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Later Medieval Philosophy of Cognitive Psychology

  • Peter KingEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action book series (HSNA, volume 3)

Abstract

King’s chapter provides a systematic overview of the state of the philosophy of cognitive psychology in the first half of the fourteenth century, and so a framework for the subsequent chapters as well. In addition to outlining the broad consensus position, which he calls ‘the Neo-Aristotelian synthesis,’ King identifies ‘five specific trouble spots’ in which this consensus is threatened.

Keywords

Ontology of psychology Mental architecture Transduction Objects of thought Intentionality 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of TorontoTorontoCanada

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