Abstract
This chapter examines the legal principle of judicial independence in Pakistan in two stages. First, a brief analysis of select secondary sources, including academic commentary and the views of participants in Pakistan’s legal system, distills themes that are seen by observers as important to the meaning and practice of judicial independence in Pakistan. From this starting point, the study identifies and examines a number of primary legal sources related to the themes identified, including constitutional arrangements, legislation, and reported judicial decisions. These primary sources are used to construct a narrative of judicial independence in Pakistan from the time of its independence in 1947 to the first half of 2016. While the study draws on illustrative scholarship and commentary to identify themes, its focus is on the identification and analysis of primary legal sources that reflect institutional arrangements and shed light on the interactions between courts and other branches of government. The second stage of this study considers implications and lessons learned from the experience of judicial independence in Pakistan.
Keywords
- Judicial Review
- Military Regime
- Constitutional Amendment
- Judicial Independence
- Parliamentary Committee
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Notes
- 1.
See, e.g., Larkins (1996), p. 618. Although beyond the scope of this study focused on primary legal sources, there are a number of important historical and political works on Pakistan that provide additional detail in relation to the country’s present and past economic, political, and social context. See, e.g., Wheeler (1970), Waseem (1989), Noman (1990), Shehab (1995), Kennedy (1996), Malik (1996), Shafqat (1997), Ahmed (1998), Ziring (1998), Akhtar (2000), Rizvi (2000), Desai and Ahsan (2005), Cloughley (2006), Kāẓmī (2009), Siddiqi (2012), Long (2015).
- 2.
The division of time into these two periods is not based on a single event. Instead, the division is designed to facilitate a reflection on the overall developments after the first 50 years.
- 3.
Pakistan’s population grew by more than 23 % over the most recent 10 years (from 153 million in 2005 to 189 million in 2015) while its per capita gross domestic product doubled during the same period ($714 in 2005 to $1429 in 2015): World Bank (2015). With a gross national income per capita of $14,400 in 2015, the World Bank classifies Pakistan as a lower middle income economy. All amounts in USD.
- 4.
Talbot (2009), pp. 3–13, 50.
- 5.
Abbasi (2012).
- 6.
National Accountability Bureau (2002).
- 7.
Islamic teaching also provides for an independent judiciary to determine disputes, see e.g., Cotran and Sherif (1999), Lau (2004), and Sherif and Brown (2003) who write that “the independence of the judiciary is a very well established principle in the Islamic Shari’a”. This study focuses on the role of secular courts established on the English common law model. For an excellent overview of the use of precedent in Pakistan’s secular legal system see Munir (2014).
- 8.
Jinnah’s ambition to establish an independent state as a homeland for India’s Muslims was initially opposed by other Indian Islamic parties who saw him as an advocate of the English legal system: Khan (2012), p. 291. Jinnah died 1 year into office.
- 9.
Jinnah (1947).
- 10.
The enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 incorporating the European Convention (1953) provides the English courts with the power to invalidate subordinate legislation or executive action on the basis of the Art. 6(1) guarantee of an independent and impartial tribunal. This power, to date, has been used sparingly by English courts: it does not defeat ‘dependent’ administrative decision-makers, such as government ministers exercising power under statute, nor has it radically altered the use of lay magistrates in England who enjoy none of the traditional protections of judicial independence such as guaranteed tenure, compensation, and administrative independence.
- 11.
Khan (2004).
- 12.
Khan (2016).
- 13.
Newberg (1995).
- 14.
Ibid, p. 11.
- 15.
Ibid, pp. 2, 11.
- 16.
Ibid, p. 5.
- 17.
Ibid, p. 11.
- 18.
Ibid, pp. 12–13, Newberg writes that “[b]y allowing courts to operate, even if under stricture, the state has been the ultimate beneficiary of judicial largesse.”
- 19.
Ibid, pp. 2, 11.
- 20.
Ibid, p. 11.
- 21.
Ibid, pp. 11–12.
- 22.
Ibid, p. 6.
- 23.
Ibid, p. 33.
- 24.
Ibid, p. 13.
- 25.
Ibid, pp. 4–5, 33.
- 26.
Ibid, p. 11.
- 27.
Ibid, pp. 6–7, 13.
- 28.
Ibid, pp. 5–6.
- 29.
Ibid, pp. 248–250.
- 30.
Ibid, p. 8.
- 31.
Ibid, p. 250.
- 32.
Lee (2010).
- 33.
Ibid, p. 371.
- 34.
Ibid, p. 372.
- 35.
Ibid, p. 373.
- 36.
Ibid, pp. 381–384; see the discussion of the judicial crisis below.
- 37.
Ibid, pp. 386–387.
- 38.
Constitution of Pakistan (1956), Constitution of Pakistan (1962).
- 39.
- 40.
Constitution (Nineteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, 1 (2011).
- 41.
The Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution made several changes to the judicial appointment process in accordance with a Supreme Court ruling: see discussion below.
