Abstract
Affective psychology plays only a very minor role in medieval De anima commentaries. John Buridan dedicates only a single question in his commentary to appetitive acts, namely question 18 of book III on “Whether in a human being one appetite is contrary to another.” As this contribution intends to demonstrate, Buridan’s response to this question contains a sophisticated moral psychology. In the first part of the contribution, the author examines the general framework of Buridan’s moral psychology. The second part is dedicated to show how Buridan uses this general framework in his account of what goes on in an agent when we act against our own best judgment. Unlike other contemporary philosophers, Buridan turns out to have the philosophical means to account for what is often referred to as “clear-eyed weakness of will”, where the agent really judges in the very instance of acting that he ought not do what he does. In this respect, Buridan’s psychology of appetitive acts seems to have a clear advantage over rival accounts, which often have to deny—on purely theoretical grounds—that such a phenomenon is possible.
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Notes
- 1.
Trans. Hicks (1907), with minor modification.
- 2.
See, e.g., Aristotle, ANPOST I.28 87a38-39.
- 3.
See Qq. DA III, qq. 26–28. For an edition of these questions, see Brito (1974).
- 4.
See QDA III, q. 18, n. 6.
- 5.
The correct translation of the terms incontinentia and continentia (and cognate forms) is a matter of debate. I use the transliterations despite their strange connotations in modern English because incontinentia and continentia are for Buridan more specific psychological states than those we usually associate with expressions such as “lack of self-control”, “moral weakness”, or “self-control” and “moral strength”, terms that are sometimes employed as translations of incontinentia and continentia.
- 6.
“Et ad hoc est ratio quia nisi tam continens quam incontinens haberet appetitus contrarios, sequeretur quod continens non differet a simpliciter temperato, et quod incontinens non differet a simpliciter intemperato, quod est falsum, prout debet videri in septimo Ethicorum.”
- 7.
See Aristotle, NE III.1 1110a8-12.
- 8.
“Nec intendo quaerere utrum sit possibile in eodem homine fieri successive appetitus contrarios, quia hoc non dubitatur. Sed dubitatur utrum sit possibile in eodem homine esse simul appetitus contrarios.” Here and in the following I use Zupko’s (1989) translation (with minor modifications).
- 9.
“Sexta conclusio est quod impossibile est intellectum assentire et dissentire simul eidem propositioni, vel etiam assentire simul utrique propositioni sibi invicem contradictiarum, si sit sibi evidens contradictio.” See also QDA III, q. 18, n. 6 and QNE III, q. 3, 42vb.
- 10.
Note that Buridan, like his contemporaries, considers emotions (passions of the soul) primarily as appetitive acts, i.e., as acts pertaining to the appetitive part of the soul and not as perceptions or ‘sensations’. The view that emotions are forms of judgments has many followers among current philosophers of the emotions. The most prominent defender of this view was Robert Solomon. See, for instance, Solomon (1988, 1993, esp. 125).
- 11.
This is not to deny that Buridan’s response is also interesting for other reasons. The existence of contrary appetites played a huge role in discussions about the unity of the soul, for instance. But other scholars have already dealt with this topic. See, e.g., Lagerlund (2009), who also briefly mentions QDA III, q. 18.
- 12.
The reason why Buridan is so circumspect with regard to this point is obvious: the case is different for acts of the sensitive appetite (the appetite that we share with animals) and acts of the rational appetite (i.e., acts of the will). See, e.g., QMETA IX, q. 4, 57vb-58rb. And it is also different depending on the different types of appetitive acts (even those belonging to the same appetitive power); see QNE III, q. 3, 41va-43rb.
- 13.
Buridan admits (QDA III, q. 18, n. 7) that some use the term “judgment” (iudicium) in a broader sense so as to cover all forms of mere appearances. But he himself prefers to use it in a strict sense to refer only to acts of assent or dissent.
- 14.
“Et isti appetitus solent dici primi motus ipsius appetitus.”
- 15.
- 16.
See QNE III, q. 3, 42rb.
- 17.
- 18.
