Bresnahan, T. F. (1981). Duopoly models with consistent conjectures. American Economic Review, 71, 934–945.
Cabral, L. M. B. (1995). Conjectural variations as a reduced form. Economics Letters, 49, 397–402.
Corchón, L. C. (1994). Comparative statics for aggregative games. The strong concavity case. Mathematical Social Sciences, 28, 151–165.
Cornes, R. (2016). Aggregative environmental games. Environmental and Resource Economics, 63, 339–365.
Cornes, R., & Hartley, R. (2003). Risk aversion, heterogeneity and contests. Public Choice, 117, 1–25.
Cornes, R., & Hartley, R. (2005). Asymmetric contests with general technologies. Economic Theory, 26, 923–946.
Cornes, R., & Hartley, R. (2007). Aggregative public good games. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9, 201–219.
Cornes, R., & Hartley, R. (2011). Well-behaved aggregative games. Presented at the 2011 Workshop on Aggregative Games at Strathclyde University, Glasgow.
Cornes, R., & Hartley, R. (2012). Fully aggregative games. Economics Letters, 116, 631–633.
Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. (1983). On commons and tragedies. American Economic Review, 73, 787–792.
Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. (1984a). The theory of public goods: Non-nash behavior. Journal of Public Economics, 23, 367–379.
Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. (1984b). Easy riders, joint production and public goods. Economic Journal, 94, 580–598.
Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. (1996) The theory of externalities, public goods and club goods (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Costrell, R. M. (1991). Immiserizing growth with semi-public goods under consistent conjectures. Journal of Public Economics, 45, 383–389.
Dixon, H. D., & Somma, E. (2003). The evolution of consistent conjectures. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 51, 523–536.
Dockner, E. J. (1992). Dynamic theory of conjectural variations. Journal of Industrial Economics, 40, 377–395.
Güth, W., & Yaari, M. (1992). An evolutionary approach to explain reciprocal behavior in a simple strategic game. In U. Witt (Ed.), Explaining process and change – Approaches to evolutionary economics (pp. 23–34). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Itaya, J.-I., & Dasgupta, D. (1995). Dynamics, consistent conjectures, and heterogeneous agents in the private provision of public goods. Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 50, 371–389.
Itaya, J.-I., & Okamura, M. (2003). Conjectural variations and voluntary public good provision in a repeated game setting. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 5, 51–66.
Laitner, J. (1980). Rational duopoly equilibria. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95, 641–662.
Makowski, L. (1987). Are ‘rational conjectures’ rational? Journal of Industrial Economics, 36, 35–47.
Maynard Smith, J., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(Nov 2), 15–18.
Müller, W., & Normann, H.-T. (2005). Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability: A rationale for consistency. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 161, 491–502.
Perry, M. K. (1982). Oligopoly and consistent conjectural variations. Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 197–205.
Possajennikov, A. (2009). The evolutionary stability of constant consistent conjectures. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72, 21–29.
Possajennikov, A. (2015). Conjectural variations in aggregative games: An evolutionary perspective. Mathematical Social Sciences, 77, 55–61.
Selten, R. (1980). A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 84, 93–101.
Sugden, R. (1985). Consistent conjectures and voluntary contributions to public goods: Why the conventional theory does not work. Journal of Public Economics, 27, 117–124.
Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent-seeking. In J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison, & G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society (pp. 131–146). College Station: Texas A&M University Press.