- 42.
Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act, 2012, 5.
- 43.
Ibid, Statement of Objects and Reasons.
- 44.
In the case where the amendment alters the ‘limits’ of a province, a two-thirds majority of the province’s assembly is also required: Art. 239(4).
- 45.
Arts. 141–144 distribute legislative powers between the federal government and the provinces.
- 46.
Art. 41 sets out the qualifications and election procedure for the President while Art. 44 sets out the term of office for the President. It appears that under Art. 44(2) a single individual may hold the office of President for more than two terms provided they are not consecutive.
- 47.
Art. 43.
- 48.
Arts. 46, 48. Note that under Art. 48(1), the President may require the Cabinet or Prime Minister to reconsider its advice although the President must act in accordance with the reconsideration within a period of 10 days.
- 49.
Arts. 232–237.
- 50.
Art. 89.
- 51.
Arts. 91(1), 91(6).
- 52.
Art. 92.
- 53.
Arts. 91(3)-91(5).
- 54.
Arts. 58, 90(1). For a detailed analysis of a previous version of Article 58, which provided the power for the President to dissolve the National Assembly, see Siddique (2006).
- 55.
Art. 101(1).
- 56.
Officially styled the Federal Shariat Court.
- 57.
Art. 175A.
- 58.
Art. 175(2).
- 59.
Art. 187(1).
- 60.
Art. 187(2).
- 61.
Art. 190.
- 62.
Art. 183.
- 63.
Arts. 175, 184, 185, 186.
- 64.
See, e.g., Ontario (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney General), [1912] AC 571, where the Privy Council upheld a legislated reference procedure to the Supreme Court of Canada.
- 65.
Art. 189.
- 66.
Art. 176.
- 67.
Supreme Court Rules, SRO 1159(I)/80.
- 68.
Art. 199(1).
- 69.
Ibid.
- 70.
Huq (2003–2004), p. 26, the judicial appointment process is discussed further below.
- 71.
Art. 203D(1).
- 72.
Ibid.
- 73.
Art. 203D(3).
- 74.
Art. 203DD with the exception of converting an acquittal into a conviction.
- 75.
Art. 203G. Despite the parallel system of Islamic courts, it is evident from an analysis of the case law that secular higher courts have influenced the role of Islam in the legal system through their jurisprudence: Lau (2006).
- 76.
- 77.
Art. 175A.
- 78.
Art. 175A(3).
- 79.
Art. 193(2).
- 80.
Arts. 177(2), 203C(3).
- 81.
Arts. 178 (Supreme Court), 194 (High Courts), 203C(7) (Federal Sharia Court). The text of the oath is found in the Third Schedule to the Constitution.
- 82.
Arts. 179, 195.
- 83.
Hussain (2011), p. 20.
- 84.
Art. 205.
- 85.
Arts. 8–28.
- 86.
Art. 10(3).
- 87.
Art. 232(1).
- 88.
Art. 232(2).
- 89.
Art. 233(1).
- 90.
Art. 232(2).
- 91.
Art. 232(2)(c).
- 92.
Provisional Constitutional Order, 1999, 2-10/99 Min. I.
- 93.
Section 2(1) of the Provisional Constitutional Order. 1999, 2-10/99 Min. I. stated that “[n]otwithstanding the abeyance of the provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, Pakistan shall, subject to this Order and any other Orders made by the Chief Executive, be governed, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the Constitution.”
- 94.
Hussain (2011), ss 11.2–11.4.
- 95.
Supreme Court of Pakistan (2016).
- 96.
Ibid.
- 97.
Ibid.
- 98.
Hussain (2011), p. 28.
- 99.
Reuters (2012).
- 100.
Ibid.
- 101.
Art. 236(2).
- 102.
Art. 24(4).
- 103.
Art. 41(6).
- 104.
Art. 69(1).
- 105.
Arts. 99(2), 139(2).
- 106.
Art. 105(2).
- 107.
Art. 155(6).
- 108.
Constitution (Amendment) Order 1985, Art. 165A(2).
- 109.
Art. 211.
- 110.
Art. 212(2).
- 111.
Art. 239(5).
- 112.
Art. 245(2).
- 113.
Part XII.
- 114.
See, e.g., Zafar Ali Shah v General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan, PLD 2000 SC 869.
- 115.
The Objectives Resolution (1949), now annexed to the Constitution and incorporated into its text through Art. 2A, was passed by the Constituent Assembly in March 1949 and provides that “the independence of the Judiciary shall be fully secured.”
- 116.
Both the Preamble and Art. 2A, incorporating the Objectives Resolution, guarantee an independent judiciary, which has been treated as an enforceable legal right by the courts, discussed below.
- 117.
Art. 205.
- 118.
Art. 81(a)(i).
- 119.
Arts. 81(b), 81(d).
- 120.
Arts. 209(6)-209(7) (removal procedure), Arts. 179, 195 (retirement for judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court).
- 121.
Art. 68.
