Abstract
For solving this case from a Norwegian point of view the offences in chapter 19 of the Norwegian Criminal Code, entitled Protection of official authority and trust to this, are relevant. Relevant provisions are misuse of public office, pursuant to section 173 of the Criminal Code, misconduct, according to section 171 of the Criminal Code as well as gross negligent misconduct, pursuant to section 172 of the Criminal Code. These offences may to some extent need to be stretched to be applicable in the case. The fact that M under part 1 pursues personal interests is not as such criminalized but is considered part of political decision-making in general.
For criminal liability for pursuit of personal interests, part 2, there are several offences that are relevant. Most of these are found in chapter 30 of the Criminal Code, which regulates fraud, tax fraud and similar economic criminality. Relevant provisions are fraud, pursuant to section 371 of the Criminal Code (gross fraud is regulated in section 372 and minor fraud in section 373, whereas gross negligent fraud is found in section 347), corruption, according to section 387 of the Criminal Code (gross corruption is regulated in section 388), or trading in influence, according to section 389.
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Notes
- 1.
The Norwegian Constitution, Kongeriket Norges Grunnlov, LOV-1814-05-17.
- 2.
Art. 2 of the Constitution.
- 3.
See E. Smith, Konstitusjonelt demokrati, Statsforfatningsretten i prinsipielt og komparativt lyst, 3. utgave, 2015 (Fagbokforlaget), pp. 246-248.
- 4.
The Norwegian Parliament, the Storting is officially called Storting also in English.
- 5.
‘The executive power is vested in the King, or in the Queen if she has succeeded to the Crown pursuant to the provisions of Article 6 or Article 7 or Article 48 of this Constitution. When the executive power is thus vested in the Queen, she has all the rights and obligations which pursuant to this Constitution and the law of the land are possessed by the King.’
- 6.
H.P. Graver, Alminnelig forvaltningsrett, 4. utgave, 2015 (Universitetsforlaget), p. 149.
- 7.
Ibid. p. 150. See also Art. 31 of the Constitution on the countersigning on the decisions of the King. The relationship of the Government and the King is that the members of the Government assume the functions that, in accordance with the Constitution, are assigned to the King, and it is the Government that formally passes the resolutions. However, the involvement of the King, by way of signing the resolutions passed by the King in Council of State, is judicially required in some cases, compare with Art. 31 of the Constitution. The Government has two main forms of decision, the Council of State meeting and the Government conference. The Constitution and constitutional practice regulates which matters must be formally decided in the Council of State presided over by the King, and which may be decided by the individual minister on his own. For decisions to be made in the Council of State, more than half of its members must be present. The term ‘The King in Council’ (Kongen i statsråd) is used to a large extent in the Norwegian Constitution. However, it is in fact the Government that has the executive power, and therefore the term ‘Government’ will be used in this report to demonstrate the actual state of play, unless directly quoting an article from the Constitution. This confusion in terminology is mainly due to the fact that some parts of the Constitution have not been updated, and still stand in their older format.
- 8.
Act relating to Civil Servants etc., (the Civil Service Act), Tjenestemannsloven, LOV-1983-03-04-3. Ministers or state secretaries are not included in the scope of the Civil Service Act, and are therefore not considered as senior civil servants in the understanding of the act.
- 9.
See T. Eckhoff, Var det straffbart å offentliggjøre LORAN C-instillingen? Kritisk Juss (1978), p. 18, on the fact that a member of the Storting was considered falling under the scope of the sec. 121 of the previous Norwegian Criminal Code (offentlig tjenestemann). See further infra II.1. on the current regulation.
- 10.
See further Art. 15 of the Constitution on the vote of no confidence. This report has not, and will not focus on the Sameting, which has no constitutional status. See https://www.sametinget.se/lang/english for more information (last visited 8 April 2016).
- 11.
http://www.kartverket.no/Kunnskap/Fakta-om-Norge/Fylker-og-kommuner/Tabell/ (last visited 4 April 2016).
- 12.
Act relating to municipalities and county authorities (the Local Government Act), Kommuneloven, LOV-1992-09-25-107. There is currently an on-going process to update and renew this act. The newest document is NOU 2016:4 Ny Kommunelov (A new Local Government Act, the report is from 10 March 2016), where several amendments are suggested. It is not possible to further look into these here.
