LEAP: A Next-Generation Client VPN and Encrypted Email Provider

  • Elijah Sparrow
  • Harry Halpin
  • Kali Kaneko
  • Ruben Pollan
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10052)


As demonstrated by the revelations of Edward Snowden on the extent of pervasive surveillance, one pressing danger is in the vast predominance of unencrypted messages, due to the influence of the centralizing silos such as Microsoft, Facebook, and Google. We present the threat model and architectural design of the LEAP platform and client applications, which currently provisions opportunistic email encryption combined with a VPN tunnel and cross-device synchronization.


Encryption Email VPN 



The authors are supported by NEXTLEAP (EU H2020 ref: 688722) and the Open Technology Fund.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elijah Sparrow
    • 1
  • Harry Halpin
    • 2
  • Kali Kaneko
    • 1
  • Ruben Pollan
    • 1
  1. 1.LEAP Encryption Access ProjectSeattleUSA
  2. 2.INRIAParisFrance

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