- 122.
Arts. 187(2), 190.
- 123.
Art. 204(2).
- 124.
Third Schedule.
- 125.
Constitution (Nineteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, 1 (2011) and Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act, 2012, 5.
- 126.
See discussion below.
- 127.
Ghias (2010), p. 997.
- 128.
Ibid, p. 998.
- 129.
Supreme Court of Pakistan (2009).
- 130.
Ibid, Art. XI.
- 131.
Art. 209(8).
- 132.
Art. 209(5).
- 133.
Dawn (2011a).
- 134.
For a critical overview of the functioning of the Supreme Judicial Council see Niazi (2016).
- 135.
Art. 209(5).
- 136.
Art. 209.
- 137.
Art. 210.
- 138.
Arts. 209(4), 209(6).
- 139.
Art. 211.
- 140.
Siddique (2013), pp. 267–269.
- 141.
Ibid, p. 302.
- 142.
Iqbal (2015).
- 143.
Art. 50.
- 144.
Ibid.
- 145.
Art. 142(d).
- 146.
Acts of Parliament (2014).
- 147.
Art. 142(c).
- 148.
Arts. 142(b), 143.
- 149.
Art. 144.
- 150.
Art. 59(1).
- 151.
Art. 59(3).
- 152.
Arts. 73(1), 73(1A).
- 153.
Arts. 51(6), 213–226.
- 154.
Arts. 52, 58.
- 155.
Arts. 91(4), 91(5).
- 156.
Art. 91(7).
- 157.
Art. 70(3).
- 158.
Arts. 75(1), 75(2).
- 159.
See Lau (2004) for an analysis of how judges drew upon Islamic principles to preserve their independence.
- 160.
Indian Independence Act 1947, 10 & 11 Geo 6, c. 30; see Khan (2004), p. 67.
- 161.
Government of India Act 1935, 26 Geo 5 & 1 Edw 8, c. 2.
- 162.
Indian Independence Act 1947, 10 & 11 Geo 6, c. 30.
- 163.
Newberg (1995), p. 37.
- 164.
Act of Settlement 1701, 12 and 13 Will, c. 2. See also the Commissions and Salaries of Judges Act of 1760, 1 Geo 3, c. 23. See, e.g., Section 200(2)(b) of the Government of India Act 1935, 26 Geo 5 & 1 Edw 8 c. 2 that sets out the removal process for judges of the Federal Court on the grounds of “misbehaviour or of infirmity of mind or body” but only if removal was recommended by the Privy Council. Section 201 of the Act establishes that the salaries, leave, and pension benefits for judges of the Federal Court shall not be “varied to his disadvantage after his appointment.”
- 165.
Newberg (1995), p. 39.
- 166.
Ibid, pp. 39–40.
- 167.
Ibid, pp. 40–41.
- 168.
Khan (2004), p. 129.
- 169.
Federation of Pakistan v Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan, PLD 1955 FC 240, p. 251.
- 170.
Ibid.
- 171.
Ibid, p. 300.
- 172.
Ibid.
- 173.
Khan (2004), p. 140.
- 174.
Ibid, pp. 141–142.
- 175.
Ibid, pp. 142–143.
- 176.
Newberg (1995), pp. 46–47.
- 177.
Ibid, p. 49.
- 178.
Ibid, p. 68.
- 179.
Emergency Powers Ordinance IX of 1955.
- 180.
Khan (2004), p. 143.
- 181.
Usif Patel v The Crown, PLD 1955 FC 387.
- 182.
Ibid, pp. 391–392.
- 183.
Ibid, p. 396.
- 184.
Ibid.
- 185.
Ibid, pp. 446–447.
- 186.
Reference by HE the Governor-General, PLD 1955 FC 435.
- 187.
For a detailed overview of the doctrine of necessity, see Wolf-Phillips (1979).
- 188.
Reference by HE the Governor-General, PLD 1955 FC 435, p. 445.
- 189.
Ibid, p. 448.
- 190.
Ibid, p. 479.
- 191.
Ibid, p. 486.
- 192.
Khan (2004), p. 153.
- 193.
Ibid.
- 194.
Ibid.
- 195.
Newberg (1995), p. 55.
- 196.
Ibid, pp. 60–61.
- 197.
Khan (2004), p. 158.
- 198.
Newberg (1995), p. 69.
- 199.
Ibid, 70.
- 200.
Khan (2004), pp. 197–209.
- 201.
Ibid, p. 210.
- 202.
Laws (Continuation in Force) Order (1958).
- 203.
Khan (2004), p. 212.
- 204.
The State v Dosso, PLD 1958 SC 533.
- 205.
Kelsen (1945).
- 206.
The State v Dosso, PLD 1958 SC 533, p. 538.
- 207.
Ibid, pp. 538–539.
- 208.
Ibid, p. 540.
- 209.
Ibid, p. 541.
- 210.
Khan (2004), p. 217.
- 211.
Newberg (1995), p. 79.
