The second act of RAMAC’s diplomatic mission took place only a few weeks later, on September 21, 1959. The architectural backdrop this time was situated back in California, at the IBM Manufacturing and Administration Building in San Jose. Designed by award-winning Berkeley, California architect John S. Bolles, the plant had only been recently completed the year before. The modernist campus, with the single story Building no. 25 devoted to Advanced Research and Development at its center, was the manufacturing site of, or in IBM’s words “Home of” the RAMAC.Footnote 15
Just as the disk unit of the RAMAC 305 exposed its revolving magnetic plates through Noyes’s glass casing, Building no. 25 on the San Jose campus similarly revealed its inner workings. Vast glazed surfaces provided sneak peaks of whatever was happening in manufacturing spaces, laboratories and offices, even the workers’ cafeteria. Outside, a system of reflective pools, pedestrian bridges, manicured landscapes and sculptures reminded little of typical factories in the Bay area. Resembling more a seaside holiday resort on Santa Cruz than an industrial plant, IBM used Building no. 25 as the new architectural face of the company. Invoking a seductive blurring between work and leisure time, colorful depictions of the San Jose campus in IBM’s brochures and advertisements explicitly pointed out that this architecture had pretty much arrived from the future. In one of these brochures titled “One of America’s 10 most beautiful plants,” a graphic inversion of the last two digits of the completion date of the plant (from 1958 to 1985) alluded to an architecture that had travelled back in time from the future to meet the present.
During the same month, Nikita Khrushchev had embarked on a 12-day diplomatic trip through the United States, making major stops in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Washington among other cities. Khrushchev strategically arrived to the U.S. just a week after the Soviet spacecraft Luna-2 became the first human-made object to impact the surface of the moon on September 14, 1959.Footnote 16 Shortly after a failed attempt to visit Disneyland in Anaheim California, Khrushchev also made a stop in San Jose. The invitation had come from Thomas J. Watson Jr. himself, who reasoned to the Department of State that “a visit to an IBM plant might help the Russians understand America and Americans better and thus contribute to the cause of world peace.”Footnote 17 After having witnessed the exposure that IBM had received through its participation in the USIA exhibition in Moscow a couple of months earlier and the publicity frenzy that closely followed Khrushchev’s trail on American ground, Watson Jr. was cunning enough to foresee that even the briefest stop-over of the Soviet Premier in San Jose was free publicity for the company, both in the US and the Soviet Union.
Khrushchev’s visit resulted in nationwide headlines from local newspapers – from The San Jose Mercury-News, to the cover of The New York Times – as well as coverage by national television networks such as NBC.Footnote 18 IBM’s own journal even devoted its whole October 1959 issue to the coverage of the event. The surge of dozens of press representatives, newspapermen and TV reporters, coincidentally provided a last-minute opportunity for IBM to set-up a special battery of IBM typewriters, similar those exhibited in Moscow.Footnote 19
If diplomatic obstacles were eventually surpassed, the Soviet Union could at some later point become a key among the several international business clients of IBM. Considering its sheer geographical size, its vast array of bureaucratic institutions and manufacturing sector as well as its practically non-existent computer industry, the Soviet Union could potentially become one of the most profitable additions in IBM’s multinational clientele through IBM World Trade Corporation.Footnote 20 Bookkeeping of all sorts was IBM’s expertise and the Soviet Union could have its own RAMAC 305 s permanently shipped to Moscow for a “mere” $189,000 each.Footnote 21 If such an agreement was to blossom, IBM would see profits from its international sales rise well above the 1/5 of its total revenue at the time, which was primarily due to the recovering European market.Footnote 22
Watson Jr. had arranged for a 20-minute presentation of the RAMAC 305, lunch with the Soviet Premier in the plant’s cafeteria, and a tour through the assembly line of the computer (Fig. 10). The RAMAC’s updated demonstration, “coincidentally” included the ability to recite key historical event that paved the formation of the Soviet Union, such as the Russian Revolution.Footnote 23 The message that had to be successfully communicated during the short duration of the demonstration was that, despite their American origin, IBM computers were flexible and fast learners; not only capable of assimilating new languages, such as Russian, but also adaptable enough to handle all kinds of references and information. And while individuals like Watson and Khrushchev might have conflicting ideologies and views, the computing “ghost” in this machine was implied to be blind to ideology.Footnote 24
Recalling his discussion with Khrushchev through the assembly line, Watson Jr. wrote in his memoirs:
…when we toured the plant, Khrushchev said, “We have plants like this in the Soviet Union.” Then he looked a little puzzled and said, half to himself, “We must have plants like this in the Soviet Union.” Why [his interpreter, Viktor] Sukhodrev didn’t leave that one untranslated I never knew.Footnote 25
In a confidential memorandum regarding this conversation between Khrushchev and the American delegation the Department of State interpreter to President Eisenhower, Alexander Akalovsky, later mentioned:
On our way back from San Jose, Khrushchev commented on the excellent IBM plant, but said that computers were very highly developed in the Soviet Union too; such things as A bombs or the H bomb could have never been developed in the Soviet Union if it hadn’t had highly complicated and sophisticated computers.Footnote 26
Even though digital electronic computing in the USSR at the time was still at its infancy, Khrushchev’s exaggerated claims reinforced to one of the biggest American fears since the confirmation of Soviet espionage during the Manhattan Project: that the Soviets were possibly also advancing in digital computing beyond the phase of prototyping. After returning to San Francisco a few hours after his tour, Khrushchev reformulated his response, to state:
The plant we saw was making computers, I’m no specialist in the matter, and any assessment that I were to give of the plant would be insignificant; but I suppose we also produce machines like that. I don’t know who makes the better machines; that, of course, is a question. I saw the machines, but, of course, I don’t understand the actual substance of the matter. Perhaps, ours are better; I don’t know…Footnote 27
By the time Khrushchev finally got to dictate his own memoirs, any reference to the computers showed in IBM’s plant had completely evaporated. Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita’s son who accompanied him throughout the trip in North America and the visit to IBM’s plant, has also noted repeatedly that his father’s fascination in San Jose lay elsewhere. He commented:
Father was staggered by the IBM cafeteria much more than by its computers. In 1959 the idea of self-service had not reached our country. […] After returning, to Moscow, Father ordered that food service be organized the IBM model. Without tablecloths and without waiters. That innovation alone would save a great deal of money if applied country-wide.Footnote 28
Khrushchev was more impressed by the view of sliding trays across a horizontal rack at the restaurant, rather than the spinning memory platters along a vertical spindle in the factory (Fig. 11). And it is no coincidence that the self-service layout of the cafeteria constituted the single “IBM technology,” that could be most immediately transferred back to the USSR, as the reverse engineering of machines like the RAMAC clearly called for a whole different kind of expertise.