- 13.
Also Graver (note 6), p. 155.
- 14.
Ibid.
- 15.
The decision on the amendment was made by the Storting on 31 March 2016 where a new provision is inserted into Art. 49 of the Constitution, see https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Stortinget/2015-2016/160331/. This amendment is however mainly of symbolic value, and does not as such change the autonomy of municipalities.
- 16.
Graver (note 6), p. 155. See also, e.g., sec. 59 of the Local Government Act on review of legality and sec. 60 of the same act on the approval of financial obligations.
- 17.
These are then also not considered as legislative bodies.
- 18.
Sec. 35(1) of the Local Government Act.
- 19.
The central planning document for this at the state level is the National transport plan (Nasjonal transportplan) and the economic plans are granted in the state budget each year.
- 20.
This applies for example when the financing for a new measure is done by collective traffic effort (bompenger), based on Art. 75(a) of the Constitution.
- 21.
The Norwegian Criminal Code, Lov om straff (straffeloven) LOV-2005-05-20-28. The Norwegian Criminal Code is not yet translated into English. The translations used here are the author’s own, and therefore should be used with certain caution.
- 22.
Lov om behandlingsmåten i forvaltningssaker (forvaltningsloven) LOV-1967-02-10. Here, an administrative decision is defined as ‘a decision made in the exercise of public authority which generally or specifically determines the rights or duties of private persons (individual persons or other private legal persons)’. See further also the comment by T. Bekkedal on this on lovdata (inlogged version). See also Ot.prp.nr. 8 (2007-2008) pp. 233-236, especially p. 235 on this more systematic approach for offences committed in office as compared to the previous system.
- 23.
Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) p. 337 in relation to sec. 171, which comes systematically first, but the same wording of public authority is used also in sec. 173.
- 24.
NOU 2002:4 p. 312, see also NOU 2002:22 pp. 22-23.
- 25.
Ot.prp.nr. 8 (2007-2008) p. 339.
- 26.
Ot.prp.nr. 8 (2007-2008) p. 339.
- 27.
More generally on the definition of public official (offentlig tjenestemann) in Norwegian legislation, see e.g. NOU 1992: 23 pp. 63-66 and NOU 2002:4 pp. 179-180, also pp. 311-312. Also, in the Public Administration Act, sec. 2(1)(d), a public official is defined as ‘a senior official or other person employed in central or local government service’.
- 28.
NOU 2002:4 p. 312.
- 29.
Based on sec. 40(1) and (2) of the Local Government Act.
- 30.
Ot.prp.nr. 8 (2007-2008) p. 337.
- 31.
Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) p. 337.
- 32.
Ibid.
- 33.
In Rt. 1986 p. 1030 the Supreme Court considered attempt to fraud to fall under the official duty (under the previous sec. 324 of the previous Criminal Code), when related to the perpetrator’s position as a publicly elected person in the municipal council. This seems to be applicable today as well.
- 34.
See further Art. 75 and 76 of the Constitution. See also the Rules of Procedure for the Storting, available at https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Lover-og-instrukser/Stortingets-forretningsorden (in Norwegian, last visited 5 April 2016). https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Representantene/Etisk-veileder-for-stortingsrepresentantene/ (available only in Norwegian, last visited 5 April 2016). See also Smith (note 3), pp. 208-212.
- 35.
Art. 28 of the Constitution. See also Art. 30.
- 36.
Reglement om register for stortingsrepresentatenes verv og økonomiske interesser, available at https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Representantene/Okonomiske-interesser/ (only in Norwegian, last visited at 5 April 2016). See also the ethical guidelines that have been prepared for the Civil Service, but which also apply for the members of the Government and all politicians in the ministries found in The manual on political leadership (2013, available at https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/smk/vedlegg/retningslinjer/handbok_for_politisk_ledelse_september_2013.pdf last visited 14 April 2016). It has comprehensive provisions and deals with amongst other receipt of gifts, remuneration, reporting of financial assets and positions.
- 37.