- 212.
Ibid, pp. 79–80.
- 213.
Khan (2004), p. 216.
- 214.
Pakistan’s GDP growth reached 10.4 % in 1965: World Bank (2015).
- 215.
Khan (2004), p. 345.
- 216.
Ibid, pp. 254–255.
- 217.
Ibid, judicial review of the constitutional validity of legislation was made clear following the first amendment: ibid, p. 275.
- 218.
Asma Jilani v Government of the Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139, p. 161.
- 219.
Khan (2004), pp. 323–329.
- 220.
Ibid, p. 363.
- 221.
Ibid, p. 375.
- 222.
Ibid, pp. 375–376.
- 223.
Ibid, pp. 385–388.
- 224.
Ibid, pp. 406–407.
- 225.
- 226.
Khan (2004), p. 434.
- 227.
Khan (2004), p. 437.
- 228.
Asma Jilani v Government of the Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139.
- 229.
The State v Dosso, PLD 1958 SC 533.
- 230.
Asma Jilani v Government of the Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139, p. 166. The Supreme Court adopted this position, at least in part, to refute the Attorney General’s argument that the judiciary had given tacit approval to martial law: ibid, p. 203.
- 231.
The State v Dosso, PLD 1958 SC 533.
- 232.
Asma Jilani v Government of the Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139, pp. 197–199.
- 233.
The State v Dosso, PLD 1958 SC 533.
- 234.
Asma Jilani v Government of the Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139, pp. 178–179.
- 235.
Ibid, p. 163.
- 236.
Ibid, pp. 184–185.
- 237.
Ibid, pp. 187–189.
- 238.
Ibid, p. 190.
- 239.
Ibid, pp. 190–192.
- 240.
Ibid, p. 204.
- 241.
Ibid, pp. 205–206.
- 242.
Ibid, p. 207.
- 243.
Ibid, p. 208. The Supreme Court also noted that the National Assembly ratified Bhutto’s assumption of power and an interim constitution, which “may well have radically altered the situation.”
- 244.
Ibid.
- 245.
Newberg (1995), p. 129.
- 246.
Ibid, p. 122.
- 247.
Ibid, p. 132.
- 248.
Ibid, p. 126.
- 249.
The State v Zia-ur-Rehman, PLD 1973 SC 49.
- 250.
Ibid, p. 66.
- 251.
Ibid.
- 252.
Ibid.
- 253.
Ibid, p. 69.
- 254.
Ibid, p. 70.
- 255.
Khan (2004), pp. 467–472.
- 256.
Ibid, p. 555.
- 257.
For a discussion of the election results see Khan, ibid, pp. 556–562.
- 258.
Ibid, pp. 563–564.
- 259.
Ibid, p. 571.
- 260.
Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977, CMLA Order I.
- 261.
Begum Nusrat Bhutto v Chief of Army Staff and Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1977 SC 657, p. 704.
- 262.
Khan (2004), p. 581.
- 263.
Begum Nusrat Bhutto v Chief of Army Staff and Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1977 SC 657.
- 264.
Ibid, p. 692.
- 265.
Ibid, pp. 692–693.
- 266.
Ibid, p. 721.
- 267.
Ibid, p. 694.
- 268.
Ibid.
- 269.
Ibid, pp. 698, 702.
- 270.
Ibid, p. 702.
- 271.
Ibid, p. 703.
- 272.
Ibid.
- 273.
Ibid, p. 705.
- 274.
Ibid, p. 716.
- 275.
Ibid.
- 276.
Ibid.
- 277.
Newberg (1995), p. 169.
- 278.
Ibid, pp. 163, 168.
- 279.
Ibid, p. 168.
- 280.
The State v Dosso, PLD 1958 SC 533.
- 281.
Khan (2004), p. 599.
- 282.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto v The State, PLD 1979 SC 38.
- 283.
Khan (2004), p. 615.
- 284.
Ibid, p. 617.
- 285.
Ibid, p. 624.
- 286.
Ibid, pp. 627–628.
- 287.
Ibid, pp. 640–641. For a detailed analysis of the role of Islam in the legal system of Pakistan see Lau (2006).
- 288.
Khan (2004), pp. 635–636.
- 289.
Ibid, pp. 637–638.
- 290.
Ibid, pp. 661–666.
- 291.
Provisional Constitutional Order, 1981, CMLA Order 1.
- 292.
Khan (2004), p. 647.
- 293.
Ibid, p. 648.
- 294.
Ibid, p. 649.
- 295.
Ibid, p. 675.
- 296.
Ibid, pp. 692–693.
- 297.
Ibid, p. 697.
- 298.
Ibid, p. 722.
- 299.
Khawaja Ahmad Tariq Rahman v The Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1992 SC 646.
- 300.
Ibid, p. 666 per Justice Shafiur Rahman.
- 301.
Khan (2004), p. 734.
- 302.
Ibid, p. 752.
- 303.
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1993 SC 473.
- 304.
Khan (2004), pp. 755–758.
