Showdown in Schönau: A Contest Case Study

  • Bouwe R. DijkstraEmail author
  • Patrick R. Graichen


This chapter analyzes a referendum campaign as a case study of a contest. The referendum, held in 1996 in the small German town of Schönau, led to the replacement of the conventional electricity supplier by a firm founded by the local environmentalists. We discuss both qualitative aspects (activities, arguments and strategies of the environmentalists, the electricity firm and its local allies) and quantitative aspects (lobbying effectiveness, stakes, effort and success probability). We identify voter groups more inclined to vote one way or the other and factors that contributed to the environmentalists’ victory. Finally, we discuss modeling implications.


Spare Time Lobby Group Contest Success Function Town Council Lobbying Effort 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of NottinghamNottinghamUK
  2. 2.Agora EnergiewendeBerlinGermany

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