Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Criminal Liability of Political Decision-Makers in Germany

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Criminal Liability of Political Decision-Makers

  • 353 Accesses

Abstract

The provision in German criminal law that can best capture a waste of public budgets is § 266(1) of the Penal Code. However, the elements of this offence pose various problems in the context of political decisions. In particular, it is subject to debate to what extent politicians are bound by a ‘fiduciary duty’ and under which circumstances ‘damage’ in the terms of § 266(1) occurs. Nevertheless there are tendencies in the jurisprudence as well as the legal doctrine that could allow for a supervision of political decisions by criminal courts. As far as bribery offences are concerned, German courts have dealt with the legal situation of election candidates and illicit campaign donations in several instances. Furthermore, a legislative reform in 2014 brought significant changes for members of Parliament, municipality councils and other persons holding a democratic mandate: whereas they normally do not qualify as public officials (i.e. the ordinary bribery offences do not apply), the acceptance of an ‘undue benefit’ for exercising their mandate ‘by order or under direction’ now entails criminal liability. German law also provides for criminal sanctions that are of particular relevance for politicians. Furthermore, it grants immunities ratione materiae and ratione personae, but both are basically limited to parliamentarians. Apart from that, political decision-makers enjoy some procedural privileges. For trials against them, however, the ordinary courts are competent.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 119.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Several exceptions exist, particularly where criminal law provisions build upon behavioural norms laid down in the states’ laws. For instance, several aspects of the press law as well as the law regulating the right to assemble belong to the legislative competence of the states. Therefore, many (if not all) states have adopted provisions imposing criminal sanctions for breaches of these laws.

  2. 2.

    This information was provided by staff of the competent ministry, who referred to the so-called Richtlinien zum Planungsprozess und für die einheitliche Gestaltung von Entwurfsunterlagen im Straßenbau.

  3. 3.

    For some recent proposals see B. Schünemann, Unverzichtbare Gesetzgebungsmaßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Haushaltsuntreue und der Verschwendung öffentlicher Mittel, 2011, pp. 40 et seq.; A. Coenen, Die Strafbarkeit von Verstößen gegen das Haushaltsrecht bei der Bewirtschaftung öffentlicher Mittel, 2000 (Dissertation, Köln).

  4. 4.

    § 266(1) PC neither requires fraudulent behaviour, nor ‘lawful possession’ in a strict sense; it is sufficient that the perpetrator has the possibility to access the assets because they were entrusted to him/her. T. Weigend, in: Heller/Dubber (eds.), The Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law, 2011, p. 279, suggests ‘violation of trust’ as alternative translation; M. Dubber/T. Hörnle, Criminal Law. A Comparative Approach, 2014, p. 98 use the term ‘disloyalty’.

  5. 5.

    A slightly different translation of the provision is suggested by Dubber/Hörnle (note 4), p. 98.

  6. 6.

    T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch, 63rd ed. 2016 (Beck, München), § 266/6a; U. Kindhäuser, in: Kindhäuser/Neumann/Paeffgen (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch, 4th ed. 2013 (Nomos, Baden-Baden), § 266/26.

  7. 7.

    F. Saliger, in: Satzger/Schluckebier/Widmaier (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch, 3rd ed. 2017 (Heymanns, Köln), § 266/21 with further references; with some differences B. Schünemann, in: Von Laufhütte/Rissing-van Saan/Tiedemann (eds.), Leipziger Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, vol. 9/1, 12th ed. 2012 (De Gruyter, Berlin/New York), § 266/47 et seq.

  8. 8.

    This term is used by Weigend (note 4), p. 279; for details, see infra II.1.a)cc).

  9. 9.

    According to the jurisprudence of Bavarian administrative courts the mayor’s signature does not result in a binding agreement—see for example Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof, 4 CS 11.2047, 20 October 2011, § 7 (BayVbl 2012, 341). For an overview, see U. Becker/D. Heckmann/B. Kempen/G. Manssen, Öffentliches Recht in Bayern, 6th ed. 2015 (Beck, München), p. 121 with further references in footnote 109.

  10. 10.

    According to the prevailing opinion the violation of a fiduciary duty is also required in the first alternative of § 266(1) PC, see A. Dierlamm, in: Joecks/Miebach (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, vol. 5, 2nd ed. 2014 (Beck, München), § 266/40 with further references.

