaten the subsidizing governments that in case the latter would not be willing to grant or maintain such subsidies, they will re-allocate to another country, thus harming the local economy of the country they thus would abandon even more.

  99. 99.

    Stiglitz has in this regard pointed out that the future of Europe and the euro depends on whether the Eurozone’s political leaders will be able combine a modicum of economic understanding with a visionary sense of, and concern for, European solidarity (based, a.o., upon a unitized tax model) (see Stiglitz 2015b).

  100. 100.

    See Stiglitz (2003), p. 55, on the impact of this attitude on government deficits.

  101. 101.

    Lipton (2014).

  102. 102.

    Compare Galbraith (1979), p. 93. See also the ideas of Rudolf Goldscheid on the limits of the so-called tax state (Streeck 2015, pp. 112 a.f.).

  103. 103.

    As already explained before, as governments of most (Western and Western inspired) countries are but the expression of systems of “Corporatocracy”, such government skimming by taxing the lower and middle classes, comes, bluntly put, down to a system by which the reach steal from the poorer and middle classes. (See already Plato (1987), pp. 298 a.f.)

    More recent: Oxfam (2014), p. 14; Sachs (2011), p. 118.

    See also the opinion of Stiglitz that the financial and monetary problems (some member-states of) the European Union has (have) been facing during the past years, are to a large extent due to the failure of democracy:

    The rising crescendo of bickering and acrimony within Europe might seem to outsiders to be the inevitable result of the bitter endgame playing out between Greece and its creditors. In fact, European leaders are finally beginning to reveal the true nature of the ongoing debt dispute, and the answer is not pleasant: it is about power and democracy much more than money and economics.

    and, furthermore:

    We should be clear: almost none of the huge amount of money loaned to Greece has actually gone there. It has gone to pay out private-sector creditors – including German and French banks. Greece has gotten but a pittance, but it has paid a high price to preserve these countries’ banking systems. The IMF and the other “official” creditors do not need the money that is being demanded. Under a business-as-usual scenario, the money received would most likely just be lent out again to Greece. But, again, it’s not about the money. It’s about using “deadlines” to force Greece to knuckle under, and to accept the unacceptable – not only austerity measures, but other regressive and punitive policies. (See Stiglitz 2015a).

  104. 104.

    Muttin (2014a), p. 13; Muttin (2014b).

    It appears indeed from the earlier quoted research undertaken by Oxfam that such types of indirect (consumer) taxes (including for instance the notorious VAT-systems) are to a great extent contributing to the increasing economic inequality which is currently world-wide prevailing (see Oxfam 2014, p. 83).

    To illustrate this, further reference could be made to the situation in Japan, where a persistent recession has been caused by Japan’s VAT-system which has been reported to undermine too much the purchasing power of the general population (and because of this: the demand within economy).

  105. 105.

    Oxfam (2014), p. 16, where it has been pointed out:

    Well-meaning governments around the world are often hamstrung by rigged international tax rules and a lack of coordination. No government alone can prevent corporate giants from taking advantage of the lack of global taks cooperation.

    On several other places in said Oxfam-report, it is pointed out that there is a most definite need for a globally uniformalized fiscal policy (see e.g. Oxfam 2014, pp. 17 and 22).

  106. 106.

    Compare Galbraith (1996), p. 65, pointing out:

    The basic need, however, is to accept the principle that a more equitable distribution of income must be a fundamental tenet of modern public policy in the good society, and to this end progressive taxation is central.

  107. 107.

    See for further reasons why this system is here proposed Kousari (2006), pp. 35–46, pointing out that the African continent, above all, is in need of new capital and of debt relief.

  108. 108.

    For further reading, see e.g. Skidelsky (2003), pp. 125–151. See also Tew (1977), pp. 101 a.f.; James (1996).

    At the approval of the original text of the IMF-(Articles of Agreement) in 1944, the so-called “Keynes plan” (Keynes having been one of the architects of the IMF-treaty) presuming a far reaching system of international money creation had been rejected.

    However, 25 years later, in a period during which the international exchange mechanism originally agreed upon came under a lot of pressure, it became clear that the system that had been agreed upon in 1944, was too burdensome on the American dollar as it, a.o., implied a continuous deficiency in the current accounts of the American balance of payments. Hence, a strong need for a new supplemental international liquidity was felt. To accommodate this need, the IMF-Board of Governors approved, obviously taking inspiration from the Keynes plan (which, as said, had not made it in 1944–1945), on September 29th 1967, the so-called “First Amendment of the Articles of Agreement” (of the IMF). This amendment introduced a new kind of international liquidities, namely the “Special Drawing Rights” (abbreviated: “SDRs”) and entered into force on July 28th 1969 (i.e. after the acceptance by three fifths of the members representing four fifths of the voting rights) (For additional details, see Devries 1976, pp. 25 a.f.)

