Advertisement

Strong Emergence Via Constitutive Fields

  • Ihor Lubashevsky
Chapter
Part of the Understanding Complex Systems book series (UCS)

Abstract

In the previous chapter I have proposed the concept of attractor-caused supervenience of the mental upon the physical. This type supervenience does not possess causal power, which gives freedom for the mental to cause mental as well as physical events. In its turn, the physical also have causal power to affect physical and mental events. Therefore the attractor-caused supervenience, on one hand, admits all the types of causation: inter-level, i.e., upward and downward causation as well as intra-level (horizontal) causation. On the other hand, the given relationship between the mental and the physical with respect to humans with well-developed consciousness obeys the general definition of supervenience. It means that each mental state of a human is coupled with some collection of the physical states of his/her body such that no changes in the mental state can arise without a change in the corresponding physical states. This approach opens a gate to resolving the Fodor-Kim dilemma via allowing the mental and the physical to be complementary components of an human individual whose interaction with each other gives rise to the mental-physical supervenience.

Keywords

Electromagnetic Field Causal Power Constituent Particle Ontological Model Downward Causation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Ayala, F.J.: Introduction. In: Ayala, F.J., Dobzhansky, T.G. (eds.) Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems, pp. vii–xvi. University of California Press, Berkeley (1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bechtel, W., Richardson, R.C.: Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research. The MIT Press, Cambridge (2010)Google Scholar
  3. Bedau, M.A.: Weak emergence. Noûs 31 (Supplement s11: Philosophical Perspectives: Mind, Causation, and World), 375–399 (1997)Google Scholar
  4. Bedau, M.A.: Downward causation and autonomy in weak emergence. In: Bedau, M.A., Humphreys, P. (eds.) Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science, pp. 155–188. The MIT Press, Cambridge (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Bickhard, M.H.: Systems and process metaphysics. In: Hooker, C. (ed.) Handbook of the Philosophy of Science (Volume 10): Philosophy of Complex Systems. Elsevier, Amsterdam (2011)Google Scholar
  6. Britannica, E.: Entelechy (2015). http://global.britannica.com/topic/entelechy. Online; accessed 14 Dec 2015
  7. Clayton, P., Davies, P.C.W. (eds.): The Re-emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2006)Google Scholar
  8. Corradini, A., O’Connor, T. (eds.): Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge, New York (2010)Google Scholar
  9. Davies, P.C.W.: The physics of downward causation. In: Clayton, P., Davies, P. (eds.) The Re-emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, pp. 35–52. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2006)Google Scholar
  10. English Oxford Living Dictionaries: access on 11 Dec 2016, Nomological, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/nomological.
  11. Esfeld, M.: Holism in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Physics. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Esfeld, M., Sachse, C.: Conservative Reductionism. Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, New York (2011)Google Scholar
  13. Healey, R.: Holism and nonseparability in physics. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2009 edn. (2009)Google Scholar
  14. Jones, R.H.: Reductionism: Analysis and the Fullness of Reality. Associated University Press, Inc., London (2000)Google Scholar
  15. Jones, R.H.: Analysis & the Fullness of Reality: An Introduction to Reductionism & Emergence. Jackson Square Books, New York (2013)Google Scholar
  16. Kim, J.: Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2005)Google Scholar
  17. Kim, J.: Two concepts of realization, mental causation, and physicalism. In: Kim, J. (ed.) Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind, pp. 263–281. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Macdonald, C., Macdonald, G. (eds.): Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford (2010)Google Scholar
  19. Magee, G.A.: The Hegel Dictionary. Continuum International Publishing Group, New York (2010)Google Scholar
  20. Murphy, N.: Supervenience and the nonreducibility of ethics to biology. In: Russell, R.J., Stoeger, W.R., Ayala, F.J. (eds.) Evolutionary and Molecular Biology: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Volume 3 of Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, pp. 463–489. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame (1998)Google Scholar
  21. Murphy, N.: Reductionism: how did we fall into it and can we emerge from it? In: Murphy, N., Stoeger, S.J. W.R. (eds.) Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons, pp. 19–39. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2007)Google Scholar
  22. Ney, A.: Metaphysics: An Introduction. Routledge, New York (2014)Google Scholar
  23. Ney, A.: Reductionism. In: Fieser, J., Dowden, B., Bishop, R. (Phil. Sci. Ed.) (eds.) The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015). http://www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/.
  24. O’Connor, T., Wong, H.Y.: Emergent properties. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2012 edn. (2012). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/properties-emergent/
  25. Peacocke, A.R.: Reductionism: a review of the epistemological issues and their relevance to biology and the problem of consciousness. Zygon®; : J. Relig. Sci. 11 (4), 307–334 (1976)Google Scholar
  26. Peacocke, A.R.: Creation and the World of Science: The Re-shaping of Belief. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1979)Google Scholar
  27. Röpke, G.: Nonequilibrium Statistical Physics. Wiley-VCH, Berlin (2013)CrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  28. Sachse, C.: Reductionism in the Philosophy of Science. Ontos, Frankfurt (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Sawyer, R.K.: Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Simon, H.A.: The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd edn. The MIT Press, Cambridge (1996)Google Scholar
  31. Sklar, L.: Philosophy of statistical mechanics. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2015 edn. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Stanford (2015)Google Scholar
  32. Stephan, A.: Varieties of emergentism. Evol. Cogn. 5 (1), 50–59 (1999)MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  33. Stephan, A.: Emergentism, irreducibility, and downward causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien Int. J. Anal. Philos. 65 (1), 77–93 (2002)MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  34. Wimsatt, W.C.: Reductionism and its heuristics: making methodological reductionism honest. Synthese 151 (3), 445–475 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ihor Lubashevsky
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer Science & EngineeringUniversity of AizuAizu-WakamatsuJapan

Personalised recommendations