- 305.
Ibid, p. 793.
- 306.
Ibid, pp. 793–797.
- 307.
Ibid, p. 827.
- 308.
Ibid.
- 309.
Ibid, p. 833.
- 310.
Ibid, p. 924; Talbot (2009), p. 392.
- 311.
Khan (2004), pp. 926–933; the Kargil war involved the withdrawal of Pakistan’s forces to the Kashmir line of control and was perceived by Pakistan as an international embarrassment. General Pervez Musharraf’s address to the nation of 13 October 1999 reported that the country faced “turmoil and uncertainty” from the destruction of the nation’s institutions and economy and that the armed forces were the “last remaining viable institution” that was obligated to provide the country with “stability, unity and integrity”: Musharraf (1999).
- 312.
Khan (2004), p. 783.
- 313.
Ibid, pp. 784–785.
- 314.
Al-Jehad Trust v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1996 SC 324.
- 315.
Ibid, p. 389.
- 316.
Ibid, pp. 389, 399, 404.
- 317.
Ibid, p. 365.
- 318.
Ibid.
- 319.
Ibid, p. 408.
- 320.
Ibid, p. 365.
- 321.
Ibid, p. 366.
- 322.
Ibid, p. 419.
- 323.
Ibid, p. 428.
- 324.
Ibid.
- 325.
Khan (2004), p. 787.
- 326.
Ibid, p. 788.
- 327.
Ibid, p. 787.
- 328.
Ibid, p. 788.
- 329.
Ibid, pp. 823–824.
- 330.
Ibid, p. 825.
- 331.
Ibid, pp. 825–826.
- 332.
Ibid, p. 826.
- 333.
Ibid, p. 829.
- 334.
Ibid.
- 335.
Asad Ali v Federation, PLD 1998 SC 161.
- 336.
Al-Jehad Trust v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1996 SC 324. Khan (2004), p. 830.
- 337.
Khan (2004), p. 831.
- 338.
Ibid, pp. 802–803.
- 339.
Khan Asfandyar Wali v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2001 SC 607.
- 340.
Ibid, paras 164–165.
- 341.
For a comparative discussion of emergency powers in India and Pakistan see Kalhan (2010).
- 342.
- 343.
Mahmud (1993), pp. 1302–1305.
- 344.
See Lau (2004) for an analysis of how judges drew upon Islamic principles to preserve their independence.
- 345.
India’s Supreme Court developed innovative constitutional doctrines during this time, such as the basic structure doctrine, which holds that certain basic features of the Constitution cannot be changed even though the process of constitutional amendment: Kesavananda Bharati v The State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
- 346.
Asma Jilani v Government of the Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139.
- 347.
Provisional Constitutional Order, 1999, 2-10/99 Min. I.
- 348.
Section 2(1) of the Provisional Constitutional Order 1999, 2-10/99 Min. I. stated that “[n]otwithstanding the abeyance of the provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, Pakistan shall, subject to this Order and any other Orders made by the Chief Executive, be governed, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the Constitution.” President Muhammad Rafiq Tarar continued as President: Khan (2004), p. 933.
- 349.
Section 7 of the Provisional Constitutional Order 1999, 2-10/99 Min. I.
- 350.
Provisional Constitutional Order, 1999, 2-10/99 Min. I.
- 351.
Oath of Office (Judges) Order 2000; see Khan (2004), pp. 934–935.
- 352.
Khan (2004), p. 935.
- 353.
Ibid.
- 354.
Ibid.
- 355.
Ibid.
- 356.
Qureshi (2010), p. 491.
- 357.
Zafar Ali Shah v General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan, PLD 2000 SC 869.
- 358.
Ibid.
- 359.
Ibid.
- 360.
Ibid.
- 361.
Ibid. Although presumably new judges would take the place of those who refused to take a new oath to keep the courts operational, as happened with the six judges of the Supreme Court who refused to take the fresh oath.
- 362.
The Times of India (2008).
- 363.
Zafar Ali Shah v General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan, PLD 2000 SC 869.
- 364.
Ibid.
- 365.
Ibid.
- 366.
Ibid.
- 367.
Ibid.
- 368.
Ibid.
- 369.
Legal Framework Order, 2002, Chief Executive’s Order No 24 of 2002. Note that Musharraf had dismissed President Rafiq Tarar and appointed himself President on 20 June 2001: Qureshi (2010), p. 492.
- 370.
Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s Case, PLD 2002 SC 853.
- 371.
Ibid, para 61.
- 372.
Legal Framework Order, 2002, Chief Executive’s Order No 24 of 2002.
- 373.
Ibid.
- 374.
Constitutional Petition No 36 of 2002, para 7.
- 375.
Constitutional Petitions Nos 13, 14, 39 & 40 of 2004 & 2 of 2005.
- 376.
Ibid, para 30.
- 377.
Ibid, para 40.
- 378.
Supreme Court Bar Association v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2002 SC 939.
- 379.