    The original goal of the first Amendment was that in case of a worldwide scarcity of international reserves, the Fund could intervene by granting newly created Special Drawing Rights to the Member States, with which the Member States could subsequently acquire currency from (an)other Member State(s). To make this possible, the SDRs were set up as an international monetary reserve deriving their value from the participating Member States’ commitment to maintain and accept the SDRs on the one hand and to comply with the obligations imposed by the Fund with respect to the functioning and use of the SDRs on the other hand (see e.g. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Pamphlet Series No. 45, p. 1).

    Otherwise put, pursuant to this first amendment, the Fund obtained the power to create new liquidities through SDR grants awarded in function of the size of the participating IMF Member States’ quota (see International Monetary Fund (IMF), Pamphlet Series No. 45, p. 1).

    To this end, Article XV.,- Section 1, Articles of Agreement provides that “[to] meet the need, as and when it arises, for a supplement to existing reserve assets, the Fund is authorized to allocate special drawing rights to members that are participants in the Special Drawing Rights Department.”

    Any such grant comes down to a form of creation of international reserve “ex nihilo”, as the SDRs are in fact not covered by any other monetary value. On the contrary, they come into life solely by decision of the IMF, the only “coverage” being the commitment that the participating States will, in accordance with the IMF rules, accept SDRs in exchange for (other) freely usable currencies which they themselves possess. In this sense, the SDRs can be described as an “international transferable currency” (or more accurately: a credit on account), of which only the participating countries and the prescribed holders (namely some international institutions) can make use.

    Such allocation of SDRs can however, in principle, solely be made to Member States and in proportion to the quotum of the Member State concerned at the time of said allocation; the holding and use of the SDRs can however also be done by other acknowledged holders.

    Any decision regarding a (new) SDR allocation depends furthermore on a collective decision of the participating countries that a global demand for such new currency exists in addition to existing reserves. Such decision requires a voting majority of at least 85% of the votes.

    Given the above characteristics the SDRs is by some regarded as a conventional form of money which is nevertheless not fully valuable, as the SDRs does not fulfill one of the most important functions of money, being the one of generally accepted means of payment. (In this regard Devries 1976, pp. 180 a.f.; Fritz-Krockow and Ramlogan 2007, pp. 40 a.f.).

    Although the possibility to create “SDRs” as a method aiming at providing the world economy with a new international reserve currency has been set up already in 1969, SDR creation has, in practice, remained relatively limited. According to some sources, the IMF has, from the 1970s until 2009, only issued SDRs for a value of 21.4 billion SDRs, i.e. about 32 billion USD (which is but a small fraction of the total money supply in circulation worldwide) (see Aiyar 2009).

    Rainer Masera has argued that the failure of the SDR system has not been due to intrinsic features of the system, but rather to the fact that “they were introduced too late in the game”. (See Masera 1996, pp. 65–73, especially p. 66.)

  109. 109.

    For instance, in a remarkable paper by the “Strategy, Policy, and Review Department” of the IMF, called “Enhancing International Monetary Stability—A Role for the SDR?” and dating from January 7th 2011, several proposals have been brought forward to significantly expand the current (limited) role of the SDR’s, including the proposal to use them in the private sector.

    See also Hu (2011), pp. 143–158.

  110. 110.

    Camdessus (2011), pp. 33–43, especially pp. 39–40.

    Elements of this proposed “road map” consist of:

    • broadening the present basket of currencies which determine the value of the SDR, at present the USD, the euro, the yen and the pound to some further major currencies, such as the yuan, but also the Indian and Brazilian currencies (in addition to others);

    • working towards an expanded use of the SDR (beyond the present official holders);

    • transforming the SDR into a real currency that can also be used as a payment instrument for current (international) transactions;

    • working towards the use of the SDR as a payment instrument on the private markets;

    • encouraging the renewed creation of financial assets denominated in SDR’s;

    • facilitating the determination of the value of the SDR.

  111. 111.

    See already the works of Galbraith advocating a sufficiently large understanding of the notion “public interest”. (See e.g. Galbraith 1964.)

  112. 112.

    See Oxfam (2014), pp. 16 a.f.

  113. 113.

    At least implicitly, this question has also been raised by Piketty. (See Piketty 2014, p. 540.)

