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Cryptanalysis of GlobalPlatform Secure Channel Protocols

  • Mohamed Sabt
  • Jacques Traoré
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10074)

Abstract

GlobalPlatform (GP) card specifications are the de facto standards for the industry of smart cards. Being highly sensitive, GP specifications were defined regarding stringent security requirements. In this paper, we analyze the cryptographic core of these requirements; i.e. the family of Secure Channel Protocols (SCP). Our main results are twofold. First, we demonstrate a theoretical attack against SCP02, which is the most popular protocol in the SCP family. We discuss the scope of our attack by presenting an actual scenario in which a malicious entity can exploit it in order to recover encrypted messages. Second, we investigate the security of SCP03 that was introduced as an amendment in 2009. We find that it provably satisfies strong notions of security. Of particular interest, we prove that SCP03 withstands algorithm substitution attacks (ASAs) defined by Bellare et al. that may lead to secret mass surveillance. Our findings highlight the great value of the paradigm of provable security for standards and certification, since unlike extensive evaluation, it formally guarantees the absence of security flaws.

Keywords

GlobalPlatform Secure Channel Protocol Provable security Plaintext recovery Stateful encryption 

Supplementary material

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Orange Labs, 42 rue des couturesCaenFrance
  2. 2.Sorbonne universités, Université de technologie de Compiègne, Heudiasyc, Centre de recherche RoyallieuCompiègneFrance

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