The guidelines contain six principles, accompanied by a brief commentary, dealing with 1) trust, 2) prohibition on exploiting their position to obtain unwarranted advantages, 3) registration of appointments and economic interests, 4) prohibition on accepting payments or gifts intended to influence them, 5) responsible use of the resources at their disposal and 6) public openness and transparency. See https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-emokratiet/Representantene/Etisk-veileder-for-stortingsrepresentantene/ (available only in Norwegian, last visited 5 April 2016). As these ethical guidelines are not legally binding and the Storting itself enforces them, the effectiveness of such can of course be questioned.
- 38.
Ot.prp.nr. 8 (2007-2008) p. 337 and NOU 2002:4 p. 312.
- 39.
Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) pp. 231 and 338. Examples of such a reprimand are disciplinary measures or summary discharge, as laid down in sec. 14 and 15 of the Civil Service Act.
- 40.
Sec. 40(3) has some specific regulations on this, see infra 2.d) on the conflict of interest and the fact that this section does not seem that relevant for our case.
- 41.
Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) p. 338.
- 42.
The Norwegian criminal justice system recognises three forms of intent, i.e. direct intent (hensiktsforsett), probability intent (sannsynlighetsforsett) and (positive, not hypothetical) dolus eventualis, see sec. 22 CC.
- 43.
This applies for all forms of intentional fraud, but not for negligent fraud pursuant to the Supreme Court judgment Rt. 1999 p. 874. Also, how the new regulation on mistake of law (rettsuvitenhet) in Norwegian law will have an impact on this, is unclear.
- 44.
NOU 2002:4 p. 381.
- 45.
On the term ‘office’ more in detail, see infra II.2.b).
- 46.
See what was mentioned supra in relation to official duties, II.1.b), which to some extent can be used to distinguish how a position of public office should be handled, and what can constitute misuse.
- 47.
Domsnr. 188-87. The matter of misuse of public resources has been discussed often, usually in relation to travel reimbursements. There are no specific rules on the misuse of public resources for members of the Storting, but if the Accounting Section would find discrepancies afterwards, a possible criminal investigation and criminal proceedings would take place in accordance with ordinary legislation.
- 48.
When the guilt is minor due to an insignificant value and when the circumstances otherwise so indicate, a fine is the only sanction available (sec. 373).
- 49.
Ot.prp.nr. 78 (2002-2003) p. 54.
- 50.
Ot.prp.nr.22 (2007-2008) p. 470.
- 51.
For example, as regards Bergen, some guidance can be found here https://www.bergen.kommune.no/jobb/hvorfor-kommunen/9664/article-100755 (available only in Norwegian, last visited on 11 May 2016). These, however, can vary between the municipalities, and there is no overview of these.
- 52.
Ot.prp.nr. 78 (2002-2003) p. 55. Examples mentioned here that are not considered improper are when the office personnel of a court receive a bottle of wine from a local attorney at Christmas or gifts of lesser value, such as advertisement objects.
- 53.
Ot.prp.nr.78 (2002-2003) p. 54. There were some cases in 2010 where members of the Government or the Storting had received gifts of considerable value. These were not taken to court, as the prosecution did not consider it necessary, but the media attention and the value of the gifts could indicate otherwise.
- 54.
Ibid.
- 55.
On corruption and municipalities in Norway, see further T. Dølvik, Korrupsjonsrisiko i norske kommuner, in: Eriksan (ed.), Å Bekjempe et samfunnsonde – om korrupsjon, varsling, granskning og organisasjonskultur, 2014 (Gyldendal), pp. 92-107. This includes some interesting graphs in relation to how much corruption the inhabitants of a municipality think there is and other issues related to trust.
- 56.
Ot.prp.nr.78 (2002-2003) p. 58.
- 57.
See also supra II.2.b) on the requirement of an improper advantage.
- 58.
Ot.prp.nr.22 (2008-2009) p. 471.
- 59.
Ot.prp.nr.78 (2002-2003) pp. 41 and 59-60.
- 60.
Ot.prp.nr. 78 (2002-2003) p. 60.
- 61.
For the latest elections, information can be found here: http://www.partifinansiering.no/a/vkb2015/index.html (last visited 11 April 2016).
- 62.
As a side note, for municipal/county council elections and how the candidates are chosen, there are no internal rules for candidate nominations and how the inside nominations of the candidates are done. This can of course open up a possibility for corruption or other criminal offences in relation to the nomination committees, but this aspect cannot be further analysed here.
- 63.