Ibid, p. 981.
- 380.
Ibid, pp. 981–982.
- 381.
Ibid, p. 983.
- 382.
Ibid, p. 987.
- 383.
Huq (2003–2004), p. 32.
- 384.
Talbot (2009), pp. 417–418.
- 385.
United Nations Human Rights Council (2008), para 233.
- 386.
Ibid.
- 387.
Ibid, para 234.
- 388.
Constitutional Petition No 21 of 2007, paras 70, 102.
- 389.
Ibid, para 54.
- 390.
Ibid, para 55.
- 391.
Ibid, paras 57, 59.
- 392.
Ibid, paras 122, 134.
- 393.
Ibid, para 157.
- 394.
Ibid, para 198.
- 395.
Ibid, para 279 per Justice Muhammad Nawaz Abbasi.
- 396.
Talbot (2009), pp. 419–420.
- 397.
Provisional Constitutional Order No 1 of 2007 (amended 15 November 2007).
- 398.
Ibid.
- 399.
Ibid.
- 400.
Ibid.
- 401.
Harvard Law Review Notes (2010), p. 1715.
- 402.
Ibid, pp. 1716–1717.
- 403.
Ibid, p. 1719.
- 404.
Ibid, p. 1720.
- 405.
Ibid, p. 1725.
- 406.
Talbot (2009), p. 428.
- 407.
Ibid, p. 429.
- 408.
Ibid, p. 432.
- 409.
Sindh High Court Bar v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2009 SC 789 (short order), PLD 2009 SC 879 (full reasons).
- 410.
Sindh High Court Bar v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2009 SC 789, p. 799.
- 411.
Ibid, pp. 799–800.
- 412.
Provisional Constitutional Order, 1999, 2-10/99 Min. I.
- 413.
Provisional Constitutional Order No 1 of 2007 (amended 15 November 2007).
- 414.
Sindh High Court Bar v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2009 SC 789, p. 800.
- 415.
Ibid, p. 802.
- 416.
Ibid, pp. 801–802.
- 417.
Ibid, pp. 800–801.
- 418.
Ibid, p. 804.
- 419.
Ibid.
- 420.
Ibid, pp. 804–805.
- 421.
Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 2003, 3.
- 422.
Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, 10.
- 423.
See e.g., Waseem (2012), pp. 28–30 who notes that the ‘personal aura’ of the Chief Justice played a role in shaping the direction of the court in looking outward instead of a needed inward focus to improve the functioning of the justice system. See also an illuminating analysis by Kalhan (2013) who argues that the judiciary in Pakistan has placed the country in a ‘gray zone’ of institutional imbalance because of its unqualified view of judicial independence, which needs to achieve a new balance between autonomy and restraint. See also Ahmed (2015) for an account of judicial activism during this period and Cheema (2016) for an account that focuses on the nature and consequences of the politics of the Chaudhry Court.
- 424.
Art. 184(3) of the Constitution provides the Supreme Court with the power to make an order if it considers that there is a question of public importance relating to any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution.
- 425.
Ghias (2010).
- 426.
Ibid, p. 999 suggests that this may have resulted from judicial exchanges between Pakistan and India.
- 427.
- 428.
Alam (2008), p. 2.
- 429.
Ibid, p. 3 notes the potential influence of the public interest model developed by the Indian Supreme Court.
- 430.
Benazir Bhutto v President of Pakistan, PLD 1988 SC 388.
- 431.
Ibid.
- 432.
Ibid, pp. 416, 488, cited in Alam (2008), p. 2 who refers to a quote from the former Chief Justice Ajmal Miam who describes the adversarial system as an “inherited evil” as it prevents large groups of persons from obtaining constitutional justice.
- 433.
Alam (2008), pp. 8–9.
- 434.
Alam (2008), p. 5 highlights the case of M. Ismail Qureshi v M. Awais Qasim, 1993 SCMR 1781, where the Supreme Court converted private litigation into public interest litigation, inviting and hearing from a wide range of stakeholders.
- 435.
Supreme Court of Pakistan (2014b).
- 436.
Supreme Court of Pakistan (2011), p. 129.
- 437.
Ibid.
- 438.
Reuters (2012).
- 439.
Supreme Court of Pakistan (2016).
- 440.
Supreme Court of Pakistan (2011), p. 129; Hussain (2011), p. 15 notes that legislative reform was brought about through the system in relation to the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1998, 19 the Prohibition of Smoking and Protection of Non Smokers Health Ordinance, 2002, F. No. 2(1)/2002-Pub., the Prohibition of Kite Flying (Amendment) Act, 2009, 14 and the Human Organs and Tissues Act, 2010, 6 among others.
- 441.
Hussain (2011), p. 15.
- 442.
Ghias (2010), pp. 991–996.
- 443.
Benazir Bhutto v President of Pakistan, PLD 1988 SC 388.
- 444.
Dharshan Masih’s Case, PLD 1990 SC 513.
- 445.
