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Doing Policy Analysis

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The Art and Craft of Policy Advising

Abstract

Doing policy analysis in practice is not as rational and systematic as textbooks make it sound. To understand this, we need to unpack the relationships between science, policy and politics, and between evidence, emotions and values in public persuasion and political decision making. Public policy making is incremental social problem solving. The most important contribution policy analysis makes is crafting the right questions, and facilitating collective thinking to support problem solving.

This chapter introduces:

  • Relationships between science, policy and politics;

  • Policy analysis as crafting the right questions to facilitate collective social problem solving;

  • The roles of evidence, emotions and values in the art of public persuasion;

  • A ‘fair go’ framework for public policy;

  • Collective thinking and the technique of storyboarding;

  • Multi-criteria decision analysis, as a tool to supplement cost-benefit analysis; and

  • Some further reflections on free and frank advice.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Majone (1989, pp. 10–11) usefully distinguishes between data, information and evidence. Evidence is “information selected from the available stock and introduced at a specific point in the argument in order to persuade a particular audience of the truth or falsity of a statement. Selecting inappropriate data or models, placing them at a wrong point in the argument, or choosing a style of presentation that is not suitable for the intended audience, can destroy the effectiveness of information used as evidence, regardless of its intrinsic cognitive value. Thus, criteria for assessing evidence are different from those used for assessing facts. Facts can be evaluated in terms of more or less objective canons, but evidence must be evaluated in accordance with a number of factors peculiar to a given situation, such as the specific nature of the case, the type of audience, the prevailing rules of evidence, or the credibility of the analyst.”

  2. 2.

    “The concept of Grand Challenges has been applied for some years in both science and policy, and refers to challenges that are complex in at least three dimensions: the technical, temporal and societal dimensions. These are major long-term challenges faced by society (climate change mitigation, overpopulation, good security, water supply, infectious diseases etc.) whose costs will increase over time and which (globally) influence the lives of people in very different ways.” (Stiftung Mercator, 2015).

  3. 3.

    On theoretical approaches to public policy (see Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009, Chaps. 2 and 6; Althaus, Bridgman, & Davis, 2013, pp. 32–37; Scott & Baehler, 2010, pp. 26–41; Sabatier, 1991).

  4. 4.

    Van Zwanenberg and Millstone distinguish a fifth model (a risk-management model), which I have included in this summary as a variation on the inverted decisionist model.

  5. 5.

    Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) do not merely report evidence. They present evidence in an attempt to warrant a normative argument about what developed nations ought to do. Admittedly, they present their argument in relatively straightforward consequentialist terms with little reference to ideas of justice, but as Marquez (2011) has noted, it is clear that Wilkinson and Pickett do think that income inequality is unjust, at least on account of its consequences.

  6. 6.

    This model is sometimes called a “Pragmatic-Enlightened Model”, building on the philosophical tradition of American pragmatism (Kowarsch & Edenhofer, 2015, p. 118).

  7. 7.

    On policy implementation planning (see Weimer and Vining 2016, Chap. 12).

  8. 8.

    For a brief genealogy of evidence-based policy and the linear model of the relationship between evidence and policy (see Freiberg and Carson 2010, pp. 153–56); St John and Dale 2012, pp. 39–40). Head (2010, 2015) usefully summarises key issues and challenges in reconsidering evidence-based policy and promoting “evidence-informed” policy making.

  9. 9.

    Logically one can derive a moral “ought” from an “is”, but only if the “is” expresses a truth about a reality that embodies a moral norm. Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis (1987, p. 102) provide an example: “Thus, from ‘This is the act an honest person would do’ one can deduce ‘This act ought to be done’.” See also Jonas (1984), esp. pp. 130–35.

  10. 10.

    The application of behavioural insights to public administration is promising but requires careful reflection if it is not to lead back to a technocratic application of science to policy making. See, for example, John et al. (2011), Strassheim and Korinek (2015) and Thaler and Sunstein (2009).

  11. 11.

    Wilson was subsequently recalled to prison in February 2013 following a breach of his parole conditions. He was granted parole again in December 2014 and released to live in a house on the grounds of Whanganui Prison where he is subject to GPS monitoring and supervision if he leaves the house.

  12. 12.

    Pluralist societies also host “unreasonable doctrines” that generate different and more difficult questions about the limits of liberal tolerance. See further Bromell (2008).

  13. 13.

    On the idea of an “overlapping consensus” (see Rawls, 1971, pp. 387–88, 517, 580–81, 1987, 2001, pp. 37, 26–38, 2005.

  14. 14.

    Appeal to public reason does not restrict us to logos (evidence and reasoned argument), to the exclusion of pathos and ethos from the public sphere (cf. Sect. 4.2.2). The important contrast, Barry notes, is with authority, prescription, revelation or coercion: “In this context, ‘reason’ means reasoned argument, from premises that are in principle open to everyone to accept. We can add a contemporary gloss to this by saying that these are premises which reasonable people, seeking to reach free, uncoerced agreement with others, would accept” (Barry, 1995, p. 7). Sen (2009a, p. 195) has similarly noted that: “Rationality is in fact a rather permissive discipline, which demands the test of reasoning, but allows reasoned scrutiny to take quite different forms, without necessarily imposing any great uniformity of criteria. If rationality were a church, it would be a rather broad church.”

  15. 15.

    In arguing contra Rawls (1971, pp. 65, 101–04) that “justice itself requires us to reward superior performance in a suitable manner”, Harsanyi nevertheless concurs with Rawls that “we must not create needless economic and social inequalities”. He maintains that “such a policy would be fully compatible with significantly smaller economic and social inequalities than we have today” (Harsanyi, 2008, p. 76).

  16. 16.

    On equity, see further Stone (2012, Chap. 2).

  17. 17.

    On efficiency, see further Stone (2012, Chap. 3).

  18. 18.

    Majone (1989, pp. 40–41) notes that because analysis cannot produce conclusive proofs, only more or less convincing arguments, analysis should be done in two stages: “the first stage to find out what the analyst wants to recommend, and a second stage to make the recommendation convincing even to a hostile and disbelieving audience.” See further Chap. 5.

  19. 19.

    See Mintrom (2003, pp. 164–169) on brainstorming and analytical discussions.

  20. 20.

    Bardach & Patashnik (2016, p. 21) encourage us not to characterise the status quo as “do nothing”, although we could think of it as “do nothing different”. They comment: “It is not possible to do nothing or to ‘not decide’. Most of the trends in motion will probably persist and alter the problem, whether for better or for worse.”

  21. 21.

    Criteria for assessment may include abstract principles, or concrete effects (consequences). See Scott and Baehler (2010, pp. 131–36).

  22. 22.

    On projecting outcomes (see Bardach & Patashnik, 2016, pp. 46–65).

  23. 23.

    Kibblewhite (2015, pp. 5–6) specifically references the 2013 amendments to the State Sector Act 1988 (Sect. 32) which elevated “free and frank” from a convention to a legislative obligation, as well as the State Services Commission’s Standards of Integrity and Conduct, the Cabinet Manual and the Official Information Act 1982.

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Bromell, D. (2017). Doing Policy Analysis. In: The Art and Craft of Policy Advising. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52494-8_4

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