  114. 114.

    Engelen (2011), p. 49. Compare Stiglitz (2003), p. 107.

  115. 115.

    To some extent, the presently prevailing IMF already conducts a policy whereby such factors may be taken under consideration (see Fritz-Krockow and Ramlogan 2007, pp. 44 a.f.).

  116. 116.

    Abstraction was made from the fact that in many countries, in addition to a central government, a lot of further local governments or other entities with public authority may prevail. In some cases, such local or decentralized authorities may even have the competence to impose taxes or to take on debt financing.

    The system for a New Monetary World Order which is proposed here will, in principle, imply that the newly to be created New Monetary World Institute will decide upon allocations on behalf of the national or central governments of the participating countries, who in their own turn will be responsible for redistributing the thus obtained means to the lower authorities. Hence, when drafting its proposal to obtain an allocation of funds, a participating country will also have to bear in mind the needs of all of the authorities operative on its territory. Otherwise put, as long as the world remains artificially divided in countries (sovereign states), it seems advisory to mirror the outlook of the newly to be established “New Monetary World Order” to the ones currently in place for similar supra-national organizations (whereby membership and membership rights and obligations are for the sovereign states with exclusion of delocalized or decentralized lower authorities).

    Hence, when speaking of an allocation of New World Currency to the national (or central) government of a participating country, one needs to bear in mind that such an allocation will also have to meet the needs of such lower (delocalized or decentralized) authorities as there may be: member-states of a federal state, provinces, cities, communities, in addition to decentralized public legal persons, regardless of their (international) public law denomination.

  117. 117.

    As regards the latter, it could be considered to establish a separate sub-department for public money creation within the New Monetary World Institute.

  118. 118.

    One could also work out a system with panels that fluctuate, so that the composition of such a panel would be different for each subsequent allocation decision, resulting in a system which guarantees that the panels may function independently and impartially over time.

  119. 119.

    In case, under such a system, the name of a country would be drawn two times for the same panel, the drawing process should continue until ten different names are drawn.

    In such a case, the name of a country which would be drawn more than one time, should be put back in the “drawing put” in order to ensure that all participating countries are equally (or proportionally) present in the allocation panels. In case a country would be drawn to be part of its own panel, this will of course have to be neglected and the drawing process should continue until a panel constituted of ten different countries has been selected (and whereby the name of the former country itself should also be put back in the “drawing pot” so it will become again available to be selected as a member of a panel of another country).

  120. 120.

    In this way, every country (or other “public entity”) could, for instance, no later than on June 30th of year X, hand in its allocation proposal to the New Monetary World Institute and the latter will then have time until November 30th of that same year to decide upon the allocation for the (next) year X + 1 (whereby, if needed, the decision process could run in phases and the New Monetary World Institute could for instance already announce its decisions on certain sub-parts of the proposed allocation in order to enable the participating country to properly prepare its future policy for the spending year X + 1). If this would be deemed necessary or advisable, the moment in time to submit the allocation proposal could also be brought forward by 6 (or even more) months (e.g.: submittal by December 31th of year X − 1, decision by the New Monetary World Institute on November 30th of year X, for approval of the allocation for the year X + 1).

  121. 121.

    See already, under current IMF-policy International Monetary Fund (2000).

  122. 122.

    On the policy goal of diminishing the gap between the rich and the poor, see Foucault (2008), p. 206.

  123. 123.

    See especially Galbraith (1996), pp. 68 a.f.

  124. 124.

    See once more Kruithof (1985), or more recent De Grauwe (2014).

  125. 125.

    In the earlier mentioned study by Oxfam, “Even it up” 2014, it has, in this context, already been noted that if for instance estates worth 1 billion USD or more would be taxed at 1.5%, this would make enough money available to organize appropriate medical care and appropriate education in all developing countries (see Oxfam 2014, p. 9).

  126. 126.

    Kruithof (2012), pp. 70–77, especially p. 77.

  127. 127.

    This would meet an “old demand” of “left” political thinking that income from capital and from capital transactions should be more taxed. In a similar way, the “New Monetary World Order” should aim at completely banning tax havens (a policy objective which, per definition, will require an international agreement between all countries participating in the NMWO). (See e.g. Kruithof 2012, pp. 70–77, especially p. 76.)

  128. 128.

    It has already before been pointed out that indirect taxes are among the most unjust, as they weigh relatively much higher on the lower than on the richer classes as people all have to eat (and commit to other daily consumption) in order to live (see Todd 2015, p. 95).

  129. 129.

    Compare Galbraith (1996), p. 29.

