Strong Permission in Prescriptive Causal Models

  • Linton WangEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10091)


This paper formulates strong permission in prescriptive causal models. The key features of this formulation are that (a) strong permission is encoded in causal models in a way suitable for interaction with functional equations, (b) the logic is simpler and more straightforward than other formulations of strong permission such as those utilizing defeasible reasoning or linear logic, (c) when it is applied to the free choice permission problem, it avoids paradox formation in a satisfactory manner, and (d) it also handles the embedding of strong permission, e.g. in conditionals, by exploiting interventionist counterfactuals in causal models.


Strong permission Free choice permission Prescriptive causal model Counterfactual Intervention 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNational Chung Cheng UniversityChia-YiTaiwan

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