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An Analytical Study of Board Accountability in Transnational Codes of Corporate Governance

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Book cover Corporate Governance Codes for the 21st Century

Abstract

The accountability of boards of directors is a critical element of good corporate governance. It has been widely observed that good corporate governance is best achieved by holding directors accountable for their behaviour and decisions. The World Bank has stated that corporate governance is ‘concerned with the systems of law and practice which will promote enterprise and ensure accountability.’ Many countries have codes of corporate governance. Such codes play an important role in a country’s corporate governance framework and so it follows that they should provide in some way for board accountability, especially given that codes are regarded as providing a set of best practice recommendations regarding, inter alia, the behaviour and role of the board of directors, and the content of codes is heavily affected by corporate governance practices. Certainly one of the first voluntary corporate governance codes, the UK’s Combined Code, stressed the importance of accountability as one of the principles on which it was based. In fact the Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (commonly referred to as ‘the Cadbury Report’), on which the UK’s Combined Code, and ultimately the UK Corporate Governance Code, was based, stated: ‘The issue for corporate governance is how to strengthen the accountability of boards of directors to shareholders.’ Enforcement of codes is a matter governed by external market forces and, most importantly, the board of directors. If the latter is not accountable then the enforceability of codes is likely to be diminished.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Young (2009), pp. 355–356.

  2. 2.

    Solomon and Solomon (2004), p. 14; Makuta (2009), p. 56.

  3. 3.

    World Bank (1999), p. 3.

  4. 4.

    Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), p. 417.

  5. 5.

    Zattoni and Cuomo (2008), p. 3.

  6. 6.

    Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992), para 6.1.

  7. 7.

    Zattoni and Cuomo (2008), p. 3.

  8. 8.

    Cuomo et al. (2015), p. 2.

  9. 9.

    See for example Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) and Reid (2003).

  10. 10.

    Cuomo et al. (2015), p. 13. Examples include Greece, China, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Egypt.

  11. 11.

    This explanation draws on Mertus (1999), p. 1337.

  12. 12.

    ICGN (1999), p. 5.

  13. 13.

    Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009), p. 379. For an instance of this, see Berg (undated).

  14. 14.

    Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009), p. 379. It is said that the World Bank has used the reviews of more than 60 nations: G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 3.

  15. 15.

    Cuomo et al. (2015).

  16. 16.

    Zattoni and Cuomo (2008), p. 4.

  17. 17.

    Davis and Steil (2001) and referred to in Zattoni and Cuomo (2008), p. 4.

  18. 18.

    For a comparison of the three codes, see de Zwart (2015).

  19. 19.

    Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009), p. 379.

  20. 20.

    Cuomo et al. (2015), p. 1.

  21. 21.

    Sahin (2015), p. 692.

  22. 22.

    Cuomo et al. (2015), p. 4.

  23. 23.

    Luetz et al. (2011).

  24. 24.

    de Zwart (2015), p. 93. See Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (1999), p. 1.

  25. 25.

    Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), p. 427; Sahin (2015), p. 694.

  26. 26.

    Micheler (2012), p. 11.

  27. 27.

    German Corporate Governance Code (2012), para 1.

  28. 28.

    Enrione et al. (2006).

  29. 29.

    Haxhi and Aguilera (2014), p. 2.

  30. 30.

    For example, Institute of Chartered Accountants for England and Wales (2013).

  31. 31.

    Zattoni and Cuomo (2008), p. 3; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), p. 417.

  32. 32.

    Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004).

  33. 33.

    Cicon et al. (2012), p. 621.

  34. 34.

    Soltani and Maupetit (2015), p. 273.

  35. 35.

    The terms, ‘company’ and ‘corporation,’ are used interchangeably in this chapter. While there was, historically, a difference in the meaning of the respective terms, this is no longer the case. In some jurisdictions, such as the UK the former term is used, while elsewhere, such as the US and Australia, the latter is used.

  36. 36.

    Coombes and Wong (2004).

  37. 37.

    Pye (2013), p. 135.

  38. 38.

    Hill (2005), p. 376.

  39. 39.

    Salterio et al. (2013), p. 25.

  40. 40.

