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Preventing Coercion in E-Voting: Be Open and Commit

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Electronic Voting (E-Vote-ID 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10141))

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Abstract

We present a game-theoretic approach to coercion-resistance from the point of view of an honest election authority that chooses between various protection methods with different levels of resistance and different implementation costs. We give a simple game model of the election and propose a preliminary analysis. It turns out that, in the games that we look at, Stackelberg equilibrium for the society does not coincide with maxmin, and it is always more attractive to the society than Nash equilibrium. This suggests that the society is better off if the security policy is publicly announced, and the authorities commit to it.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The definition was game-based in the technical sense, i.e., the security property was defined as the outcome of an abstract game between the “verifier” and the “adversary”. In this paper, we use game models to study the interaction between the actual participants of the protocol.

  2. 2.

    It suffices that the constraints are common knowledge among the players.

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Acknowledgements

Wojciech Jamroga acknowledges the support of the National Research Fund (FNR), Luxembourg, under the project GALOT (INTER/DFG/12/06), the support of the 7th Framework Programme of the European Union under the Marie Curie IEF project ReVINK (PIEF-GA-2012-626398), and the support of the National Centre for Research and Development (NCBR), Poland, under the PolLux project VoteVerif (POLLUX-IV/1/2016). Masoud Tabatabaei acknowledges the support of the National Research Fund Luxembourg under project GAIVS (AFR Code: 5884506).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Computer Science, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warszawa, Poland

    Wojciech Jamroga

  2. Interdisciplinary Centre for Security and Trust, University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-alzette, Luxembourg

    Masoud Tabatabaei

Authors
  1. Wojciech Jamroga
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  2. Masoud Tabatabaei
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Masoud Tabatabaei .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia

    Robert Krimmer

  2. Karlstad University, Karlstad, Sweden

    Melanie Volkamer

  3. EVOL2-eVoting Research Lab, Tarragona, Spain

    Jordi Barrat

  4. Microsoft Research, Seattle, USA

    Josh Benaloh

  5. University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada

    Nicole Goodman

  6. University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada

    Peter Y. A. Ryan

  7. University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia

    Vanessa Teague

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Jamroga, W., Tabatabaei, M. (2017). Preventing Coercion in E-Voting: Be Open and Commit. In: Krimmer, R., et al. Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10141. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52240-1_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52240-1_1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-52239-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-52240-1

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