Kenya: More Local than Global

  • Andrew GlazzardEmail author
  • Sasha Jesperson
  • Thomas Maguire
  • Emily Winterbotham


The Kenyan case compares the operations and supporters of Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin (Al Shabaab) in Kenya and affiliated or sympathetic groups such as Al-Hijra—with two contemporary groups (the armed wing of the Mombasa Republic Council (MRC) and the Mungiki) as well as a historical group (the Mau Mau movement). Islamist violent extremism in Kenya cannot be understood without taking into account the dynamics in neighbouring Somalia, where Al Shabaab has been conducting an Islamist insurgency for several years. However, there are similarities in the aims, motivations and behaviour of Islamist and non-Islamist conflict groups, and the factors behind these similarities are mostly specific to Kenya.


Al Shabaab Mombasa Republican Council Mau Mau Identity Marginalisation 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrew Glazzard
    • 1
    Email author
  • Sasha Jesperson
    • 2
  • Thomas Maguire
    • 3
  • Emily Winterbotham
    • 4
  1. 1.National Security and ResilienceRoyal United Services InstituteLondonUK
  2. 2.Centre for the Study of Modern SlaverySt Mary’s UniversityLondonUK
  3. 3.Department of War StudiesKings College LondonLondonUK
  4. 4.National Security and ResilienceRoyal United Services InstituteLondonUK

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