  130. 130.

    Earlier, Stiglitz pleaded for a full harmonization of taxes within the context of the European Union (see Bijlo 2014, p. 63; see also Stiglitz 2015c).

  131. 131.

    See before Galbraith (1974), p. 93.

    Stiglitz has “demystified” this argument (see Stiglitz 2012, p. 78).

  132. 132.

    See Pascal Bruckner:

    Il s’en faut donc de beaucoup que les plus méritants touchent les émoluments les plus élevés: “Si les marchés imposaient vraiment une discipline, les personnes qui travaillent dur ne seraient pas pauvres et les spéculateurs en général ne seraient pas riches” (John Kenneth Galbraith). L’argent ne va pas au mérite mais à la puissance et au désir; quiconque capte les désirs capte aussi les ressources. (see Bruckner 2002, pp. 22–23).

  133. 133.

    In its widest sense, thus including succession taxes and otherwise heritage related taxes.

  134. 134.

    With exclusion of the aforementioned taxes on transactions aimed at acquiring (to-be-listed) luxurious and/or (too) harmful goods or services.

  135. 135.

    Based upon an ongoing appreciation for individual property as a (human) right, which under the “New Monetary World Order” should be(come) accessible to everyone who is willing to make reasonable efforts to acquire it.

  136. 136.

    In the true meaning of the word as used by, for instance, Aristotle. (See Aristotle 1996, pp. 85 a.f.)

  137. 137.

    Compare Taylor (1934), p. xxxviii:

    Economic inequalities cannot be altogether prevented, but they may be kept within reasonable bounds by a series of wise regulations.

    and

    Plato proposes a similar division, the fourth, or poorest class, possessing nothing beyond their patrimony, the first or richest being allowed to own four times the annual yield of the patrimony. Any increasement of wealth beyond this upper limit will be escheated to the Treasury, or, as we should say, subject to an income-tax of one hundred per cent.

  138. 138.

    In the fiscal system that is proposed here, such a distinction would hardly be of any further relevance. (Compare Crombez 2013, p. 102.)

  139. 139.

    Compare Moutton (2014), pp. 44–48, especially 46.

  140. 140.

    Compare to the insights of Arnold Carnegie (1835–1919), one of the richest Americans of the nineteenth century who was also one of the main drives behind the then occurring American industrial revolution (having been the leader of the enormous expansion of the American steel industry in the late nineteenth century). By 1898, his corporation “Carnegie Steel Corporation” had become the largest of its kind in the world. During the last part of his life, Carnegie aspired for a societal leadership role as a philanthropist. Hence, during the last 18 years of his life, he gave away to charities, foundations, and universities about USD 350 million (in 2015 share of GDP, this would amount to USD 78.6 billion), almost 90% of his fortune. (See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Carnegie; last consulted on February 27th 2016; http://www.biography.com/people/andrew-carnegie-9238756; last consulted on February 27th 2016.)

    In a 1889 article entitled “The Gospel of Wealth”, Carnegie had called on the rich to use their wealth to improve society, an insight that he himself wanted to put into daily practice by giving away the largest part of his fortune (See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Carnegie; last consulted on February 27th 2016. See also Veldman and Parlevliet 2003, p. 53.)

    Carnegie’s viewpoint on money gathering was in one of his writings described as follows:

    I propose to take an income no greater than $50,000 per annum! Beyond this I need ever earn, make no effort to increase my fortune, but spend the surplus each year for benevolent purposes! Let us cast aside business forever, except for others. Let us settle in Oxford and I shall get a thorough education, making the acquaintance of literary men. I figure that this will take 3 years active work. I shall pay especial attention to speaking in public. We can settle in London and I can purchase a controlling interest in some newspaper or live review and give the general management of it attention, taking part in public matters, especially those connected with education and improvement of the poorer classes. Man must have no idol and the amassing of wealth is one of the worst species of idolatry! No idol is more debasing than the worship of money! Whatever I engage in I must push inordinately; therefore should I be careful to choose that life which will be the most elevating in its character. To continue much longer overwhelmed by business cares and with most of my thoughts wholly upon the way to make more money in the shortest time, must degrade me beyond hope of permanent recovery. I will resign business at 25, but during these ensuing 2 years I wish to spend the afternoons in receiving instruction and in reading systematically! (See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Carnegie; last consulted on February 27th 2016.)