See e.g., Suo Motu Case No 14 of 2009, an action based on a press clipping in the Daily News about land dealings.
- 446.
Ghias (2010), p. 995.
- 447.
Ibid.
- 448.
Supreme Court of Pakistan (2012).
- 449.
After visiting Pakistan in 2012, Special Rapporteur Gabriela Knaul stated that she commended “the use of inherent powers of the Supreme Court in recent cases related to gross human rights violations” although she called for clear criteria on the use of suo motu: Dawn (2012d).
- 450.
Hussain (2011).
- 451.
Ibid.
- 452.
Alam (2008), pp. 4–5.
- 453.
Ibid, p. 6.
- 454.
Ibid, p. 11.
- 455.
Ibid, pp. 12–13.
- 456.
Ghias (2010), p. 992, see Saad Mazhar v Capital Development Authority, 2005 SCMR 1973.
- 457.
Ghias (2010), p. 993.
- 458.
Ibid, see Maulvi Iqbal Haider v Capital Development Authority, PLD 2006 SC 394.
- 459.
Ghias (2010), pp. 993–994.
- 460.
Constitutional Petition No 9 of 2006 & Civil Petition Nos 345 & 394 of 2006.
- 461.
Ibid; Ghias (2010), pp. 994–995.
- 462.
Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, 10.
- 463.
Nadeem Ahmed v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2010 SC 1165.
- 464.
See Siddique (2010) for a discussion of the Eighteenth Amendment leading up to the case.
- 465.
Nadeem Ahmed v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2010 SC 1165, p. 1180; Art. 239(5). The Supreme Court itself has held that it did not have the power to look at the substance of constitutional amendments in Constitutional Petitions Nos 13, 14, 39 & 40 of 2004 & 2 of 2005.
- 466.
Nadeem Ahmed v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2010 SC 1165, p. 1180.
- 467.
Ibid.
- 468.
Ibid.
- 469.
Ibid, p. 1181.
- 470.
Ibid.
- 471.
Ibid.
- 472.
Ibid, p. 1182.
- 473.
Nadeem Ahmed v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2010 SC 1165, pp. 1183–1184. The decision has been criticised by commentators on the basis that it invokes judicial independence in a case where the process of the commission is simply a matter of mechanics not principle and that the judiciary left little scope for parliamentary contributions: Sattar (2012), pp. 85–86.
- 474.
Constitution (Nineteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, 1 (2011).
- 475.
19th Amendment Draft (2010).
- 476.
Munir Hussain Bhatti v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2011 SC 407.
- 477.
Ibid, p. 443.
- 478.
Ibid, pp. 444–445.
- 479.
Ibid, p. 446.
- 480.
Rizvi (2015). See also Zafar Ali Shah v General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan, PLD 2000 SC 869, discussed above.
- 481.
Ibid.
- 482.
Constitutional Petition No 12 of 2010, etc., p. 901.
- 483.
Iqbal (2011).
- 484.
See Suo Moto Action Regarding Death of more than 90 Heart Patients under Treatment in Punjab Institute of Cardiology on Account of Spurious Drugs, in which suo motu action was taken in relation to the “death of more than 90 heart patients under treatment in Punjab Institute of Cardiology on account of spurious drugs”. It is not clear from the judgment itself on what legal grounds the suo motu action was initiated although suo motu is seen as connected to fundamental rights: see Art. 184(3).
- 485.
The Nation (2012).
- 486.
CMA Nos 4343, 5436 and 5869 of 2014 in SMC No 1 of 2005.
- 487.
CMA No 3221/2012 in SMC No 25/2009, para 1.
- 488.
Supreme Court of Pakistan (2015).
- 489.
Dawn (2012a).
- 490.
Nizami (2012).
- 491.
Suo Motu Action Regarding Allegation of Business Deal between Malik Riaz Hussain and Dr. Arslan Iftikhar Attempting to Influence the Judicial Process, para 6.
- 492.
Ibid.
- 493.
Dawn (2011b).
- 494.
Dawn (2011c).
- 495.
Dawn (2012d).
- 496.
United Nations General Assembly (2013), pp. 14–15.
- 497.
Dawn (2012b).
- 498.
National Reconciliation Ordinance (2007).
- 499.
Discussed in Muhammad Azhar Siddique v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2012 SC 774, pp. 794–795.
- 500.
Ibid, p. 795.
- 501.
Quoted ibid, p. 798.
- 502.
Art. 63(2).
- 503.
Muhammad Azhar Siddique v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2012 SC 774.
- 504.
Ibid, p. 807.
- 505.
Ibid, p. 811.
- 506.
Ibid, p. 817.
- 507.
Ibid, p. 811.
- 508.
Ibid.
- 509.
Ibid, p. 829.
- 510.
Ibid, p. 833.
- 511.
Walsh (2012).
- 512.
Ibid.
- 513.
Baz Muhammad Kakar v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2012 SC 866.
- 514.
Ibid, p. 887.