    Salterio et al. (2013), pp. 24–25. The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (2016), p. 31 has, in a draft for a new version of its code, the King Report (King IV), suggested an ‘apply and explain’ approach for South Africa.

  41. 41.

    Arcot and Bruno (2007).

  42. 42.

    RiskMetrics Group (2009), pp. 12 & 167.

  43. 43.

    For instance, see Davies et al. (2011), p. 22.

  44. 44.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 13.

  45. 45.

    Fernandez-Rodriguez et al. (2004).

  46. 46.

    Keay (2014a).

  47. 47.

    Cuomo et al. (2015), p. 2.

  48. 48.

    Dzierzanowski and Tamowicz (2003), p. 285.

  49. 49.

    Hopt (2011).

  50. 50.

    Wong (2008).

  51. 51.

    Coombes and Wong (2004), p. 50.

  52. 52.

    European Confederation of Directors’ Association (2012), p. 5.

  53. 53.

    Fisher (2004), p. 496; Moore (2013), p. 35.

  54. 54.

    Sinclair (1995), p. 221.

  55. 55.

    Soltani and Maupetit (2015), p. 260.

  56. 56.

    OECD (2004), p. 24.

  57. 57.

    Solomon and Solomon (2004), p. 14; Makuta (2009), p. 56.

  58. 58.

    Belcher (2014), p. 183.

  59. 59.

    Young (2009), p. 356.

  60. 60.

    Makuta (2009), p. 56.

  61. 61.

    Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992), para 1.1.

  62. 62.

    Haddrill (2012).

  63. 63.

    Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), p. 418.

  64. 64.

    Wong (2008), p. 5.

  65. 65.

    Fernandez-Rodriguez et al. (2004).

  66. 66.

    Keay (2014b). Generally, see Moore (2013).

  67. 67.

    Sinclair (1995), p. 221 arguing that the more we try to define the concept the murkier it becomes.

  68. 68.

    Keay (2015b).

  69. 69.

    Uhr (1993), p. 4.

  70. 70.

    Kaler (2002), p. 328.

  71. 71.

    Uhr (1993), p. 4.

  72. 72.

    Simon et al. (1950), p. 513.

  73. 73.

    Roberts and Scapens (1985), p. 448.

  74. 74.

    Zadek (1998), p. 1428.

  75. 75.

    Allen (2003), p. 1382.

  76. 76.

    Mulgan (2000), p. 555; Bovens et al. (2008), p. 225.

  77. 77.

    Bovens (2007), p. 451.

  78. 78.

    Behn (2001); Kaler (2002), p, 329; Koenig-Archibugi (2004), p. 238.

  79. 79.

    Lerner and Tetlock (1999), p. 256.

  80. 80.

    Harlow and Rawlings (2007), p. 545, who do not agree that sanctions are a core aspect of accountability.

  81. 81.

    Kaler (2002), pp. 329–330. Kaler sees the attribution of blame as a weaker version of coercive accountability and punishment as the stronger version.

  82. 82.

    OECD (1998).

  83. 83.

    Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), p. 436.

  84. 84.

    Iu and Batten (2000), p. 51.

  85. 85.

    Keay and Zhao (2016).

  86. 86.

    Cuomo, et al. (2015), p. 7.

  87. 87.

    ICGN(1999), p. 1.

  88. 88.

    Horak and Bodiroga-Vukobrat (2011), p. 181.

  89. 89.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of Corporate Governance.

  90. 90.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of Corporate Governance, p. 11.

  91. 91.

    du Plessis et al. (2011), p. 175.

  92. 92.

    de Zwart (2015), p. 93.

  93. 93.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 51.

  94. 94.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 51.

  95. 95.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 29.

  96. 96.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 22.

  97. 97.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 51.

  98. 98.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 53.

  99. 99.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 54.

  100. 100.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 56.

  101. 101.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 54.

  102. 102.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 57.

  103. 103.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, pp. 41–49.

  104. 104.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 41.

  105. 105.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 51.

  106. 106.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of corporate governance, p. 37.

  107. 107.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of Corporate Governance, p. 51.

  108. 108.

    Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance (1997), para 1.17.

  109. 109.

    For example, see Keay (2012), Ho (2010), Millon (2012) and Williams and Conley (2005).

  110. 110.