    In his article “Wealth”, more commonly known as “The Gospel of Wealth” (1889), Carnegie describes the responsibility of philanthropy by the new upper class of self-made rich. Carnegie hereby argued that the best way of dealing with the new phenomenon of wealth inequality was for the wealthy to redistribute their surplus means in a responsible and thoughtful manner. This approach was in contrast with traditional bequest where wealth is handed down to one’s heirs, and other forms of bequest where wealth is willed to the state for public purposes. Carnegie furthermore argued that the surplus wealth acquired by the captains of industry produces the greatest net benefit to society when it is administered carefully by the wealthy. Hence, the wealthy should administer their riches responsibly for the general good of society. (See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Gospel_of_Wealth; last consulted on February 27th 2016. For the full text of “The Gospel of Wealth”, see https://archive.org/stream/gospelofwealthot00carnuoft/gospelofwealthot00carnuoft_djvu.txt; last consulted on February 27th 2016.)

  141. 141.

    For a moral ground, reference can be made to the comparison made by Jesus Christ in Luke, 21:1–4 (King James Version):

    And he looked up, and saw the rich men casting their gifts into the treasury. And he saw also a certain poor widow casting in thither two mites. And he said, Of a truth I say to you, that this poor widow has cast in more than they all: For all these have of their abundance cast in to the offerings of God: but she of her penury has cast in all the living that she had.

  142. 142.

    To paraphrase Galbraith, it is hereby expected that this differentiating tax system would assume the essential, difficult and intensely controversial task of making and making effective such (types of) differentiation. (See Galbraith 1996, p. 29.)

  143. 143.

    See Oxfam (2014), pp. 16 a.f.

  144. 144.

    However, in a more altruistically based social and economic order, the expectancy should be that societies would become less conflictual both on a national and international level, resulting in a lesser need for army and police forces. The focus in organizing society could hence shift from guarding private property (in addition to other interests of the rich classes), to the establishment of a society model which cares for all people, including the poor and the deprived. (Compare Sachs 2011, p. 204, also and for similar reasons calling for a diminishment of government expenditure on army and police forces.)

  145. 145.

    The necessity of ensuring free education and free health care is one of the main themes of the earlier quoted Oxfam-report “Even it up” (see e.g. Oxfam 2014, pp. 5, 13 and 18).

    Compare Galbraith (1996), p. 65.

  146. 146.

    Oxfam (2014), p. 102.

  147. 147.

    See e.g. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2014), p. 85:

    Universal coverage of basic social services is not only imperative—it is also possible at early stages of development. And recent evidence shows that it can be achieved in less than a decade. Furthermore, universal provision of basic social services is better than targeting, which leads to social stigma for recipients and segmentation in the quality of services, as those who can afford to opt out of receiving public services do so.

  148. 148.

    See Oxfam (2014), p. 19, furthermore arguing that

    there are (…) good examples from around the world of how expanding public services are helping to reduce inequality.

  149. 149.

    Oxfam (2014), p. 23, furthermore mentioning that

    such social services must be universal and permanent.

  150. 150.

    See Galbraith (1996); Vandewalle (1976), pp. 315–316. Compare Hollenberg (1942), pp. 205–207.

  151. 151.

    Rand (2008), p. 93.

  152. 152.

    See Smith (1979), p. 759.

  153. 153.

    See http://boingboing.net/2011/01/28/ayn-rand-took-govern.html.

  154. 154.

    See Ford (2010–2011).

  155. 155.

    Friedman (1993), p. 11.

  156. 156.

    Browne (2008), p. 101.

  157. 157.

    One may in this regard refer to the way street children are treated in certain South-American countries (see Child Poverty in Brazil—Facts, Reasons, and what can be done. http://www.childrenofbahia.com/childpoverty.htm. Last consulted on December 18th 2014):

    Most street children are viewed at best as a nuisance and at worst as an infestation to be eradicated. Because they have no vote or voice there is little impetus on the politicians to work to solve the issue. Whilst there is a drive from the president’s office any actions are so watered down by the time it gets to city level that they become almost useless.

  158. 158.

    See especially Galbraith (1996) and Galbraith (1960).

  159. 159.

    Reference can again be made to the illustrations made above under marg. 174 of Chap. 3 of this book.

  160. 160.

    Oxfam (2014), p. 20.

  161. 161.

    Quotation from: http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/matthew-asv.html (last consulted on October 21st 2015).

  162. 162.

    Already, some countries are thinking of introducing such a basic income as an alternative for social security. It has, for instance, been reported that the government of Finland has committed to implement a universal basic income experiment (see Laterza 2015; see also Schiller 2016).

  163. 163.

    See e.g. Van den Broeck (2014), p. 21 (containing an interview with Paul De Grauwe).