  11. 11.

    Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court—BVerfG from here onwards) 2 BvR 2259/08, 23 June 2010, § 108 (BVerfGE 126, 170 et seq.); Fischer (note 6), § 266/21.

  12. 12.

    W. Perron, in: Schönke/Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch, 29th ed. 2014 (Beck, München), § 266/23b.

  13. 13.

    Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice—BGH from here onwards) 5 StR 494/98, 17 February 1999, § 9 et seq. (BGHSt 44, 376 et seq.); 3 StR 17/15, 26 November 2015, § 78 (BGHSt 61, 48 et seq.); Saliger (note 7), § 266/14.

  14. 14.

    Dierlamm (note 10), § 266/109; W. Nettesheim, Bayerische Verwaltungsblätter 1989, p. 161 (164); U. Weber, Bayerische Verwaltungsblätter 1989, p. 166 (168).

  15. 15.

    Perron (note 12), § 266/26.

  16. 16.

    Dierlamm (note 10), § 266/109; T. Soyka, Juristische Ausbildung 2011, p. 566 (568). A different approach is to be chosen when a member of Parliament is responsible for his/her own budget (to buy things that are needed for the work in Parliament); see Schünemann (note 7), § 266/127.

  17. 17.

    H. Hinrichs, Zur Untreuestrafbarkeit gemeindlicher Vertreter, 2011 (Kovač, Hamburg), pp. 79 et seq.; Perron (note 12), § 266/25; Weber (note 14), p. 166 (168).

  18. 18.

    See for example Art. 7 of the Bavarian Financial Regulation (Bayerische Haushaltsordnung).

  19. 19.

    BGH 3 StR 17/15, 26 November 2015, § 82; L. Rojas, Grundprobleme der Haushaltsuntreue, 2011 (Nomos, Baden-Baden), p. 144.

  20. 20.

    See for example Art. 6 of the Bavarian Financial Regulation (Bayerische Haushaltsordnung).

  21. 21.

    Saliger (note 7), § 266/94.

  22. 22.

    BGH 2 StR 391/51, 28 September 1951, § 10 (BGHSt 1, 332 et seq.); J. Wessels/W. Beulke/H. Satzger, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 46th ed. 2016 (Müller, Heidelberg), § 217 et seq. The former Adäquanztheorie, by contrast, considered an act to be the cause of an effect if it had increased the possibility of that effect to occur, see J. v. Kries, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, vol. 9 (1889), pp. 528, 531 et seq.; R. Maurach/H. Zipf, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 1, 7th ed. 1987 (Müller, Heidelberg), § 18/30 et seq.

  23. 23.

    Wessels/Beulke/Satzger (note 22), § 218.

  24. 24.

    BGH 2 StR 549/89, 6 July 1990, § 59 et seq. (BGHSt 37, 106 et seq.); C. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, vol. 1, 4th ed. 2006 (Beck, München), § 11/19.

  25. 25.

    Schünemann (note 7), § 266/168; this test is refused by G. Wolf, Strafbarkeit der rechtswidrigen Verwendung öffentlicher Mittel, 1998 (Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M.), pp. 53 et seq.

  26. 26.

    BGH 5 StR 354/07, 2 April 2008, § 26 (BGHSt 52, 182 et seq.); Perron (note 12), § 266/45.

  27. 27.

    Weigend (note 4), p. 279.

  28. 28.

    Further counts concerned undue payments and other irregularities in the context of the project finances. In the worst case, the obligations of the Land may amount to 330 million euros, see BGH 3 StR 17/15, 26 November 2015, § 45.

  29. 29.

    BGH 3 StR 17/15, 26 November 2015, § 50 et seq.

  30. 30.

    If the recipient is entitled to the payment, however, an economic compensation can be seen in the fact that the state’s obligation ceases to exist once it has been fulfilled.

  31. 31.

    Perron (note 12), § 266/43; Saliger (note 7), § 266/94.

  32. 32.

    Saliger (note 7), § 266/96; Perron (note 12), § 266/44; see also Wolf (note 25), pp. 104 et seq.

  33. 33.

