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What’s Critical About a Critical Theory of Justice?

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Feminism, Capitalism, and Critique

Abstract

In this article, Forst presents a critical theory of justice in dialogue with Nancy Fraser. Using the concept of justification as the connection between theory and practice allows us to de-reify concepts like justice, democracy, power or alienation – aiming to identify and overcome domination in various contexts of social life.

This article is dedicated to Nancy Fraser, a dear friend and great critical theorist to whom I owe more inspiration and insights than a single text could express. I am grateful to the audience at the Association for Political Thought Conference at Oxford University in January 2016 for helpful questions and comments. Special thanks are due to Brian Milstein for a critical reading of the text and a number of important remarks. I elaborate some of the points discussed here in more detail in the Introduction to my Normativity and Power (Forst 2016).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See my critique of the status quo bias of practice-dependent theories in Forst (2013a) and my sketch of critical realism in Forst (2014a).

  2. 2.

    See most recently Forst (2013b, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2016).

  3. 3.

    For the difference between my view and that of Philip Pettit, see Forst (2015d).

  4. 4.

    I discuss my approach in a comparison with the sociology of justification developed by Boltanski and Thévenot in my Introduction to Normativity and Power (Forst 2016).

  5. 5.

    See Forst (2012, part I). Generally speaking, I employ a more substantive normative concept of reason than does Habermas, especially in the context of morality and justice.

  6. 6.

    In what follows, I draw upon my reply in Forst (2015b). These questions concerning justification are also the focus of my discussion with Stephen White (2015); see my reply in Forst (2015a); see also Allen (2014), Sangiovanni (2014), Laden (2014), and my reply in Forst (2014b).

  7. 7.

    Here a range of cases should be distinguished, in particular, directly participating in or contributing to injustice; indirectly participating in injustice by profiting from it but without actively contributing to relations of exploitation; finally, the “natural” duty to put an end to unjust relations, even if one does not profit from them but is in a position to put an end to them. I cannot go into these distinctions further here.

  8. 8.

    I discuss this as a “dialectics of morality” in Forst (2012, ch. 11). See also the following quote by Immanuel Kant: “Having the resources to practice such beneficence as depends on the goods of fortune is, for the most part, a result of certain human beings being favored through the injustice of the government, which introduces an inequality of wealth that makes others need their beneficence. Under such circumstances, does a rich man’s help to the needy, on which he so readily prides himself as something meritorious, really deserve to be called beneficence at all?” (Kant 1996, p. 573, A:454)

  9. 9.

    Rawls (1999, p. 5) also argues that the concept of justice is opposed to arbitrariness: “Those who hold different conceptions of justice can, then, still agree that institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of social life.”

  10. 10.

    For a historical account of struggles against injustice, see Moore (1978).

  11. 11.

    I develop the notion of power relevant here in Forst (2015c).

  12. 12.

    This concerns a set of rights as well as institutional and social preconditions I cannot elaborate on here. See Forst (2012: part II).

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Forst, R. (2017). What’s Critical About a Critical Theory of Justice?. In: Bargu, B., Bottici, C. (eds) Feminism, Capitalism, and Critique. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52386-6_13

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