  164. 164.

    See nevertheless Galbraith (1996), p. 28:

    That some will choose not to work must be accepted. Socially compensated idleness unquestionably affronts deep-seated social attitudes; public pressure may, indeed should, be exerted to get able individuals into the work force, the exercise of such pressure being undoubtedly enjoyed by some. Starvation is not, however, a tolerable sanction. Some abuse, as it will be regarded, is inevitable in this part of the welfare system and must be tolerated.

  165. 165.

    See already Plato’s warning on finding the proper balance in this regard (Plato 1987, p. 129):

    So we have found two further things (…) which our Guardians must at all costs prevent from slipping unobserved into our state. (…) Wealth and poverty (…). One produces luxury and idleness and a desire for novelty, the other meanness and bad workmanship and the desire for revolution as well.

  166. 166.

    For all clarity: there will be no need for such correction mechanisms as regards the types of replacement income under the abovementioned social care system which are granted because of obvious, objective reasons, such as disease, invalidity, old age, etc.

  167. 167.

    For reasons of completeness, it should be pointed out that a transfer of monetary reserves to a third country may occur, implying that such a third country which is willing to acquire said monetary reserves in foreign currency, expresses its own belief in the purchasing power of this foreign currency, hence in the economy of the country having issued it. Otherwise put, the third country which is willing to acquire the monetary reserves (in foreign currency) of another (export(ing)) country, takes over the aforementioned legitimate expectation of the latter (export(ing)) country that this foreign currency will equal actual purchasing power in the import(ing) country’s economy.

  168. 168.

    It may be clear that any period of possession of money, how short it may be, constitutes an act of saving (brief as it may), as money in hand represents future purchasing power.

  169. 169.

    See also Stiglitz (2003), p. 200.

  170. 170.

    In theory, all debts worldwide could be wiped out on a Sunday afternoon. We could start from scratch with a new balance sheet the next morning. If every citizen in the world was to be credited with let’s say 1000 newly designed Bancors, we could start anew in an instant. We could even write off all mortgages an nationalize all real estate, and have a system whereby we pay rent to the state. (See Middelkoop 2014, p. 167.)

  171. 171.

    Otherwise put: one could deal with the issue of monetary reserves in foreign currency in the manner recommended by Jesus Christ to the rich young man in the already before quoted story from the Gospel (see marg. 37 of Chap. 3 of this book): “Sell everything you have and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven.” (Luke, 18: 22; quotation from: http://www.biblestudytools.com/luke/18-22.html; last consulted on October 22nd 2015).

  172. 172.

    Also from the rich young man appearing in the earlier mentioned story from the Gospel, it is said that, “when he heard this, he became very sad” (Luke, 18:23.A), because, according to the same Gospel verse, “he was a man of great wealth” (Luke, 18: 23.B); quotations again from: http://www.biblestudytools.com/luke/18-23.html; last consulted on October 22nd 2015.

  173. 173.

    See Wolf (2014).

  174. 174.

    See in general http://www.imf.org/external/about/lending.htm (last consulted on October 23th 2014).

  175. 175.

    On the website of the IMF, this policy has been motivated as follows:

    Debt relief is one part of a much larger effort, which also includes aid flows, to address the development needs of low-income countries and make sure that debt sustainability is maintained over time. For debt reduction to have a tangible impact on poverty, the additional money needs to be spent on programs that benefit the poor. (See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last consulted on October 23th 2014).)

  176. 176.

    See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last consulted on October 23th 2014), in this regard mentioning the following:

    Given the voluntary nature of creditor participation in the HIPC Initiative, the IMF and the World Bank will continue to use moral suasion to encourage creditors to participate in the Initiative and to deliver fully their share of HIPC Initiative debt relief.

  177. 177.

    http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/mdri.htm (last consulted on October 23th 2014).

  178. 178.

    See furthermore Stiglitz (2006), p. 226; Romero-Barrutieta et al. (2011); Cohen (2008), pp. 150–179, especially p. 169.

  179. 179.

    See http://jubileedebt.org.uk/ (last consulted on December 6th 2014).

  180. 180.

    The organizational institutional aspects of said authority (ies) (namely the already mentioned “NMWI” and, by extension, the further in the text proposed “New Global System of Central Banks” or, abbreviated, the “NGSCB”) will be explained further on in more detail (see further, under Sect. 5.1 of Chap. 5 of this book).

  181. 181.

    See especially Kruithof (2000), p. 60.

  182. 182.