See, e.g., QDA III, q. 18, n. 6: “Apparentiae autem contrariarum propositionum dicuntur etiam esse contrariae, vel quia sunt contrariarum propositionum vel quia si essent seorsum, essent innatae efficere contrarios assensus” (emphasis mine).
- 19.
“Ista tamen dicta sunt moderanda quantum ad voluntatem, quia proper eius libertatem potest transire [in] actum talem, licet assentive sit iudicandum per intellectum quod A est bonum et prosequendum, vel malum et fugiendum. Sed appetitus non liber statim prorumpet in prosecutione.” See also QNE III, q. 3, 42va and VII, q. 8, 145ra-b. On Buridan’s account of freedom of the will see Zupko (1995, 2003, chapter 15).
- 20.
“Illi tamen actus appetitus, scilicet complacentia et displicentia circa idem subiectum, vocantur contrarii attributive, scilicet quia sequuntur apparentias contrarias, puta quia hoc sit bonum et hoc sit malum vel etiam quia innatae sunt, si essent seorsum, facere appetitus vere contrarios [i.e. appetitus efficaces].”
- 21.
See also QDA III, q. 16, nn. 15–16. As Buridan explains here, things are a bit more complex. In order to get truly contradictory judgments in a subject the contradiction would have to be evident to the subject. For the judgments by which I judge “Mary Stuart is in the room” and “The Queen of Scots is not in the room” are not contradictory if I am not aware that Mary Stuart is the Queen of Scots. But if I were aware of the identity, I could not possibly maintain both judgments, since, for Buridan, judgments are acts of believing (credulitates), and I cannot believe something and its opposite at the same time, “for otherwise, someone could think the opposite of the first principle [i.e., the principle of non-contradiction] which is contrary to Aristotle and contrary to the truth as experienced” (QDA III, q. 16, n. 15).
- 22.
For a discussion of various later medieval accounts of the relationship between cognitions and appetitive acts, see Pickavé (2010).
- 23.
Instead of explicitly going over the examples of motivational conflict presented at the beginning of the question, Buridan simply states that “it is apparent that on the basis of these remarks” (n. 12) how the cases are to be described.
- 24.
I thus agree with Saarinen (1994, 177; 180ff) that motivational conflicts are usually only possible in the presence of such weak judgments. However, I disagree with his interpretation that, for Buridan, incontinence entails a succession of contrary volitions.
- 25.
The use of the expressions formidabile and formidinalis goes back to Avicenna, who writes in his Liber de anima that opinion (opinio) involves the awareness that things could also be otherwise. But whereas the Arabic text suggests a translation of the crucial passage as ‘cum possibilitate alterius partis’, the medieval Latin translation renders it as ‘cum formidine alterius partis’; see Avicenna, Liber de anima, tract. V, cap. 1, 79, and the editor’s note. I thank my colleague Deborah Black for having pointed this out to me.
- 26.
For details see Pickavé and Whiting (2008).
- 27.
- 28.
Buridan has an explanation (derived from Aristotle) for how emotions and other psycho-physiological phenomena can alter our body to such a degree that our cognitive capacities are impeded. See, e.g., QNE VII, q. 7, 144ra-b.
- 29.
This is so, because, as we saw earlier, (1) the higher-level judgments are not only based on appearances; they can also modify and induce appearances—take the fata morgana case, where the judgment turns the appearance of water into one of mere flickering of light—, and because (2), due to the necessary connection between appearances of goodness or badness and first movements, the corresponding first movements follow by necessity.
- 30.
Note that he uses the expression “if this is conceded” (si concedatur), when he, in the quote above, refers to his explanation of how sense and imagination can lead to efficacious appetites. He also brings this explanation at the very end of the question in an attempt to qualify (but not revoke) something he said earlier in his reply.
- 31.
Compare, however, Saarinen (1993, 143), according to whom Buridan denies the possibility of clear-eyed incontinence.
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Pickavé, M. (2017). Buridan on the Psychology and Morality of Appetitive Acts. In: Klima, G. (eds) Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51763-6_11
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