- 515.
Ibid.
- 516.
Khan (Revokes) (2015a).
- 517.
CMA No 592-K/13 in SMC No 16 of 2011, etc., para 3.
- 518.
Ibid, paras 8, 10.
- 519.
Dawn (2012c).
- 520.
The News (2014).
- 521.
Ibid.
- 522.
Ibid.
- 523.
Constitutional Petition No 9 of 2014.
- 524.
Ibid, para 2.
- 525.
Ibid.
- 526.
Constitution (Twenty-First Amendment) Act, 2015, 1.
- 527.
Shapiro (1986), p. 32.
- 528.
Reference No 1 of 2012, PLD 2013 SC 279.
- 529.
Ibid, para 32.
- 530.
Sh. Riaz-Ul-Haq v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2013 SC 501.
- 531.
Ibid, para 42.
- 532.
Ibid, para 30.
- 533.
Omer (2016).
- 534.
Dossani Travels Pvt Ltd v Messrs Travels Shop Pvt Ltd, PLD 2014 SC 1.
- 535.
Ibid, para 26.
- 536.
Ibid, para 45.
- 537.
Objectives Resolution (1949), Annex to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
- 538.
Provisional Constitutional Order No 1 of 2007 (amended 15 November 2007).
- 539.
Ibid.
- 540.
Zafar Ali Shah v General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan, PLD 2000 SC 869.
- 541.
Ibid.
- 542.
Nadeem Ahmed v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2010 SC 1165.
- 543.
Ibid, p. 1180.
- 544.
Muhammad Azhar Siddique v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2012 SC 774.
- 545.
See also Asma Jilani v Government of the Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139 (no privative clause could prevent the Supreme Court from deciding a legal controversy argued before it); The State v Zia-ur-Rehman, PLD 1973 SC 49 (Supreme Court holds the power to interpret and apply any provision of the Constitution including jurisdiction-limiting terms); Begum Nusrat Bhutto v Chief of Army Staff and Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1977 SC 657 (Supreme Court held the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the legal validity of government acts notwithstanding privative clauses of the new legal order); Zafar Ali Shah v General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan, PLD 2000 SC 869 (Supreme Court retained its review powers despite a privative clause); Constitutional Petition No 21 of 2007 (constitutional privative clause could not immunise acts done in bad faith or without legal jurisdiction).
- 546.
Muhammad Azhar Siddique v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2012 SC 774.
- 547.
Ibid, p. 811.
- 548.
See e.g., Supreme Court Bar Association v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2002 SC 939 and Sindh High Court Bar v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2009 SC 789 (short order), PLD 2009 SC 879 (full reasons) respectively.
- 549.
Baz Muhammad Kakar v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2012 SC 866.
- 550.
Muhammad Azhar Siddique v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2012 SC 774.
- 551.
Khan Asfandyar Wali v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2001 SC 607.
- 552.
Al-Jehad Trust v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1996 SC 324.
- 553.
Constitution (Nineteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, 1 (2011).
- 554.
Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act, 2012, 5.
- 555.
See, e.g., Siddiqi (2015), where the author writes that “the challenge for any court remains a balancing act of being powerful but accountable”.
- 556.
Constitutional Petition No 21 of 2007.
- 557.
See Dawn (2011d).
- 558.
Haider (2015).
- 559.
The State v Dosso, PLD 1958 SC 533.
- 560.
Asma Jilani v Government of the Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139.
- 561.
For an outline of factors that can reduce or maintain judicial independence in dominant party systems see Tushnet (2015).
- 562.
Walsh (2013).
- 563.
Provisional Constitutional Order No 1 of 2007 (amended 15 November 2007).
- 564.
Supreme Court of Pakistan (2014a).
- 565.
Federation of Pakistan v Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan, PLD 1955 FC 240.
- 566.
Usif Patel v The Crown, PLD 1955 FC 387.
- 567.
The State v Zia-ur-Rehman, PLD 1973 SC 49.
- 568.
Ibid, p. 70.
- 569.
Nadeem Ahmed v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2010 SC 1165.
- 570.
Ibid, p. 1180.
- 571.
- 572.
Dawn (2013).
- 573.
Democracy Reporting International (2011), p. 2.
- 574.
Aqil Shah writes that “military organizational choices are more decisively shaped by the extent to which the military believes in the legitimacy of democratic institutions, including the constitution”: Shah (2014), p. 258.
- 575.
Dawn (2012e).
- 576.
Constitution (Nineteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, 1 (2011) and Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act, 2012, 5.
- 577.
- 578.
Dawn (2011b).
- 579.
United Nations General Assembly (2013).
- 580.
Sindh High Court Bar v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2009 SC 789 (short order), PLD 2009 SC 879 (full reasons).
- 581.
Sindh High Court Bar v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2009 SC 789, pp. 799–800.
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Neudorf, L. (2017). Judicial Independence in Pakistan. In: The Dynamics of Judicial Independence. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49884-3_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49884-3_3
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