    For further reflections on the topic of publicly subsidized shelter becoming necessary due to the fact that in no economically advanced country the market systems builds houses that the poor(est) can afford, see already Galbraith (1992), p. 44; Galbraith (1996), p. 65.

  183. 183.

    See also Ferguson (2009), p. 15, arguing that poverty is mainly the result of a lack of access to newly created money:

    Only when borrowers have access to efficient credit networks can they escape from the clutches of loan sharks, and only when savers can deposit their money in reliable banks can it be channeled from the idle to the industrious or from the rich to the poor.

  184. 184.

    Pauli (2014), pp. 32–35, especially 35.

    See also Geysels (2014), pp. 11–59, especially p. 25; Raspoet (2014), pp. 51–55.

  185. 185.

    Galbraith (1996), p. 61.

  186. 186.

    Galbraith (1996), p. 61.

  187. 187.

    See also Oxfam (2014), p. 65.

  188. 188.

    It has, for instance, been estimated that in 2014 alone, the cost of the Belgian royalty which was borne through public funding, amounted to ±38,742,000 euro (see Debels 2014, p. 192).

  189. 189.

    See Plato (1987), pp. 181 a.f.

    Reflecting on an ideal method of upbringing and education of children is one of the main topics of Plato’s “The Republic”. Hence, in order to have a good overview of the opinions of Plato in this regard, one should (re-)read the whole work. One may nevertheless already get some idea about Plato’s radical reasoning by reading this quote:

    Each generation of children will be taken by officers appointed for the purpose (…). They will arrange for the suckling of the children by bringing their mothers to the nursery when their breasts are still fill, taking every precaution to see that no mother recognizes her child. (Plato 1987, pp. 181–182).

    See also Vandamme (1985), p. 24; Popper (1966), p. 145.

  190. 190.

    Indeed, throughout history, Judeo-Christian thinking has increasingly promoted the “niche family” as being “sanctifying” (which is “literally” expressed in the fact that, for instance under the doctrine of the Catholic church, marriage is considered as a so-called “sacrament”; see Marc., 10: 2–12), and through this, the niche family has worldwide become a dominant type of living in the micro sphere. One needs, nevertheless, observe that, in our time, more and more people choose for other arrangements of living than the coercive “niche family” model.

  191. 191.

    See also Dawkins (2006), p. 6 (dealing with the topic of how different types of animals care, above all, for their offspring, sometimes against their own interest or well-being).

  192. 192.

    According to modern biologists, man could even be considered as “a fish” as, going back in time, one of the ancestors of “man” (and, by extension, all mammals) has been a fish (like creature) (see e.g. Reumer 2013, p. 46).

  193. 193.

    As shamelessly exhibited on all kinds of social media; see e.g. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/rich-kids-of-instagram/ (last consulted on October 24th 2014).

    See also Bruckner (2002), pp. 25–26, speaking of the “rent aristocracy”:

    Pitié pour les nababs : ces derniers s’imposent comme les nouveaux rois de notre temps, se moquant des lois ordinaires, jouissant d’un pouvoir et d’un prestige démusurés, s’accommodant de tous les régimes pourvu qu’ils vivent à leur guise. Qu’ils ressortent du showbiz, du sport ou de la finance, ils forment une élite transnationale qui parle le nouvel espéranto planétaire, le wallish, l’anglais de Wall Street, et habite le royaume envoûtant de l’opulence et du divertissement de luxe. Une aisance privée inconcevable voisine avec un dénuement affligeant ou des services publics déplorables comme dans certains pays anglo-saxons. Et tout cela au nom du vieux principe utilitariste du plus grand bonheur pour le plus grand nombre, “chacun comptant (en principe) de manière égale” (Jeremy Bentham).

  194. 194.

    See also Byanyima (2014), p. 4:

    A child born to a rich family, even in the poorest of countries, will go to the best school and will receive the highest quality care if they are sick. At the same time, poor families will see their children taken from them, struck down by easily preventable diseases because they do not have the money to pay for treatment. The reality is that across the world, the richest people are able to live longer, happier and healthier lives, and are able to use their wealth to see that their children do the same.

    And furthermore:

    Researchers have shown that, across the 21 countries for which there is data, there is a strong correlation between extreme inequality and low social mobility. If you are born poor in a highly unequal country you will most probably die poor, and your children and grandchildren will be poor too. In Pakistan, for instance, a boy born in a rural area to a father from the poorest 20 percent of the population has only a 1.9 percent chance of ever moving to the richest 20 percent. In the USA, nearly half of all children born to low-income parents will become low-income adults. (Oxfam 2014, p. 11).