    G20/OECD (2015) Principles of Corporate Governance, p. 52.

  111. 111.

    In many jurisdictions standing to take such action is limited to shareholders, but in some countries, such as Canada, Singapore and South Africa other stakeholders might be permitted to bring proceedings.

  112. 112.

    ICGN (2014), p. 4.

  113. 113.

    ICGN (2014), p. 1.

  114. 114.

    ICGN (2014), p. 2.

  115. 115.

    ICGN (2014), s A, para 1.2.

  116. 116.

    ICGN (2014), para 1.2.

  117. 117.

    ICGN (2014), para 1.1.

  118. 118.

    See Keay (2015a), Ch. 4.

  119. 119.

    ICGN (1999), p. 3; ICGN (2009), para 2.1.

  120. 120.

    ICGN (1999), pp. 3 and 6, ICGN (2009), para 1.1.

  121. 121.

    ICGN (1999), p. 7.

  122. 122.

    ICGN (1999), s A, para 2.5.

  123. 123.

    V, s A para 3.6.

  124. 124.

    ICGN (1999), s A, para 3.1.

  125. 125.

    ICGN (1999), s A, para 6.5.

  126. 126.

    ICGN (1999), s A, para 7.5.

  127. 127.

    ICGN (1999), s A, para 9.6.

  128. 128.

    CACG (1999), pp. 2–3.

  129. 129.

    CACG (1999), p. 4.

  130. 130.

    CACG (1999), p. 3.

  131. 131.

    CACG (1999), p. 3.

  132. 132.

    CACG (1999), p. 3.

  133. 133.

    CACG (1999), p. 10.

  134. 134.

    CACG (1999), p. 3.

  135. 135.

    See Keay (2014b).

  136. 136.

    Keay (2014b), p. 3.

  137. 137.

    Keay (2014b), p. 11.

  138. 138.

    Keay (2014b), p. 6.

  139. 139.

    Keay (2014b), p. 6.

  140. 140.

    Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (2009), Para 33.2.

  141. 141.

    Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (2009), Para 32 and Principles 1.1 and 8.4.

  142. 142.

    Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (2009), Principle 6.1.1.

  143. 143.

    CACG (1999), Principles 1–11, 14 and 15.

  144. 144.

    CACG (1999), p. 3.

  145. 145.

    Licht (2014), p. 36.

  146. 146.

    Macey (2008), p. 51. Macey says that the directors are the governors of the company.

  147. 147.

    Salterio et al. (2013), p. 25.

  148. 148.

    This is not to suggest that all consequences of accountability will be negative and/or punitive. Some consequences might be positive, such as shareholder meetings praising the board for its handling of a particular issue.

  149. 149.

    The UK code is a good example of a well-respected code that does not deal with accountability in any depth. See Keay (2015b).

  150. 150.

    Keay (2015a), p. 37.

  151. 151.

    Dubnick (2012), p. 18.

  152. 152.

    Dubnick and Justice (2004), p. 8.

  153. 153.

    Keay and Zhao (2016).

  154. 154.

    Veldman and Willmott (2016).

  155. 155.

    In a similar way to the UK’s Code: Veldman and Willmott (2016).

  156. 156.

    Soltani and Maupetit (2015).

  157. 157.

    Soltani and Maupetit (2015), p. 272.

  158. 158.

    Essamel and Watson (1997), p. 56; Keay (2015a).

  159. 159.

    Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992), Para. 5.2.

  160. 160.

    RiskMetrics Group (2009), p. 17.

  161. 161.

    Moore (2009), p. 103, RiskMetrics Group (2009), pp. 152, 181.

  162. 162.

    Wymeersch (2006).

  163. 163.

    Dubnick (2009), p. 20.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Business Law and Practice, School of Law, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK

    Andrew Keay

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  1. Andrew Keay
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Correspondence to Andrew Keay .

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  1. Deakin Law School, Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, Australia

    Jean J. du Plessis

  2. CUHK Business School, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

    Chee Keong Low

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Keay, A. (2017). An Analytical Study of Board Accountability in Transnational Codes of Corporate Governance. In: du Plessis, J., Low, C. (eds) Corporate Governance Codes for the 21st Century. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51868-8_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51868-8_6

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