Based on the Local Government Act sec. 40(3) with some specifications.
- 64.
See e.g. the Innst. 302 S (2011-2012) Innstilling fra kontroll- og konstitusjonskomitteen, where this paragraph is analysed in relation to the (then) Foreign Minister, and see also the statement on the interpretation on this from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security from 2011, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/-6---vurdering-av-arbeidsministerens-hab/id665529/ (visited on 16 March 2016).
- 65.
For more details on this section, see O. Overå/J.F. Berndt, Kommuneloven med kommentarer, 6. utgave (Kommuneforlaget 2014), pp. 372-384.
- 66.
Rt. 1986 p. 1030 also comments on this, where the perpetrator owned 1/3 of a company, and that he should have declared himself partial, when the matter was discussed at the municipal level.
- 67.
Ot.prp.nr. 22(2008-2009) pp. 471-472 and Rt. 1984 p. 1275.
- 68.
NOU 2002:4 p. 315.
- 69.
Ot.prp.nr. 22(2008-2009) p. 472.
- 70.
This is stated in sec. 390(2), and it is also commented on in the NOU 2002:4 p. 315 and Ot.prp.nr. 22 (2008-2009) p. 472. The section can, however, be used together with the offence of theft in sec. 321 CC.
- 71.
See further sec. 41 of the Public Administration Act on effects of procedural errors, see also the Veileder, Habilitet i kommuner og fylkeskommuner, Om inhabilitetsreglene i forvaltningsloven og kommuneloven, p. 35 and Overå/Berndt (note 65), pp. 385-388.
- 72.
Also pointed out by the CoE Greco: Fourth evaluation round: Corruption prevention in respect of members of Parliament, judges and prosecutors, Evaluation report Norway, 25 June 2014, p. 14.
- 73.
If the holder of such an appointment is elected as a member of the Storting, he should be given leave of absence from the appointment, along similar rules as those which apply to government ministers.
- 74.
CoE Greco: Fourth evaluation round: Corruption prevention in respect of members of Parliament, judges and prosecutors, Evaluation report Norway, 25 June 2014, pp. 14-15, also on the recommendations.
- 75.
See what was mentioned supra II.1.b).
- 76.
H. Renå, Norway’s Integrity System – Not Quite Perfect? (Transparency International Norway 2012, available at http://www.transparency.no/2013/09/15/norges-integritetssystem-ikke-helt-perfekt/, last visited 14 April 2016). See further also CoE Greco: Fourth evaluation round: Corruption prevention in respect of members of Parliament, judges and prosecutors, Evaluation report Norway, 25.6.2014, pp. 18-20 on this.
- 77.
Renå (note 76), p. 73. Also J. Andenæs/A. Fliflet, Statsforfatningen i Norge, 10. utgave 2006 (Universitetsforlaget), p. 169. Transparency International Norway has further also suggested a register for lobbyists.
- 78.
Renå (note 76), p. 17.
- 79.
The criticism of Transparency International Norway is naturally still valid.
- 80.
The Public Administration Act sec. 10.
- 81.
Based on administrative law principles, one could argue that a government decision could be declared void based on the non-statutory requirements if the personal interest of a government member has had a decisive effect on the result. This view is supported by Renå (note 76), p. 92.
- 82.
Renå (note 76), p. 93.
- 83.
See e.g. the Innst. 302 S (2011-2012) Innstilling fra kontroll- og konstitusjonskomitteen, where this paragraph is analysed in relation to the (then) Foreign Minister, and see also the statement on the interpretation on this from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security from 2011, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/-6---vurdering-av-arbeidsministerens-hab/id665529/ (visited on 16 March 2016).
- 84.
Tap av retten til å ha en stilling eller utøve en virksomhet eller aktivitet.
- 85.
Ot.prp.nr. 8 (2007-2008) p. 454 also Rt-1992-597, which concerned a police inspector and drunk driving.
- 86.
Ot. prpr.nr. 90 (2003-2004) p. 454. On the public interest, see NOU 1992:23 p. 186.
- 87.
Also mentioned in the NOU 1992:23 p. 185 and Ot.prp.nr.17 (2008-2009) p. 52.
- 88.
Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) p. 455. Also Rt. 1961 p. 899.
- 89.
Ot.prp.nr.8 (2007-2008) p. 455.