    Compare Saliger (note 7), § 266/63.

  34. 34.

    See, in a different context, BVerfG 2 BvR 2259/08, 23 June 2010, § 108 (BVerfGE 126, 170 et seq.); the relevance of this decision for the ‘individual damage’ doctrine is further examined infra II.1.a)cc)(5).

  35. 35.

    BGH 4 StR 166/61, 16 August 1961, §§ 13, 18, 19 (BGHSt 16, 321 et seq). This was a fraud case, but the damage requirement of fraud is considered identical to the one of § 266(1) PC.

  36. 36.

    This reasoning is sharply criticised by Schünemann (note 3), pp. 42 et seq.

  37. 37.

    The case concerned damage caused to the budget of a Land; put more generally the BGH addresses the possibility of a public entity to dispose of its resources.

  38. 38.

    BGH 1 StR 273/97, 4 November 1997, § 24 (BGHSt 43, 293 et seq.).

  39. 39.

    See for example Dierlamm (note 10), § 266/3; Schünemann (note 7), § 266/24 et seq.

  40. 40.

    BVerfG 2 BvR 2259/08, 23 June 2010, § 68 et seq. (BVerfGE 126, 170 et seq.).

  41. 41.

    BGH 1 StR 592/10, 13 April 2011 (NStZ 2011, 520 et seq.).

  42. 42.

    BVerfG 2 BvR 1235/11, 1 November 2012, § 22 (NJW 2013, 365 et seq.).

  43. 43.

    BVerfG 2 BvR 1235/11, 1 November 2012, § 23 et seq. (NJW 2013, 365 et seq.).

  44. 44.

    BVerfG 2 BvR 1235/11, 1 November 2012, § 26 (NJW 2013, 365 et seq.).

  45. 45.

    BGH 1 StR 185/01, 15 November 2001, § 79 (BGHSt 47, 148 et seq.); Perron (note 12), § 266/49; Kindhäuser (note 6), § 266/122.

  46. 46.

    Roxin (note 24), § 12/23.

  47. 47.

    § 356 PC applies only to an attorney who, in breach of his duty, serves both parties in the same legal matter.

  48. 48.

    See, for instance, Art. 49 of the Bavarian Municipality Code (Gemeindeordnung).

  49. 49.

    In order to not exceed the framework of this case study, only public officials under German law are addressed here. But it is important to note that since a legislative reform in November 2015 §§ 331, 332 PC et seq. no longer cover only German but also European public officials (defined in § 11(1) no. 2a PC) and in some cases even foreign public officials (§ 335a PC).

  50. 50.

    The translation of § 11(1) no. 2(c) PC provided by the Federal Ministry of Justice is slightly different (‘have otherwise been appointed to serve with a public authority or other agency or have been commissioned to perform public administrative services regardless of the organisational form chosen to fulfil such duties’). The version used here shall make clear that the performance of public administrative services is the common element of all sub-categories.

  51. 51.

    See, for instance, Art. 1(2) of the Bavarian Act on Elected Civil Servants on the Local Level (Gesetz über kommunale Wahlbeamte und Wahlbeamtinnen).

  52. 52.

    Fischer (note 6), § 11/16.

  53. 53.

    H. Satzger, in: Satzger/Schluckebier/Widmaier (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch, 3rd ed. 2017 (Heymanns, Köln), § 11/28.

  54. 54.

    BGH 5 StR 453/05, 9 May 2006, § 22 et seq. (NJW 2006, 2050 et seq.).

  55. 55.

    BGH 3 StR 301/03, 28 October 2004, § 39 et seq. (NJW 2004, 3569 et seq.).

  56. 56.

    BGH 3 StR 301/03, 28 October 2004, § 47 (NJW 2004, 3569 et seq.).

  57. 57.

    See H. Rosenau, in: Satzger/Schluckebier/Widmaier (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch, 3rd ed. 2017 (Heymanns, Köln), § 331/45.

  58. 58.

    BGH 3 StR 212/07, 28 August 2007, § 18 (NJW 2007, 3446 et seq.).

  59. 59.

    BGH 3 StR 301/03, 28 October 2004, § 48 (NJW 2004, 3569 et seq.).

  60. 60.