  195. 195.

    Oxfam (2014), p. 47.

  196. 196.

    Quoted by Beaud (1994), p. 72.

  197. 197.

    Given the further insight that, for instance, world food production is effectively more than sufficient to amply feed every citizen in the world, and that the facts that, up till today, hundreds of millions of people are still starving, and more than one billion people are living in extreme poverty, are only due to the existing social economic order, namely capitalism (see above, under Sect. 3.4.8 of Chap. 3 of this book), it can only be hoped for that whoever has ever expressed or defended such thoughts should as soon as possible come to his senses (as eventually even happened to Ebenezer Scrooge in the aforementioned famous story “A Christmas Carol” by Charles Dickens, albeit this first required the nightly visit of the ghost of his former partner Jacob Marley and of the three spirits of Christmas-past, Christmas-present, and Christmas-future).

  198. 198.

    This argument, often quoted by neo-liberal authors, has in the Oxfam-report “Even it up” been qualified as a “myth”:

    This myth assumes that everyone starts from a level playing field and that anyone can become wealthy if they work hard enough. The reality is that, in many countries, a person’s future wealth and income is largely determined by the income of their parents. A third of the world’s richest individuals amassed their wealth not through hard work, but through inheritance.

    This myth is also flawed in its assumption that the highest financial reward is given for the hardest amount of work. Some of the lowest paid jobs are those that require people to work the hardest, while some of the highest paid jobs are those that require people to work the least. Many of the richest collect large profits from the rent they generate on stocks, real estate and other assets. When this is taken into account, it becomes clear that those who are paid less work just as hard (or even harder) as those at the top of the wage ladder. Women spend more time on unpaid domestic and caring responsibilities than their highly paid counterparts, and are more likely than men to have multiple jobs. (see Oxfam 2014, p. 65).

    Also John Kenneth Galbraith has pointed out that not people who work hard have the greatest chance to get rich (as, otherwise, a lot of people working up till 14 h/day would not be living in poverty), but those who, by living on investments, ultimately exploit other man’s labor. (See e.g. Galbraith 1992, p. 30 a.f.)

    See furthermore, again, the quoted Oxfam-report “Even it up”:

    Income from work determines most people’s economic status and their future chances. But the vast majority of the world’s poorest people cannot escape poverty, no matter how hard they work, and far too many suffer the indignity of poverty wages. Meanwhile, the richest people have high and rapidly rising salaries and bonuses, as well as significant income from their accumulated wealth and capital. This is a recipe for accelerating economic inequality. (Oxfam 2014, p. 15).

    And furthermore:

    Economic inequality also leads to huge differences in life chances: the poorest people have the odds stacked against them in terms of education and life expectancy. The latest national Demographic and Health Surveys demonstrate how poverty interacts with economic and other inequalities to create ‘traps of disadvantage’ that push the poorest and most marginalized people to the bottom – and keep them there. (Oxfam 2014, p. 10).

  199. 199.

    In the more recent past, one can, for instance, refer to Galbraith who in his book “The Good Society – The Humane Agenda” has pointed out that

    in the good society, however, achievement may not be limited by factors that are remediable. There must be economic opportunity for all (…). And in preparation for life, the young must have the physical care, the discipline, let no one doubt, and especially the education that will allow them to seize and exploit that opportunity. No one, from accident of birth or economic circumstance, may be denied these things; if they are not available from parent or family, society must provide effective forms of care and guidance. (see Galbraith 1996, p. 65).

  200. 200.

    See e.g. Moutton (2014), pp. 22–24; Murray and Bonneville (2010), p. 257.

  201. 201.

    De Ekstermolengroep (2000), pp. 32 a.f.

  202. 202.

    Needless to say that the answer to this question will need a thorough study of the most cost-efficient solution (also in relation to the capacity of the planet).

  203. 203.

    For this reason, there will also be a need for a unified policy on such outsourcing of tasks of general interest to the private non-profit sector in all countries participating in the New Monetary World Order.

  204. 204.

    See earlier in the history of Christianity the ideas of Saint Paul on the importance of “social economic self-reliance” which under the New Monetary World Order should become a possibility for every human being (see above, under Sect. 3.3.2.2.2 of Chap. 3 of this book).

  205. 205.

    See also Galbraith (1992), p. 54; Byttebier and François (2015), pp. 221–250.

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Byttebier, K. (2017). Building Stones for a New Monetary World Order. In: Towards a New International Monetary Order. Economic and Financial Law & Policy – Shifting Insights & Values, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52518-1_4

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