- 90.
See also Andenæs/Fliflet (note 77), p. 144.
- 91.
This is mentioned in A. Fliflet, Grunnloven Kommentarutgave, 2005 (Universitetsforlaget), p. 249. See also NOU 2002:4 pp. 53 and 247-250, as well as Ot.prp.nr. 90(2003-2004) pp. 328-329. See also what is mentioned in the CoE Greco: Fourth evaluation round: Corruption prevention in respect of members of Parliament, judges and prosecutors, Evaluation report Norway, 25 June 2014 p. 10.
- 92.
The article continues and states that the same applies to senior officials employed in government ministries or in the diplomatic or consular service, the highest-ranking civil officials, commanders of regiments and other military formations, commandants of fortresses and officers commanding warships. It also regulates pensions and suspension of other senior officials.
- 93.
Document no. 12:1 (2003-2004) Grunnlovsforslag fra Jørgen Kosmo, Inge Lønning, Lodve Solholm, Ågot Valle, Odd Holten, Berit Brørby og Carl I. Hagen, see also document no. 19 (2003-2004) pp. 16-17. See also F. Sejersted, Om statsrådens hårfarge og været på 17. mai, Nytt norsk tidsskrift 1998 s. 227-243, and F. Sejersted, Ny paragraf, gammel regel – Om Grunnlovens § 15 og parlamentarismens rettslige innhold, Tidsskrift for rettsvitenskap (2014), s. 235-267. Previously, although no written rules existed, there was parliamentary practice and constitutional customary law.
- 94.
Kontroll- og konstitusjonskomiteen in Norwegian.
- 95.
Renå (note 76), p. 89.
- 96.
This applies for criminal offence as mentioned in sec. 151 to 154, 150(b), 171 to 174, 208, 353, chapter 27 or chapter 30 of the CC. Also, the stipulation that the charge or indictment shall be related to discharge of office or service for the municipality or county authority does not apply as regards criminal offences in sec. 151 to 154 CC. These relate to election offences.
- 97.
Ot.prp.nr.42 (1991-1992) p. 144.
- 98.
Overå/Berndt (note 65), pp. 129-130. There is in addition a section on the suspension relating to civil officials, in the sec. 14 of the Civil Service Act. As this is not applicable to our case, this section is not further focused on.
- 99.
Smith (note 3), 239-240, also p. 114, where he comments on the peculiarity related to this immunity and the ICC. The ICC statute prohibits the use of immunity for Heads of State, the Norwegian solution was to interpret the Art. 5 of the Constitution in light of the current requirements, and the ratification did not then require an amendment of the article. This seems to be a somewhat overly pragmatic solution.
- 100.
The lack of this parliamentarian immunity should of course be viewed in the light of the competence of the Norwegian Court of Impeachment, see infra V.
- 101.
See further the European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), Report on the scope and lifting of parliamentary immunities, Strasbourg, 14 May 2014, Study No. 714/2013.
- 102.
Fliflet (note 91), p. 282.
- 103.
See also more generally ECtHR case of Karácsony and others v. Hungary, Applications nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, judgment of 17.05.2016.
- 104.
Fliflet (note 91), p. 283 and Smith (note 3), pp. 210-211. According to Andenæs/Fliflet (note 77), pp. 161-163, however, discussions, e.g., in the halls of the Storting are not covered.
- 105.
See further Smith (note 3), pp. 215-216 on the Rules of Procedure.
- 106.
Andenæs/Fliflet (note 77), p. 163.
- 107.
The rules on the Court of Impeachment do not apply for municipal level politicians.
- 108.
As the members of the Supreme Court are not relevant for the case, they will not be focused on here.
- 109.
Document no. 19 (2003-2004) Rapport til Stortingets presidentskap fra utvalget til å utrede alternativer til riksrettsordningen, Avgitt 1. juni 2004, p. 10, also Smith (note 3), p. 284.
- 110.
See also Smith (note 3), pp. 282-286.
- 111.
Lov om ansvar for handlinger som påtales ved Riksrett (ansvarlighetsloven), LOV-1932-02-05-1. As is stated in the document no. 19 (2003-2004) p. 14, most offences falling under the competence of the Court of Impeachment, are considered found in this act.
- 112.
Although admittedly very vague in its formulation, this section has been considered in line with the legality principle, see further document no. 19 (2003-2004) pp. 33-34.
- 113.
Whether a person could be sentenced in the Court of Impeachment for ‘normal’ criminal offences, and for example for misuse of public office, if the conditions of the offences in the Accountability Act are found not to be fulfilled, is to some extent unclear, and the document no. 19 (2003-2004) does not give a clear answer on this, although this seems to be possible to some extent. The starting point is, however, that offences found in the Criminal Code go before normal courts, and in cases where basis can be found in the Accountability Act, the case goes to the Court of Impeachment.
- 114.
The preliminary works Ot.prp.nr.22 (2008-2009) pp. 406-407 and NOU 2002:4 pp. 320-321 do not specifically comment on this sections’ relevance for the Accountability Act.
- 115.
Lov om rett til innsyn i dokument i offentleg verksemd (offentleglova), LOV-2006-05-19-16, Act relating to public access to documents in the public administration, (Freedom of Information Act). See T. Eckhoff, Var det straffbart å offentliggjøre LORAN C-innstillingen? Kritisk Juss (1978), pp. 18-25 for details.
- 116.
Sec. 4 Accountability Act and document no. 19 (2003-2004) pp. 25-26.
- 117.
These sanctions could also have been dealt with supra under III.1., but as this only applies in cases before the Court of Impeachment, these fit better here systematically.
- 118.
In the document no. 19 (2003-2004) this seems a given starting point, at p. 8: ‘Straffelovens alminnelige regler supplerer ansvarlighetsloven og gjelder således i tillegg til de forhold som er omhandlet i ansvarlighetsloven.’
- 119.
Document no. 19 (2003-2004) pp. 23-25.
- 120.
Document no. 19 (2003-2004) pp. 23-25.
- 121.
Art. 86(2) of the Constitution.
- 122.
https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Arbeidet/Riksrett/ (last visited 28 April 2016). The Parliamentary committee is an external preliminary investigation unit that can be used for possible cases before the Court of Impeachment.
- 123.
https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Arbeidet/Riksrett/ (last visited 28 April 2016).
- 124.
Art. 86(3) and (4) of the Constitution. See also document no. 19 (2003-2004) pp. 37-45.
- 125.
Lov om rettergangsmåten i riksrettssaker [riksrettsrettergangsloven], LOV-1932-02-05-2.
- 126.
There have been several amendments and the procedure has been criticised and discussed a lot, see document no. 19 (2003-2004) pp. 11-12. The matter of a Court of Impeachment can of course be questioned also based on arguments stemming from the right to a fair trial under Art. 6 ECHR, such as an independent and impartial tribunal. See further on this the ECtHR decision in Ninn-Hansen against Denmark, Application no. 28972/95, of 18 May 1999.
- 127.
E. Smith, Alternativer til Riksretten, Nytt norsk tidsskrift nr. 2 2000 p. 199, and especially C.A. Fleischer, Bør vi også kunne straffe nasjonale politikere, Folkefiende? 70 år med Tor Erling Staff, 2002 (Kagge), pp. 199-215.
- 128.
Document no. 19 (2003-2004) p. 9.
- 129.
Document no. 18 (2000-2001) Rapport til Stortinget fra kommisjonen som ble nedsatt av Stortinget for å foreta en bred gjennomgang av utredning, planlegging, prosjektering og utbygging av ny hovedflyplass for Østlandet og Gardermobanen.
- 130.
Smith (note 3), pp. 211-212.
- 131.
Sec. 69 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Lov om rettergangsmåten i straffesaker (Straffeprosessloven), LOV-1981-05-22-25.
- 132.
Sec. 59a of the Criminal Procedure Act.
- 133.
Sec. 75(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
Acknowledgements
The author has received help and guidance from, among others, Jan Fridthjof Bernt, Bjørn Henning Østenstad, Eivind Smith and, especially, Eirik Holmøyvik and Jørn Jacobsen, who both have read the manuscript and commented on it, for which she is very grateful. All possible errors are, however, only the author to blame.
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Suominen, A. (2017). Criminal Liability of Political Decision-Makers in Norway. In: Zimmermann, F. (eds) Criminal Liability of Political Decision-Makers. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52051-3_10
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