    BGH 3 StR 301/03, 28 October 2004, § 47 (NJW 2004, 3569 et seq.); 3 StR 212/07, 28 August 2007, § 18 (NJW 2007, 3446 et seq.).

  61. 61.

    BGH 3 StR 212/07, 28 August 2007, §§ 15, 22 (NJW 2007, 3446 et seq.).

  62. 62.

    BGH 3 StR 265/14, 11 December 2014, § 37 et seq. (BGHSt 60, 94 et seq.).

  63. 63.

    M. Korte, in: Joecks/Miebach (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, vol. 5, 2nd ed. 2014 (Beck, München), § 331/78, 80.

  64. 64.

    BGH 3 StR 492/10, 26 May 2011 (wistra 2011, 391 et seq.).

  65. 65.

    BGH 3 StR 492/10, 26 May 2011, § 20 (wistra 2011, 391 et seq.); see also G. Heine/J. Eisele, in: Schönke/Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch, 29th ed. 2014 (Beck, München), § 331/17 with further references.

  66. 66.

    This solution is therefore criticised as over-criminalising, see Rosenau (note 57), § 331/44.

  67. 67.

    BGH 3 StR 492/10, 26 May 2011, § 22 (wistra 2011, 391 et seq.); 1 StR 372/01, 23 May 2002, § 47 (BGHSt 47, 295 et seq.).

  68. 68.

    See for example Korte (note 63), § 331/73.

  69. 69.

    Fischer (note 6), § 331/23.

  70. 70.

    Rosenau (note 57), § 331/29.

  71. 71.

    In contrast, § 335a PC only covers future performances of an official act.

  72. 72.

    Heine/Eisele (note 65), § 331/30.

  73. 73.

    C. Sowada, in: Laufhütte/Rissing-van Saan/Tiedemann (eds.), Leipziger Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, vol. 13, 12th ed. 2009 (De Gruyter, Berlin/New York), § 331/61.

  74. 74.

    Rosenau (note 57), § 331/31.

  75. 75.

    Heine/Eisele (note 65), § 331/7; L. Kuhlen, in: Kindhäuser/Neumann/Paeffgen (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch, 4th ed. 2013 (Nomos, Baden-Baden), § 331/75.

  76. 76.

    Korte (note 63), § 331/110.

  77. 77.

    Supra II.2.a)aa). The Court did not take a stand with regard to the question of whether this restriction is to be derived from the Grundgesetz or whether it follows from § 331 PC and its requirement of a corrupt agreement itself; see BGH 3 StR 212/07, 28 August 2007, § 15 (NJW 2007, 3446 et seq.).

  78. 78.

    Supra II.2.a)bb).

  79. 79.

    BGH 1 StR 372/01, 23 May 2002 (BGHSt 47, 295 et seq.).

  80. 80.

    Such an agreement jeopardises the integrity of the public sector. However, an act is only deemed socially appropriate if the protective purpose of the relevant provision is not affected—see for example Roxin (note 24), § 10/40; Korte (note 63), § 331/11.

  81. 81.

    BGH 1 StR 541/01, 23 October 2002 § 39 (BGHSt 48, 44 et seq.); Fischer (note 6), § 332/8.

  82. 82.

    BGH 1 StR 541/01, 23 October 2002, § 39 (BGHSt 48, 44 et seq.) with further references.

  83. 83.

    The amendment is based on the UN Convention against Corruption; see also H. Satzger, Juristische Ausbildung 2014, pp. 1022 et seq.

  84. 84.

    § 25(2) Political Parties Act, see supra II.2.a)aa) and cc)(1).

  85. 85.

    In particular, donations exceeding 10.000 € must be reported to the president of the Bundestag, see § 25(3) Political Parties Act.

  86. 86.

    R. Francuski, Höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung zum Strafrecht 2014, p. 220 (226).

  87. 87.

    Bundestags-Drucksache (Parliamentary Document—BT-Drs. from here onwards) 18/476, p. 6.

  88. 88.

    Satzger (note 83), p. 1028; E. Kempf, in: Lüderssen/Volk/Wahle (eds.), Festschrift für Wolf Schiller, 2014 (Nomos, Baden-Baden), p. 359 (365); M. Kubiciel/E. Hoven, Neue Kriminalpolitik 2014, p. 339 (352); Francuski (note 86), p. 228.

