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Truth as a Logical Connective

  • Shunsuke YatabeEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10091)

Abstract

Some truth theories allow to represent and prove generalized statements as “all that you said is true” or “all theorems of \({\mathbf {PA}}\) are true” in the sense of deflationism.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Letters, Center for Applied Philosophy and EthicsKyoto UniversityKyotoJapan

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