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Attack Mitigation by Data Structure Randomization

  • Zhongtian Chen
  • Hao Han
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10128)

Abstract

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Control Flow Integrity (CFI) have been regarded as the most effective defenses against control flow hijacking attacks. However, researchers have recently shown that data-oriented attacks can circumvent both ASLR and CFI, and are even Turing-complete. These attacks often leverage encapsulated data structures to achieve malicious behaviors. To defeat data structure oriented attacks (DSOA), we propose data structure layout randomization techniques. Our method not only randomizes the data structure layout at compile time, but also inserts the padding bytes to increase entropy. Experimental results show that our method can defeat DSOA with low performance overhead (2.1% on average).

Keywords

Randomization Algorithm Performance Overhead Data Flow Graph Base Address Buffer Overflow Vulnerability 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University High School of IndianaCarmelUSA
  2. 2.EMCWenzhouChina

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