  89. 89.

    Fischer (note 6), § 108e/35.

  90. 90.

    Satzger (note 83), p. 1029.

  91. 91.

    Fischer (note 6), § 108e/19; Kubiciel/Hoven (note 88), p. 345.

  92. 92.

    BT-Drs. 18/476, p. 8.

  93. 93.

    BT-Drs. 18/607, p. 8.

  94. 94.

    BT-Drs. 18/607, p. 8.

  95. 95.

    BT-Drs. 18/476, p. 8.

  96. 96.

    BT-Drs. 18/607, p. 7.

  97. 97.

    Kubiciel/Hoven (note 88), p. 348.

  98. 98.

    See H. Klein, in: Maunz/Dürig (eds.), Grundgesetzkommentar (Beck, München), Art. 46/65 et seq.

  99. 99.

    H.-H. Trute, in: v. Münch/Schulte (eds.), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 6th ed. 2012 (Beck, München), Art. 46/28 et seq.

  100. 100.

    N. Achterberg/M. Schulte, in: v. Mangoldt/Klein/Starck (eds.), Das Bonner Grundgesetz, 4th ed. 2000 (Vahlen, München), Art. 46/40.

  101. 101.

    H. Schulze-Fielitz, in: Dreier (ed.), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, vol. II, 3rd ed. 2015 (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen), Art. 46/22.

  102. 102.

    W. Joecks, in: Joecks/Miebach (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, vol. 5, 2nd ed. 2014 (Beck, München), § 36/25.

  103. 103.

    Klein (note 98), Art. 46/31.

  104. 104.

    § 36 PC and § 7 of the Act on the Election of the Federal President (Bundespräsidentenwahlgesetz). The Federal Convention’s only task is the election of the Federal President.

  105. 105.

    See § 5 Act on German Members of the European Parliament (Europaabgeordnetengesetz).

  106. 106.

    A. Hoyer, in: Wolter (ed.), Systematischer Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (Carl Heymanns, Köln), § 36/1; S. Magiera, in: Kahl/Waldhoff/Walter (eds.), Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (Müller, Heidelberg), Art. 46/49.

  107. 107.

    If they are, it needs to be assessed whether the respective decision was taken in their capacity as member of the Government or as member of Parliament; see Rosenau (note 57), § 36/3.

  108. 108.

    Against a decision of a lower court, the member of Parliament will have the usual right to appeal.

  109. 109.

    See Art. 93(1) no. 4a Const., § 90 Act on the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz).

  110. 110.

    BVerfG 2 BvE 2/00, 17 December 2001, § 75 (BVerfGE 104, 310 et seq.).

  111. 111.

    Art. 93(1) no. 1 Const. and § 63 et seq. Act on the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz); Magiera (note 106), Art. 46/134.

  112. 112.

    BVerfG 2 BvR 969/14, 15 August 2014, § 26 (NJW 2014, 3085 et seq.).

  113. 113.

    Schulze-Fielitz (note 101), Art. 46/41.

  114. 114.

    See F. Zimmermann, in: Fahl/Satzger/Swoboda (eds.), Festschrift für Werner Beulke, 2014 (Müller, Heidelberg), p. 1091 (1092 et seq.), with further references.

  115. 115.

    L. Meyer-Goßner, in: Meyer-Goßner/Schmitt, Strafprozessordnung, 59th ed. 2016 (Beck, München), § 120b GVG/1.

  116. 116.

    For details see C. Trentmann, Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 2016, p. 130 et seq.

  117. 117.

    F. Zimmermann, in: Oğlakcıoğlu/Rückert/Schuhr (eds.), Axiome des nationalen und internationalen Strafverfahrensrechts, 2016 (Nomos, Baden-Baden), pp. 28 et seq.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany

    Frank Zimmermann

Authors
  1. Frank Zimmermann
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Frank Zimmermann .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany

    Frank Zimmermann

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Zimmermann, F. (2017). Criminal Liability of Political Decision-Makers in Germany. In: Zimmermann, F. (eds) Criminal Liability of Political Decision-Makers. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52051-3_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52051-3_6

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-52050-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-52051-3

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation