Advancing Different Ideas

Abstract

There is no doubt that research paradigms and (social) theories influence practices, not only in the public sector but also the private sector. To get to the root of the problems facing society and the ways and means we utilise water resources, we need to investigate reality through a different set of paradigmatic lenses and theoretical perspectives. It is through these different ways of investigating reality that we will be able to advance different and innovative ideas, now and into the future. I reached this conclusion after more than two decades of learning about and researching various water governance and politics aspects linked to International Relations as an academic discipline.

Appendices

Appendix 1: My Research Journey

I developed the PULSE³ framework for analysis after more than 20 years of research in a variety of subject matters spanning International Relations, Political Science and Philosophy. The topics include water politics , regional integration, interest groups, research methodology , regional hegemons, international political economy, philosophy, ethics, political ideology, domestic politics , European domestic politics and comparative politics. What is in hindsight has had an influence on the current thinking contained in PULSE³’s various components. It is not surprising that humans are unable to anticipate what will happen next in their lives or careers. How we start out our careers as researchers or scientists and the twists and turns it takes can be quite surprising to say the least. My research career started in 1993 when I was an undergraduate political studies student at the then Rand Afrikaans University now the University of Johannesburg. By telling my story has merits. It gives insight in how the future unfolds (very uncertainly) and who and what influence a researcher’s or scientist’s career. Some readers might want to skip this introductory part and move onto the PULSE³ framework. For those who would like to keep reading, I am not promising an illustrious rendition of my research career in water governance and politics. Yet, there are one or two juicy bits, so to speak. What I would like to achieve in this preface is to give a glimpse of the past and help the reader to reflect on his or her own scholarly experience, how it has influenced her or his current thinking and what the future of water governance and politics research might hold. I will not make predictions on the subject field or sketch scenarios for how it might unfold. I will leave this to the reader to make up his or her own mind about the matter. Before I start with the memoir, I would like to talk about something more contemporary and how humans deal with problems. This is not a generalisation of how we deal with all woes, but it gives a glimpse into how we perceive of and wrestle with problems.

A conclusion like this might seem straight forward. It is in my opinion not the case. Let me explain. In 1993, I started my research career when I enrolled for a degree in BA Humanities at the then Rand Afrikaans University (RAU). In 1994, shortly after the first democratically elected government was inaugurated, I was a second year student studying international relations . Our lecturer, Professor Maxi Schoeman, had given us our first insight into international relations theory the previous semester. It was a basic course in international relations theory covering the major theories of the time: (neo)-realism, (neo)-liberal institutionalism, capitalism, Marxism , globalism and the like. For many students it was a difficult course, me included, maybe because it was too abstract for our liking. This did not go unnoticed on Professor Schoeman. Her advice was plain and simple: just learn the theory because that is what the course in political studies is prescribing. Looking back more than twenty years, I am glad I followed her advice. Yet, we wanted to know what will happen in the foreseeable future, not only for South Africa , but also with respect to South Africa’s place in the global community. The country was progressing out of isolation and was being welcomed back as a responsible ‘citizen’ of the community of states. In any event, we quickly got international relations theory behind us because we were about to learn about the real stuff of international politics . The second semester came and Prof Schoeman was again our lecturer.

A dynamic and interesting person, with an interest in the state and international political economy at that time, Professor Schoeman lectured us on issues on the global agenda (e.g. Schoeman 1997, 2002, 2007, 2011). Our prescribed textbook was Soroos’ (1986) Beyond sovereignty: The challenge of global policy . Although we did not immediately realise it, the book was published eight years earlier, well before the Berlin wall came down and the Soviet Union disintegrated. Yet, our lecturer assured us that what is covered in Beyond sovereignty is just as pertinent today as it was eight years previously. One of the issues discussed in the book is that of natural resources and nations’ dependency on the natural environment for economic goods. I remember the day when I became interested in water politics or hydropolitics as it is also known. Prof Schoeman lectured us on oil and its importance in the (international) political economy of nations as well as the profound influence the oil embargo of 1973 had on the relations among nations and international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank . After discussing the importance of oil, she said something that made me quite curious to say the least: ‘If you think oil in the Middle East is a hot topic, have a look at how water will influence the relations between nations in that region in the coming decades’. I decided to investigate further.

The catalogue search I did in the library after the lecture found a number of articles and books on the subject of ‘Water politics ’. Surely enough, Prof Schoeman told us about something that was not abstract but real. The catalogue listed works by Agnew and Anderson (1992), Beschorner (1992/1993), Falkenmark (1986), (1990), Gleick (1993a, b), Kolars (1986), Le Marquand (1977), Le Roux (1989), Lowi (1993), McCaffrey (1993), Mumme (1985), Naff and Matson (1984), Roberts (1991), Starr (1991), Thomas and Howlett (1993), Vesilind (1993), Visser (1989) and Vorster (1987–1988). I started reading and found that the study of water politics, unlike war, was not an old topic under consideration by scholars the world over. Yet, one thing that struck me was that it fitted neatly in the discipline of international relations . The subject matter was also interesting since it did not cover the conventional subjects like war and international organisations like the United Nations . What I started to think about is why would states cooperate or go to war with one another over a renewable resource like water, unlike a non-renewable resource such as oil.

Over the next few years I would read more about the topic and how it relates to international relations . What I did not realise at the time was that all these studies focused exclusively on the state as the primary actor in transboundary and national water politics . I must confess that it did not bother me at the time, since I was taught that global politics was about the relations between states. Neorealism and neo-liberal institutionalism was clear about this. Constructivism, as an alternative theory, in international relations was still in its infancy. In 1989, Nicolus Onuf published his book World of our making, wherein he introduced the theory of constructivism. At the time I researched water politics and how it manifests in international relations, Wendt’s (1999) Social theory of international politics was not yet on the shelves. In broad strokes, constructivism does not place the spotlight on the state or international organisations or multinational corporations like neorealism and neo-liberal institutionalism. Rather, for constructivism norms and ideas are the driving forces of social interaction and consequently global politics (e.g. Wendt 1999). As students we did not know about constructivism, and if it was taught to us, it was just another abstract theory, or so we felt at the time. We were after all, more interested in the concrete and material things in world affairs. The civil war in Yugoslavia was raging and we wanted to make sense of that quagmire of ethnic and religious animosity. The role of the United Nations in that bloody civil war was also a curiosity.

It was in 1997 that I started doing ‘serious’ research on the subject of water politics and by the end of 1988 I completed my Masters’ thesis on water as a source of political conflict and cooperation . The study was a comparative analysis between the situation in the Middle East and Southern Africa . I compared the circumstances between four transboundary river basins: the Orange and Okavango Rivers in Southern Africa and the Jordan and Tigris-Euphrates Rivers in the Middle East (Meissner 1998a). My supervisor was Prof Deon Geldenhuys, a well-known South African academic that had done much scholarly research on the South African state during its isolation years and after the demise of apartheid (e.g. Geldenhuys 1984, 1990, 1998, 2004).

Yet, this is not how I will remember Prof Geldenhuys and his contribution to his students. One of the most important lessons that Prof Geldenhuys imparted on us, as aspirant researchers, was that one should always question everything and everybody and always motivate your answer. During our classes he presented some of his work and asked us to critique it. It was difficult and sometimes intimidating; we were not used to questioning those who taught us. However, it started a culture of critical thinking. I did not realise it at the time, but this critical style of thinking would remain with me until today. During research for my Masters’ thesis I realised that the issue of state conflict and cooperation is not as straightforward as it appeared. This was to be one of my first, albeit subliminal, experiences with complexity thinking. What I also learned during the research is that it is not only states that are involved in water politics . Non-state entities, such as environmental interest groups, can also be political actors in water politics especially when it comes to the implementation of water resource projects such as dams and irrigation schemes. A case in point is the involvement of Greenpeace in their campaign against Botswana’s Southern Okavango Integrated Water Development Project (SOIWDP) in the mid-1990s. The plan was to divert water from the Okavango Delta to supply De Beers’ diamond mines in northern Botswana. After perceived pressure the government backed down on its plans for supplying mining operations from the Okavango Delta (Neme 1997; Meissner 1998b). There was more to water politics than mere interstate relations, the financing of water projects, the supply of potable water to economic nodes and urban centres, the protection of the environment and people as rational actors that always make cost-benefits analyses in the face of uncertainty. Emotions and individual livelihoods also played their part in politics and particularly water politics.

I was intrigued by the phenomenon of non-state actors in water politics . I started reading up on the subject and soon found that there was a surfeit of non-state activity, particularly in river basins where water resource management projects, particularly large dams, are constructed or considered. International river basins were no exception. For instance, when the Namibia government decided to utilise water from the Okavango River in the late 1990s to supply water to its dry northern regions, it got stiff opposition from interest groups in Botswana and elsewhere in the world (Meissner 1998b). I soon realised that international relations and the phenomenon of interest groups were interconnected. This realisation led me to enrol for my doctorate in International Politics at the University of Pretoria’s Department of Political Sciences. Incidentally, and shortly after enrolling and starting my studies, Prof. Maxi Schoeman became Head of the Department. Professor Anton du Plessis became my supervisor after the previous Head of the Department; Professor Marie Muller was promoted to the position of Dean of the Faculty of Humanities. She was my supervisor during the first two years of my research and could no longer supervise students because of her ever-increasing work-load. Prof. Du Plessis did an excellent job in supervising my thesis. He has a keen interest in international relations theory, the subject we found so abstract when we were undergraduate students. Early on in my studies he introduced me to work of the eminent American International Relations scholar, James N. Rosenau.

Rosenau’s works had a profound influence on my research career. His explanations of change in world politics , the ascendency of non-state actors onto the stage of world politics , the ins and outs of theorising and the variety of actors involved in issues like global climate change , resource depletion and migration (Rosenau 1980, 1990, 1997, 2003a, b) immediately appealed to me. For the thesis I based much of the framework for analysis on the various works of Rosenau and in particular Turbulence in world politics (Rosenau 1990). Because Prof. Du Plessis was a keen reader of international relations theory, he encouraged the reading of theory. At first I did with dread; remembering my days as a second year student dealing with those abstract things. Yet, the more I read international relations theory the more I started enjoying the subject. This was maybe because I was now a more mature student and could link the real with the abstract more readily. I enjoyed it so much that I ended by discussing nine theories in my thesis (realism, liberal pluralism, interest group pluralism, interest group corporatism, modernity, the hydrosocial contract theory, risk society, political ecology and social constructivism) rejecting most of them and adopting social constructivism as the theory on which to base my study. The role of norms [as standards of appropriate behaviour (Klotz 1995)] played an important role in the developing of arguments for or against large dam projects. The emphasis of norms helped to put the study on a sound footing. What’s more I also discovered that the various interest groups campaigning against certain aspects of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and the proposed Epupa Dam in the Kunene River , had unique identities that influenced the norms they developed (Meissner 2004). For instance, the minority and pastoral OvaHimba people living in Namibia’s Kaokoland organised themselves into a communal interest group and opposed the construction of the Epupa Dam based on their cultural and spiritual believes. For them, the river is not on a source of water and food for their vast livestock herds, the river also has spiritual significance in that they bury their people near the river (Meissner 2005; Meissner and Jacobs 2016).

Another scholar, whose work I discovered on a research trip to London, England, in late 2000 was that of John M. Hobson. His State in International Relations (Hobson 2000) laid the conceptual foundation of my thesis. What I found fascinating about the study was his classification of state agential power and how various international relations theories treat the ‘agential power’ of the state. What intrigued me was his argument that neorealism, which is naturally associated with the state and the strength of states through mechanisms like the balance of power, accords low agential power to the entity. The reason for this is basically because neorealism puts the state on some kind of pedestal and does not look at it through the lens of reflexive agential power. Where agential power is the ability of the state to implement foreign and domestic policy without the interference of other actors or the structures in world politics , reflexive agential power is the ability of the state to embed itself into normative and class structures to increase its ability to implement foreign and domestic policy (Hobson 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002; Hobson and Ramesh 2002). The ideas around agential power were pivotal for my doctorate because I investigated how interest groups influence policies and practices in the construction of large dams on international river basins (Meissner 2004). I had taken non-state actors and looked at their behaviour vis-à-vis the state in transboundary rivers . By doing this I moved away from the state-centric approach of investigating water politics in transboundary river basins. By adopting social constructivism, I was also stepping more and more into the domain of interpretivism and critical theories.

While I was busy with my doctorate I was working as a Research Associate for the African Water Issues Research Unit at the University of Pretoria. The Research Unit conducted research on various topics relating to water politics . The research I conducted for the Unit and some of its clients led to travels to various parts of Europe, the Middle East and Southern Africa . In September 2001, I was on a visit to Israel, Jordan and Palestine, conducting interviews with Middle Eastern water experts. On September 11, 2001, I was conducting an interview with an engineer from an engineering consultancy in the Westbank, a short distance from Yasser Arafat’s compound. I had travelled from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem that morning by bus, and then from Jerusalem to Ramallah by taxi. I finished the interview and my host phoned the taxi to take me back to the bus station in Jerusalem. On arriving back in Jerusalem I noticed more than the usual number of soldiers at the bus station. It was a Tuesday and the Jewish weekend was still three days away, so the soldiers could not have been going on weekend leave. I boarded the bus and shortly after leaving Jerusalem a gentleman, sitting two seats in front of me, got a call on his mobile. He answered and spoke in English with an American accent. I remember him saying to the person on the other end: ‘This is the one we have been waiting for.’ Then he asked: ‘Was the Pentagon also hit?’ On arrival in Tel Aviv the images of the burning World Trade Centre dominated the television screens in cafes and eat outs. I approached the gentleman I heard talking on his mobile and asked what had happened. He told me about the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. He was visibly shaken by the event, and I offered my help. He said that he was shocked but all right; he was an American government official working for the Pentagon, one of the targets of the attack and he feared that some of his colleagues might have perished in the attack. Over the next few days as the events unfolded it became clear to me that non-state actors are not only involved in transboundary river basins, but can be major and often deviant or delinquent players (Geldenhuys 2004) on the international stage. My former supervisor, Prof. Geldenhuys (2004: ix) summarises the events and the role played by non-state actors as follows:

The kamikaze attacks on New York and Washington have taken terrorism to an unprecedented level of death and devastation. The destructive power at the disposal of a non-state organization has been highlighted as never before: the target whose vulnerability was so starkly exposed, was none other than today’s sole superpower [the United States of America]. The world now knows for sure that seriously offensive behaviour in the realm of high politics – directly threatening the peace and security of countries – can no longer be associated with fellow-states only; it can also emanate from non-state actors, especially terrorist organizations.

The reason for the soldiers at the bus stop became apparent: the Israeli military had mobilised its entire army in preparation for attacks on Israel itself. The following day I flew to Jordan and a few days later onto London. What struck me on the flight from the Jordanian capital Amman to London was how empty the airplane was. People were clearly afraid to fly and I had witnessed some emotional scenes on Amman’s Queen Alia International Airport when loved-ones said goodbye to their children, spouses, fathers, mothers and parents. The non-state actor, behaving in a deviant and delinquent fashion, had touched the lives of people on the other side of the world in a region where the threat of instability and even war is always a looming possibility.

While in Jordan I took time out of my schedule to travel to the Dead Sea . My tour guide was a local taxi driver, a native from Iraq. I have always heard about the cultivation of bananas in the Jordan River valley just before the river enters the Dead Sea. Travelling from Amman south into valley, you enter the lowest terrestrial points on the planet—the Dead Sea valley. The thermometer on the Nissan’s dashboard displayed the outside temperature—a staggering 48 °C. Not long after we entered the valley, we came across the first banana plantation of many (Fig. 1.1). I was amazed and somewhat amused that a tropical fruit could be cultivated in such a dry and desolate environment. It was only possible because of irrigation. As someone studying water politics , it brought home the lengths economies would go to, to reduce their dependence of agricultural produce on other countries. There is also something else. I took the photo of the plantation and said to myself that it is quite unbelievable. My tour guide responded quite proudly that the Jordanians have been doing it for years. His body language told me that this was not only about self-reliance, but that a sense of pride in accomplishing such a feat also plays a role (Fig. 6.1).

Fig. 6.1

The banana plantation in the Dead Sea valley I photographed a few days after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C.

Another incident during my visit to the Dead Sea showed the animosity the peoples of the Middle East have towards one another. Along its shores, the Dead Sea is dotted with resorts and hotels with hefty entrance fees. We decided to stop at one of the local and more informal sites where people can still enjoy the Dead Sea without paying a high price. At one of these places, an Arab gentleman and his son had set up a makeshift freshwater outlet. Their main business was selling freshwater to those venturing into the salty water . With the freshwater tourists could rinse the salt from their hair, skin and eyes. The Arab gentleman was already elderly and he was curious about me and where I was from. He could not speak any English so the taxi driver translated. The water vendor asked me my name. I replied and he then asked what type of name it was. The taxi driver translated asking where this name and surname originally comes from. I said Germany. My father was a German that immigrated to South Africa in the early 1960s. The Arab gentleman said to the taxi driver that he likes the German people very much, especially Adolf Hitler. I asked why. His reply was that it is because he murdered the Jews! I was stunned and only then realised how deep the hatred for one another can be in that part of the world.

My research trip to the Middle East was certainly the most memorable one. Shortly before the completion of my thesis, I decided to leave the African Water Issues Research Unit and struck out on a different research path: regional integration. Another trip that stands out was a visit to Lesotho working for the South African Institute of International Affairs. Lesotho is a wonderfully beautiful country and unlike Israel or Jordan, rich in water resources. I was the editor of the SADC Barometer, a quarterly publication by the Institute. The Barometer focused on regional integration trends and events in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). I decided that because my doctorate was nearing completion, I had made my mark on water politics research. I had been invited to numerous overseas conferences and workshops and was considered an expert, together with a handful of other international scholars, on the issue of virtual water. Who we come into contact with will not always lead to a favourable working relationship. One thing that I learned during my time at the University of Pretoria is that other people’s psychological pathologies and personality disorders can play an enormous role on the future of our lives (Fig. 6.2).

Fig. 6.2

The makeshift freshwater vendor’s business on the shores of the Dead Sea

After a year at the South African Institute of International Affairs, I joined a provincial government department. The Gauteng Department of Public Transport Roads and Works had just established the Directorate: Research, Analysis, and they were looking for staff with experience in research to help foster the Directorate. The role of the Directorate was to conduct research and policy analysis on behalf of the Department and at times the Gauteng Provincial Government. After staffing the Directorate, we started conducting research mainly on the socio-economic conditions of Gauteng’s citizens in the so-called top twenty townships. We would also from time-to-time do research and analysis for the Gautrain, which was at that time still under construction. I was a deputy director and headed a sub-directorate. For almost three years I gained experience in the inner workings of a government entity. I experienced the day-to-day challenges and opportunities government officials have to face to get the job done. In 2008, I decided to look for greener pastures. The political battle between the then President Thabo Mbeki and his Deputy President Jacob Zuma had a negative impact on the organisational operations of the department. The fault lines in the ruling African National Congress did not only cut across the party itself, but also across government departments. Loyalists to both camps in government pitted against each to such an extent that in the Department work literally came to a standstill. My research career suffered and I decided to move on (Fig. 6.3).

Fig. 6.3

The Dead Sea shore, the Arab gentleman is seen walking away towards the parked motor vehicles

I applied for a position at a large financial institution got the job and stagnated further. On the first day I was supposed to start working, my boss was quite surprised that it was actually my first day. They did not expect me, although I had been in contact with them just two weeks prior to me joining the team. I had no access to a laptop or internet. I was told that I should take it slow, learn the inner workings of the organisation and it was only after three months that I got my first assignment. The team I joined did work for the top executives advising the chief executive officer and his deputies on socio-political matters that could affect business. Yet, when the time arrived to do something meaningful I had stagnated to such an extent that it was literally impossible to get up to speed and do some proper research . It was nonetheless an experience. I realised that the negative connotations attached to government and service delivery, the private sector is almost no different. I also learned that the private sector can also be a powerful actor affecting the lives of individuals and the political and economic outcome of communities. My experience in the private sector had taught me further that government is not the only important actor in the political and economic scheme of things. I left after two years and shortly afterwards joined the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in 2010.

The lessons learned over the years, the experiences working in government and the private sector paid off. I was back in water research ; this time as a Senior Researcher in the Water Governance Group (to be named the Integrated Water Assessment Group in 2015). The Group consists of a small number of social scientists, which is rare for the Council with its focus on natural scientific and industrial research. Working for the group has given me an appreciation of the differences between the way in which natural scientists and social scientists conduct research. The paradigms are different, the theories are dissimilar and the methodologies are also not always in line. There is one thing that we and our natural science colleagues have in common and that is we believe in fieldwork and observing how water governance and politics impact on people’s lives, the environment and vice versa. This is not to say that I did not do fieldwork in the institutions I worked for previously. While at the Gauteng Department of Public Transport, Roads and Works, we visited informal settlements and were confronted with the stark reality of the day-to-day lives of the poorest of the poor in South African society. At the CSIR this does not go us by, but there is the added dimension of the way how different scientific disciplines think about the issue of poverty and the lack of access to water in the communities we visit. For the natural scientists a rational way out would be to connect people to water infrastructure, for the social scientists it is more about how people are interacting with one another in attaining such an outcome.

The difference in perceptions between the natural and social scientists is the foundation of PULSE³ . The ideas, concepts, theories , frameworks, models and paradigms scientists create during their research endeavours are some of the most important aspects in better understanding society and the human condition . The application of such mental constructs helps us to unravel problems and give us a better understanding of reality. The advancement of any field of enquiry depends on scientists constantly creating new ideas; replace theories with better ones and critique the use of predominant paradigms (e.g. Easton 1985; Kickert 1993; Dent et al. 2005; Gibbs 2010; Koh 2013; Kaku 2014). The development and use of the tools of a scientist’s trade are significant activities for any discipline (Koh 2013). Without the constant development and betterment of these tools, innovation is either lacking or continuing in stutters without making real progress. Innovation is not only essential for the advancement of scientific disciplines, innovation is also necessary for the survival and growth of human-created entities such as organisations, government departments and private businesses (Bello et al. 2004; Aragón-Correa et al. 2007).

I believe that there is currently a lack of innovation in the South African water research community. Old-style theories from European scholars are duplicated and critical thinking is hard to find. What is also obvious is the over-use of the scientific method or positivism in finding answers to the country’s water woes. The description of science as a well-ordered mechanism that helps us understand the world, gather facts and data has a very strong influence on the South African water research community . Yet, what if we turn this on its head, and, like, Firestein (2013) say that there are those that look upon the scientific method as this well-ordered practice, but then there are those that say it is actually nothing more than ‘farting around…in the dark.’ This boils down to the way we perceive science and how we pursue it. Data is collected and put into books, reports, scientific articles and technical guidelines. I believe that the South African water research community, or at least the largest majority of its members, are looking at things that have already been done and researched. What the community is not doing is looking at those things that still needs to be looked at; the missing things in the water sector. Ironically, ignorance, and not in the pejorative sense thereof is not followed. People are just not curious enough to find out what is it that we are missing in the water sector. It is as if Soroos’s Beyond Sovereignty is rehashed over and over, but there is no one telling us what else there is that could be of interest, or what issues could create problems in future or how can we be critical in our thinking and knowledge generation.

Appendix 2: Theories for Practice

Theory	Proponents	Interpretivist (critical)/positivist	Disciplines	Premises
Agential power	Hobson (2000)	Interpretivist/positivist	International relations, historical sociology, comparative politics	• Agential power relates to the relationships between actors in society (Hobson 2000) • A ‘structurationist ’ approach is applied in this framework, which encompasses a comprehensive ‘both/and’ understanding. The logic behind this approach rests on the premise that strong states and strong societies can exist at the same time and a more levelled playing field exists. There are no clear trade-offs of power capabilities between actors. Said differently, it is not always clear that what the one gains, the other loses (Hobson 2000) • Different types of agential power exists domestic, international and reflexive agential power (Hobson 2000, 2001, 2002; Hobson and Ramesh 2002) • Domestic agential power is the ability of the state to develop domestic or foreign policy and shape the domestic realm free of domestic social-structural requirements or the interests of other actor (Hobson 2000, 2001, 2002; Hobson and Ramesh 2002) • International agential power concerns the ability of an actor to make foreign policy and shape the international realm free of international structural requirements or the interests of other international actors (Hobson 2000, 2001, 2002; Hobson and Ramesh 2002) • Actors possess ‘embedded autonomy ’ or ‘governed interdependence’, which can also be referred to as ‘reflexive agential power’ (Hobson 2000: 227). ‘Reflexive agential power ’ hints at the ‘ability of [an actor] to embed itself in a broad array of social forces…’, that is class and normative structures. Hobson’s idea of ‘reflexive agential power ’ is that as an actor becomes more reflexive, its governing capacity grows, because it is less isolated from society and other actors. If, for instance, the state succeeds in broadening its network of collaboration with a comprehensive range of social forces and state and non-state structures, it increases its power • Agential power gives actors agency to influence their environment and each other (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • States are not the only actor that poses agential power; non-state actors can also have agential power (Hobson 2000)
Ambiguity theory of leadership	Alvesson and Spicer (2011)	Interpretivist	Business management	• Versions of leadership are invented or constructed by people when people draw on their assumptions, expectations, selective perceptions, sense-making and imaginations on leadership (Alvesson and Spicer 2011) • Leadership exists only as a perception and not a viable scientific construction (Calder 1977: 202 cited in Alvesson and Spicer 2011). Leadership varies from person to person and context to context (Alvesson and Spicer 2011) • Because of the different meanings people attach to the concept, it is difficult to say exactly what leadership is and therefore we should see it as a construct that is an ambiguous and contradictory phenomenon (Alvesson and Spicer 2011) • Not only that, leadership is complex and at times downright incoherent (Alvesson and Spicer 2011) • The different meanings and constructs people attach to the concept, brings out the potential for ambiguous interpretations, understandings and experiences of leadership (Alvesson and Spicer 2011) • Ambiguity and fragmentation is at the centre of the leadership process (Alvesson and Spicer 2011) • Leaders need to cope with ambiguity. This ambiguity has the effect that leaders do not always know what their roles are (Alvesson and Spicer 2011) • Leadership itself is highly ambiguous (Alvesson and Spicer 2011) • Leadership is a blurred concept like goodness that could almost mean anything and everything (Alvesson and Spicer 2011) • As such people use the concept to reach certain goals that they find desirable (Alvesson and Spicer 2011) • These objectives could include: attributing responsibility to senior managers for numerous outcomes, booting the identity of managers, selling leadership courses and creating faith that leadership hold solutions to the miseries of the workplace (Alvesson and Spicer 2011). In other words, the utility of the concept serves as a lever to create certain things, especially making us belief that leadership can do wonders, which is not the case according to Alvesson and Spicer (2011) • We need to problematize leadership and recognise and acknowledge its limitations (Alvesson and Spicer 2011). Leadership should not be seen as the panacea • The attributed meanings of leadership are important sources of ambiguity. The sources of ambiguous meaning of leadership are leaders, their followers and the context in which leaders and followers operate in (Alvesson and Spicer 2011) • Leaders are not always sure about what it means to do leadership , and what they are doing is actually leadership (Alvesson and Spicer 2011) • Followers interpret different acts as leadership (Alvesson and Spicer 2011) • The context has a tendency to promote different understandings and ideas of what it means to lead (Alvesson and Spicer 2011)
Complexity theory	Weaver (1948), Bak and Paczuski (1995), Bak (1996), Shermer (1997), Byrne (1998), Cilliers (2000, 2001), Rosenau (1996, 2006), Pahl-Wostl (2007a, b), Ramo (2009)	Positivist	Ecology, physics, genetics, international relations, computer science , organization studies, business management	• The central idea of complexity theory is that of systems, be they ecosystems, market systems or social systems that have a whole as well as parts (Nooteboom 2007; Pauly and Grande 2007; Albert 2007) • Complex systems consist of a large number of elements and phenomena that interact in a dynamic fashion, which has an influence on the entire system (Rosenau 1996; Cilliers 2000, 2001; Rosenau 2006; Bousquet and Curtis 2011) • When these dynamical systems organise themselves into a critical states, then complexity has occurred (Bak and Paczuski 1995) • Relationships happen in an open arrangement through a variety of indirect and direct non-linear feedback loops. This means that is no clear boundary between the system and its external environment (Rosenau 1996; Cilliers 2000, 2001; Rosenau 2006; Bousquet and Curtis 2011) • Boundaries are both changing and leaky. This is an enabling rather than a constrictive characteristic because signals can freely flow between the system and it external environment (Rosenau 1996; Cilliers 2000, 2001; Rosenau 2006), which enables the system to respond to these signals appropriately • There is no central control or fixed hierarchy. This means that structures are temporary and unstable which enables the system to respond to these signals appropriately (Rosenau 1996; Cilliers 2000, 2001; Rosenau 2006) • A change in part of a system can affect numerous other parts through a domino effect (Bak 1996; Ramo 2009). These changes do not have to be large; small events can have profound implications for the system (Rosenau 2006) • History is the systems memory with history influencing behaviour of the systems and within the system (Rosenau 1996; Cilliers 2000, 2001; Rosenau 2006) • History is non-linear, it is not the same along its trajectory, there are bumps and accidents (Nye 2010) that can, as mentioned above, change the course of direction in the system • The components or agents of such a complex adaptive system are capable of behavioural self-organisation into orderly systems resulting in novel attributes. This means that a system can evolve into something new while retaining it old characteristics (Rosenau 1996; Bousquet and Curtis 2011) • This evolution takes place, paradoxically, independently and in concert with the environment the system finds itself in. If the system does not do so, it can become extinct (Rosenau 1996) • Complex systems are therefore adaptive to their environments (Pahl-Wostl 2007a). As complex adaptive systems, they are dynamic, in a constant state of evolutionary or co-evolutionary flux, with unpredictable outcomes at the order of the day (Hoffmann 2003; Meissner and Jacobs 2016) • This complex adaptation is a result of feedback process between the adaptive actors and the dynamic contexts (Hoffmann 2003; Bousquet and Curtis 2011) in which they find themselves • Actor behaviour facilitates adaptation through unchanged and self-evaluative rule models, and as actors evaluate their rule models they change them accordingly (Hoffmann 2003)
Cultural theory of International Relations (Psychological constructivism )	Lebow (2008), Hymans (2010)	Interpretivist	International relations, security studies, democracy studies, history, philosophy, psychology	• Spirit (motivating people to participate in civic life and gives rise to self-esteem), appetite (the need for material things that can corrupt) and reason are fundamental drivers with distinct objectives or ends (Lebow 2008). These aspects are the source of typical forms of behaviour that have dissimilar implications for cooperation , conflict and risk-taking (Lebow 2008) • Spirit, appetite and reason are requirements for and assist in the creation of distinct forms of hierarchies based on different forms of justice (Lebow 2008) • These hierarchies sustain order at the individual, state, regional and international levels (Lebow 2008). When the discrepancy between behaviour and the principles of justice becomes great and obvious, order breaks down (Lebow 2008) • Order and disorder at any level has implications for order at other neighbouring levels (Lebow 2008). The three motives are present, and often fear as well, to varying degrees (Lebow 2008) • Real worlds are lumpy; the mix of motives differs from actor to actor and among the collectives they organise (Lebow 2008) • Reason is able to contain spirit and appetite, but such a balance is rare among individuals, are hardly ever reached by societies and is absent in regional and international systems (Lebow 2008). Imbalances occur when reason cannot control spirit and appetite; imbalances are associated with the with the failure of elites to adhere to the restraints of the rule emanating from their offices as well as changing conceptions of justice that deprive the existing hierarchy of its legitimacy (Lebow 2008) • Mechanisms can transform imbalance into social disorder and breakdown. When there is no reason, competition for honour and standing (spirit) or wealth (appetite) can overstep the accepted constraints and lead to a fast unravelling of order (Lebow 2008). Spirit, as an imbalance factor, operates at the elite level and become dangerous when an imbalance takes place in the direction of intra-elite competition. Imbalance in towards appetite by elites can lead to imitation and resentment by others and it can risk social disorder through the violation of norms and increasing class tensions (Lebow 2008) • Social orders at all levels go through cycles of consolidation and decline. Since fear-based worlds are difficult to escape from, realism is the default social condition (Lebow 2008) • Human history is cyclical, as realists contend (Lebow 2008). There are historical trends where societies have evolved from appetite based entities to those influenced by spirit and then back to appetite-based worlds (Lebow 2008) • A further evolutionary path is a return to a spirit-based world that is not a warrior society, but a society with diverse (and competing) forms of standing and recognition (Lebow 2008) • This evolutionary path is discontinuous and not uniform and not driven by a single dialectical process (Lebow 2008). Breakdowns of existing orders are essential, since they bring about change and stimulate learning. Technological, intellectual and social changes are driving forces that lead to transitions between appetite, spirit and fear-based worlds (Lebow 2008)
Everyday International Political Economy (EIPE)	Hobson and Seabrooke (2007)	Interpretivist	International relations, international political economy, sociology	• Everyday international political economy (EIPE) is the opposite of regulatory international political economy (RIPE). As such, EIPE do not ask ‘who governs and who benefits and how is international order regulated?’ but rather ‘who acts and how do their actions produce and change the world economy in various spatial dimensions?’ (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • By asking this latter instead of the former, new sights of agency will be unearthed (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • This means that those actors that are normally power takers are then conceptualised as power givers (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • If the EIPE question is asked it will also highlight how governmental processes are influenced by bottom-up processes and not just those emanating from the top (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • The theory is based on the 90/10 principle, where the bottom 90 % of the world can have an impact on the top 10 % of the powerful population of the world (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • Not all bottom-up actions affect the world economy since dominant elites also play a role but not an exclusive role (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • If we place our attention on the actions of bottom 90 % then we will learn more about the power and the limitations and legitimacy and authority of the dominant elites (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • The legitimacy of the top 10 % that rules is questioned and sometimes rejected by the bottom 90 % not only through protest but also through subtle forms of everyday resistance that drives change (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • One of the reasons why actors reject legitimacy is because it clashes with the rejecter’s identity that is created within broader publics through everyday actions. Identities are not only created and maintained they are also reshaped and discarded and by understanding these processes we will get a better appreciation of the operation of economic, political and societal systems (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • Everyday actors cannot behave as they please, structures are restrictive and at times actors can be victims and at other times they do have agency to affect change. Agency can always be expressed, however big or small. Even the structures are the product of everyday actions (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • Everyday actions are the acts of agents that play a subordinate role within a power relationship. These acts can take the form of negotiation, resistance or non-resistance, which can occur suddenly or over a period of time. The acts shape, constitute and transform the political and economic environment around and beyond everyday actors (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • Everyday actions are not necessarily resistance or seen as the weak winning the strong or conceived of being strategic, they can be subtle forms of deviance in the form of verbal taunts, subversive stories, rumour (Heywood and Seabrooke 2007) • These acts play out at the mesolevel but can have ramifications at the national and even global levels (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • Bottom-up changes can take place through three actions: defiance, mimetic challenge and hybridised mimicry and axiorationality (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • Defiance occurs when actors resist elite coercion through unconcealed resistance activities • Mimetic challenge is a concealed type of resistance strategy and entails the adoption of the discourse and/or characteristics of the dominant to camouflage their resistance challenges to the dominant’s legitimacy. The normative discourse of the dominant are appealed to (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007). Hybridised mimicry happens when the dominant’s discourse is adopted and then filtered through cultural lenses to produce something new and hybridised within the receptor society (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) • Axiorationality is used by actors when they reflect upon conventions and norms and the interests they inform. They then choose to act in ways that are in accordance with broader intersubjective understandings of what is socially legitimate. Actors oven operate in a rational manner, but their actions are also informed by norms and identities (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007)
Feminisms	Millett (1970), Mitchell (1974)	Interpretivist and critical	Anthropology, philosophy, international relations	• There are different forms of feminism (Pettman 1999) • Feminism can be regarded as a political project to change the inequality , exploitation or oppression of women (Pettman 1999) and how the institutions, processes and practices through which women are subordinated by men are maintained (Heywood 1999) • Feminists reject the view that politics is located in narrowly confined public activities and institutions, such as governments and elections; sexual relations are also political. For feminists sexual politics is patriarchy, which is a form of oppression and exploitation to which women are subjected. Gender is socially imposed and therefore a social construct, which is based on stereotypes of feminine and masculine behaviour and social roles. Gender is therefore not a biological difference between men and women (Heywood 1999) • Liberal feminists seek an end to the exclusion of women from public office, power and employment. These feminists seek equal rights of women in the military, including in combat. If women are protected it will invariably keep them from power and they will remain dependent on men as their full claim to citizenship, which is also understood as serving in the armed forces and fighting for one’s country (Pettman 1999) • Radical feminists see women’s subordination as universal that takes different forms at different times. For some radical feminists, women are a sex-class. This means that they are everywhere and systematically subjected to men’s sex-right of claims to access to their bodies, children and labour. The main form of keeping women from power is through violence against women. Sexuality is a form of politics (Pettman 1999) • For cultural feminists, women are seen as different from men in that women are more caring or nurturing and peaceable. Politics and environmental problems need the values of women to bring about change (Pettman 1999) • Feminist theories are critical of the so-called naturalistic explanations of sex and sexuality that premise that the social existence of women is based on some physiological fact. For feminists, the personal is political that are sometimes viewed as public (Butler 1988) • By empowering women and giving them equal rights could limit family size voluntarily. This will reduce population rates to economically sustainable levels. Women are also more prone to constructive and peaceful behaviour to conflictual issues (Viotti and Kauppi 1999) • Some feminists also link the creation of knowledge with gender. The claim that women’s lives differ from that of men has consequences for the generation of knowledge. The western white dominant male’s domination of science and knowledge has produced knowledge which is not complete (or rather partial) and excludes or marginalises women (Hartsock 1983). In other words, the gender identity of those creating knowledge has an influence on the process of knowing and the transmission of such knowledge (Smith 1996)
Hydro-social contract theory	Turton and Ohlsson (1999), Warner (2000), Turton and Meissner (2002), Meissner and Turton (2003)	Positivist	International relations	• There are a number of societal transitions when it comes to the development and management of water resources (Warner 2000; Turton and Ohlsson 1999). The theory gives insights into how such management practices have originated (Meissner and Turton 2003). The transitions can lead to a number of social instabilities (Meissner and Turton 2003) • Social, economic, political and institutional changes are at times independent variables that can impact on hydrosocial transitions. Engineered solutions, the so-called hydraulic mission are a reaction to prevailing conditions of water scarcity brought about by either biophysical and/or societal changes. Droughts, population growth, industrialisation, large scale water pollution (Turton and Meissner 2002) and constraints in water resources management (Martin-Carasco et al. 2013) can be responsible for such a change. This is the first transition, when water scarcity is encountered by a particular social entity (Turton and Meissner 2002) • The scarcity brings about adaptive behaviours that are the solutions to water scarcity. Such solutions include water restrictions during droughts, cloud seeding, changes in water policies, rain harvesting etc. Coping strategies are also the result (Turton and Ohlsson 1999). Water scarcity is the independent variable that brings about social changes • This first transition has the same characteristics as a Hobbesian-like contract where a bi-polar arrangement between government and society takes effect (Warner 2000). Power relations creeps into the domain of water resources management. The state and engineers take responsibility to supply society with water, granting the engineer a privileged position in society (Turton and Ohlsson 1999). The contract gives government a mandate to assume and execute its responsibility, and acts as the foundation for the development of institutional arrangements such as government departments. The contract also indicates to the public what fair and legitimate practices is (e.g. sustainable development ) (Turton and Ohlsson 1999) • Engineers become the ‘discursive elite’ and set in motion a sanctioned discourse. Politicians and engineers therefore dominate the first transition, with government as the custodian of water resources (Turton and Ohlsson 1999). The discursive elite determine the nature, form and content of the prevailing discourse, which is also known as the sanctioned discourse. This sanctioned discourse represents what may be said, who may say it and how it may be interpreted. This ultimately leads to the creation of dominant belief system or paradigm (Meissner and Turton 2003) • Social instability can be the outcome should the state not deliver on its promise; the state can either ignore society’s pleas for water provision, due to capacity constraints or corruption, or supply water to only one part of the population (Turton and Ohlsson 1999) • A second transition takes place when water deficits, in the face of engineering solutions, start to rear their heads (Turton and Meissner 2002). The result of this transition is a Lockean type of hydrosocial contract (Warner 2000), which is characterised by a triangular configuration between government, the public and interest groups or other elements in civil society , because of Locke’s emphasis on civil society’s role in politics , a triangular, as opposed to a bipolar (Hobbesian) • Two events are also important to consider within this transition and the context of adaptive behaviour. The first is that there is a cost in the implementation of engineering solutions. Government and local authorities find it increasingly difficult to finance water infrastructure programmes or there is no other source of water. Then a social conscience starts to surface and here civil society becomes prominent with the social conscience usually manifesting in the form of environmentalism. This psyche highlight the notion that supply-sided solutions are highly unbecoming the state. Such solutions are environmentally damaging. The theory postulates that if this transition is not handled in a sound manner, it can cause social instabilities like political unrest and varying levels of civil disobedience (Turton and Ohlsson 1999). Interest groups, through lobbying activities, are major actors in this transition (Turton and Meissner 2002; Meissner and Turton 2003) • Interest groups mobilise support against water infrastructure projects, like large dams, and demand that water resources development becomes more sustainable. Following this, and because interest groups challenge the sanctioned discourse and demand alternatives to water resources management projects, they become new members of the discursive elite and the sanctioned discourse embraces principles of the sustainable utilisation of water (Turton and Ohlsson 1999; Meissner 2004) • A possible third transition in the hydrosocial contract theory can also be present. This occurs when interest groups enters into agreement with government entities, such as when they sign memoranda of understanding (Meissner and Turton 2003)
Interactive Governance (Governability )	Jentoft (2007), Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009), Kooiman (1999, 2008), Kooiman et al. (2008), Kooiman and Bavinck and Kooiman (2008), Kooiman and Bavinck (2013), Scholtens and Bavinck (2013)	Interpretivist	Marine Fisheries	• Societies are governed by a combination of efforts (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013) • The mixture of governance efforts is the result to ever growing diversity, dynamics and complexity as well as major concerns such as poverty and climate change (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013) • Governance is the collection of governing activities carried out by societal actors in response to public needs and visions (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013) • Governance is in general organised and routine and rarely harmonious but typically interactive (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013) • Interactive governance is the ‘whole of interactions taken to solve societal problems and to create societal opportunities, including the formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them’ (Kooiman and Bavinck 2005: 17) • Society is comprised of as large number of governing actors that are constrained or enabled by their surroundings (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013) • Actors are any social unit possessing agency or power of action, which includes individuals, associations, firms, governmental agencies and international organisations (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013) • A broad range of principles is the foundation of governance. None of which has primacy over the other (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013) • Governance , however, do contain normative elements, with the most important being interaction. Interaction is often more effective than ‘going it alone’ (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013) • Broad societal participation in governance is an expression of democracy which is a desirable state of affairs (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013) • Values, principles and goals are not fixed but are at the same time developed and expressed as actors engage in social-political exchange (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013) • Goals are not given but negotiated. Neither is these goals stable but varies according to the relative strength of the participants that come and go (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013) • The goals or plans are the outcome of interactive, experience-based learning (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013) • Governability ‘is the capacity to bring about, organize and carry out governing interactions in the face of societal and natural diversity, complexity and dynamics in terms of elements, modes and orders of governance as attributes’ (Kooiman 2008: 178) • Three main elements are at play in the governability project: the governors, the governed and all the external influences that impact on the system or entity that is being governed. These three variables add to varying degrees to governability. Acts of governance as well as external factors can have an impact on the degree of governability (Kooiman 2008) • The theory starts with societal activities or primary processes such as drawing water from a river, catching fish, irrigating a field or flushing a toilet. Such processes have become more diverse, dynamic and complex and take place at different spatial and temporal scales both qualitatively and quantitatively (Kooiman 2008) • Diversity emphasises the specific and varying qualities of actors in a system-to-be-governed, its governing system and governing interactions. Diversity is the source of innovation and creation and also carries the potential of a system’s destruction or disintegration (Kooiman 2008) • Dynamics deal with regularity and irregularity and hold the potential for change as well as disruptive consequences (Kooiman 2008) • Complexity deals with societal structures, interdependencies and interrelations and is a condition for combining interdependencies (Kooiman 2008) • Scale has to do with space and time and represents the level where one can see the combined effects of diversity, complexity and dynamics (Kooiman 2008) • It is the interactions and interrelationships among economic, social, biophysical and the host of other components of the system-to-be-governed that constitute the system as a whole (Kooiman 2008) • Governability recognises three modes of governance: hierarchical governance, self-governance and co-governance (Kooiman 2003, 2008; Scholtens and Bavinck 2013) • Hierarchical governance is also the mode of governance that is visibly not functioning very well as ever increasing rules and regulations do not live up to their expectations. Co-governance, such as public-private partnerships and co-management of resources, are emerging constantly and are becoming more prominent, while self-governance is an area with little understanding, theoretically as well as politically and ideologically (Kooiman 2008) • The resilience of a system will depend, to varying degrees, not only on self-governance or co-governance or hierarchical governance, but a combination of all three in the face of complexity, dynamics, diversity and scale (Kooiman 2008) • It is here where governability moves away from the learning by doing or adaptive management (Kooiman 2008) • Governance systems have a number of attributes: images, instruments and action. Images, instruments and actions are the three elements of interaction through which governors govern (Kooiman 2008) • Images are the sets of ideas where a governor wants to go (i.e. the assumptions about fundamental matters, vision, knowledge , facts, judgements, presuppositions, hypotheses, theories , convictions, ends and goals) • Instruments give the ideas substance and actions are needed to put the instruments at work. Instruments can be hard or soft and the choice of a certain instrument is not free; it is determined by positions in and views of society. Neither are instruments neutral. Their design, choice and application can lead to strife. Images relate to specific issues as well as the images of the relationship between society and nature and the role of government (Kooiman 2008) • Action is the implementation of policy according to certain guidelines as well as the mobilisation of actors to move into new and uncharted directions. Structural conditions can be more important than governing interactions (Kooiman 2008) • Governability outlines three orders of governance: first- and second-order and meta-governance (Kooiman 2008) • Day to day affairs is what constitute first-order governance and exist where people and organisations interact to create opportunities and solving existing problems • Second-order governance is institutional arrangements within which first-order governance takes place • Meta-governance feeds, binds, and evaluates the entire governance exercise. ‘In meta-governance, governors and the governed alike take each other’s measure in formulating the norms by which they want to judge each other and the measuring process itself’ (Kooiman 2008: 181)
Interest group corporatism	Schmitter (1983), Huggins and Turner (1997), Wilson (1990), Sellars (1997)	Positivist	Political science , comparative politics	• The theory places prime importance on the role of interest groups in society (Huggins and Turner 1997) and how governments interact with interest groups (Meissner 2004). The emphasis of corporatism is away from the assumption of absolute individualism in society and that collective representation, although a restricted one can also be part of society’s structure (Carrasco 1991) • Interest groups are a central element in understanding politics and the processes surrounding interest group and government behaviour (Huggins and Turner 1997) • There is a need for the incorporation of specific interest groups into decision making processes. In this regard, economic and functional interest groups (e.g. labour unions) are as important as the governmental process and they have insider status into this process. Governments can benefit from the services and expertise of these interest groups. This means that political power is situated in the hands of a few interest groups (Smith 1993). There is not much lobbying from interest groups in the system because the personal ties between their leaders and government officials make this unnecessary (Wilson 1983) • There exist a tripartite relationship between labour, capital (business) and government in society, because of the insider status of certain interest groups (Heywood 1997; Sellars 1997) • Within such a system, the policy process is characterised by consultation and bargaining between the three groupings (Huggins and Turner 1997). Even so, government is at the top of the hierarchy (Sellars 1997) • Since there is this tripartite relationship, there is a hierarchy of interest groups in society (Heywood 1997) where economic and functional interest groups top this hierarchy • Government is therefore not a neutral moderator and actor when interacting with interest groups; it chooses which groups it will consult, and how and for what reason public policy should be implemented. This decision -making process is characterised by a top-down arrangement. There is therefore no level playing field on which interest groups compete. What is more, interest groups do not lobby government per se, they rather negotiate with it and in so doing exert an autonomous position in society (Huggins and Turner 1997; Sellars 1997) • The policy process depends on political incentives and sanctions from government to ensure interest group cooperation for public purposes (Streeck and Kenworthy 2004) • Government decision are made and implemented after close consultation with these interest groups (Wilson 1990; Sadie 1998)
Interest group pluralism		Positivist	Political science , comparative politics	• The theory falls under the rubric of liberal pluralism, but is seen as a distinct theory under Political Science (Viotti and Kauppi 1999). It is the opposite of interest group corporatism • Interest groups are important vehicles to broaden citizen participation in the political process and give them representation in the process (Huggins and Turner 1997) • Power is widely dispersed among interest groups in society (Ball 1988). There are numerous interest groups that exert influence over government processes. Government is responsive to the interest groups’ views, opinions and stances. Interest groups can therefore be successful in influencing policy outcomes because all have insider status to the governmental process (Smith 1993; Moore and Roberts 1992). There is therefore almost perfect competition between interest groups and no single interest group or particular collection of interest groups dominate (Hague et al. 1992). This means that interest groups, have little or no statutory contact with governmental decision makers and operate from outside the institutional structure of government to influence policy through political lobbying (pressure) rather than to be directly involved in decision-making (Wilson 1983) • A balance of power exists between the various interest groups and the between those groups and the ruling elite (Davies 1996) • Interest groups establish themselves around common interests and mutual threats (Davies 1996). Any threat to society will produce interest groups that will respond to it or counteract the threat (Meissner 2004) • Individuals can belong to different interest groups and may advance a number of interests at the same time (Cummings and Wise 1971) • The state poses a disproportionate amount of resources, which is transformed into political power. Interest groups have a counter balancing influence on state power. Government practitioners react to the inputs coming from a wide variety of interest groups regarding certain issues and interests and attempt to strengthen their own power base accordingly. Interest groups can force the ruling elite to respond more effectively to a wide range of constituencies than a small group of influential individuals (Smith 1993; Berry 1997). Political power is therefore diluted throughout the domestic political system by interest groups • Society dominates the state. The state is a mere domain or arena of competition between various interest groups. Interest groups therefore compete with one another on a levelled playing field (Moore and Roberts 1992; Hague et al. 1998) • Interest groups determine and establish policy agendas and public interests, relative to society’s organised interests (Viotti and Kauppi 1999)
Marxism	Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Illich Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Mao Zedong, Antonio Gramsci	Positivist	Philosophy, political science , international relations, development studies, sociology	• Classical Marxism ’s cornerstone is the materialist conception of history that highlights the importance of economic life and the circumstances under which people produce and reproduce subsistence. The theory explains social, historical and cultural development in terms of material and class factors (Heywood 1999) • History is therefore central to the theory with history being seen as driven by dialectical processes with internal contradictions with each method of production that is reflected in class antagonisms (Heywood 1999). In other words, history is produced by productive forces and economic activities, with history operating through the class struggle over the distribution of social products (Gilpin 1987) • For instance, capitalism is technologically quite advanced of class societies. Capitalism will be overthrown in a revolution that will establish a classless, communist society (Heywood 1999). In a communist society scarcity is abolished and the system will be informed and reached by socialism that is not based on profit motive and market forces (Brown 2002). Socialism is the end goal of Marxism (Gilpin 1987) • Marxism is the alternative to liberalism with its attack on individualism and the limited concern with civic and political rights. Liberalism is an ideology of the upper classes to legitimise capitalist class relations (Heywood 1999) • For contemporary Marxists, the driving forces behind politics are the class struggle and uneven development and they see history as dynamic and dialectic and not cyclical (Keohane 1983). There is no social harmony or a return to balance in society (Gilpin 1987) • For Marxists power is a crucial aspect in politics and in world politics , the theory sees periodically hegemonic powers dominating history. These powers wield unprecedented economic and military power (Keohane 1983) • Social relations are the function of particular socio-economic systems. Whether this system is capitalist, socialist or feudal, political, legal, ethical and religious ideas and institutions will be based on the nature of the system. These ‘superstructures’ justify and perpetuate the said socio-economic system (Stern 2000)
Modernity	Giddens (1990, 1991), Beck and Ritter (1992)	Positivist	Sociology	• Modernity arose from a number of revolutions that swept the world a couple of centuries ago, most notably the industrial revolution and the enlightenment (Adams 1993) • Modernity and the human progression go hand-in-hand with the modern modes of economic production. The nuclei of modernity are the city and the capitalist (money) economy (Ritzer 2000) • Modernity is described by Giddens (1990) as a juggernaut or a runaway engine that has enormous power that humans can control, to some extent, but something can also get out of hand. The juggernaut has more power than those creating and controlling it (Meissner 2004) • Modernity manifests itself in four institutions: (1) capitalism, (2) industrialism, (3) surveillance capabilities and (4) military power • Capitalism is characterised by commodity production, the private ownership of capital, propertyless wage labour and a class system derived from these characteristics. Capitalist modernity is also productivist because it creates fresh needs for its own survival, using all available means from satisfying basic human needs to development assistance. Industrialism involves the use of power resources to produce commodities with industrialism embedded in all spheres of society from transportation systems, communication and domestic life (households) (Ritzer 2000; Haralambos and Holborn 2000; Comeliau 2002) • Surveillance capabilities are concerned with observing the activities and movements of citizens by the state (Giddens 1990) • Military power concerns the control of the means of violence, which is a central function of the state as well (Ritzer 2000) • Social movements develop in correspondence to these manifestations (Haralambos and Holborn 2000). For instance, labour movements and trade unions develop alongside capitalism, democratic and free speech movements parallel to surveillance capabilities and peace and ecological movements develop laterally with the military and industrial movements (Ritzer 2000) • Modernity can bring about both positive and negative consequences. Industrialisation can create better living standards, but at the same time create pollution of the natural environment . Military capabilities can ward off enemies, but can also lead to costly arms races. These risks are global in severity and not localised to small geographic areas (Ritzer 2000) • Modernity is not static, but dynamic, which is described by three factors distanciation, disembedding and reflexivity (Ritzer 2000). Time-space distanciation explains how social systems have become interdependent whereas they were previously distinct through remote or face-to-face interaction (Karsten 2003). Disembedding refers to our removal from time and space. In pre-modern societies we moved in space and time was experienced while one moved. In modern societies, the social space is not confined by the space in which one moves we can imagine what other spaces look like, even if we weren’t there before. In other words, we also live in virtual space and virtual time and those we never see or meet in this space has an impact on our lives (Giddens 1994). Reflexivity is those social practices that are examined all the time and that are reformed in the light of new information about those practices and thereby altering their characteristics (Giddens 1990). This examination produces constant change and a permanent state of uncertainty. Knowledge is constantly reviewed in this reflexive environment and it is always likely to be revised and therefore involve the reflective monitoring of actions (Haralambos and Holborn 2000) • Every aspect of the world can be reflected upon (Ritzer 2000; Meissner 2004)
Neo-Liberalism (Liberal-pluralism )	Dahl (1963), Doyle (1986), Hoffmann (1987), Russett (1990), Matthew and Zacher (1995), Brown et al. (1996), Moravcsik (1997), Ray (1998)	Positivist	International relations, comparative politics, international political economy, democracy studies, philosophy	• Economic interdependence and democracy reduce (interstate) conflict (Oneal and Russett 1997) • States are not the only important actors in world politics (Viotti and Kauppi 1999) • Non-state entities, like international organizations, along with states are important actors in politics (Viotti and Kauppi 1999). Said differently, states are not the most important actors in world politics , with autonomous preferences also coming from non-state entities (Stone 1994; Nel 1999). These non-state entities are playing increasingly important roles in international affairs and influence states, or at least the governments of states in the determination of national interests (Viotti and Kauppi 1999) • States are not solid entities that can withstand outside influences, but are permeable entities (Heywood 1997) • The image of international relations as states pushing each other like billiard balls is incorrect. It more like a cobweb of relations with actors linked to each other in diverse ways. These linkages are based on highly complex and multiple interdependent relationships (Heywood 1997; Stern 2000) • To recognise non-state entities, liberal-pluralists replace sovereignty with autonomy as a settled norm (Heywood 1997) • States across the world are different in their composition, with different societal make ups and government apparatus (Stone 1994). States are therefore not like units • In this regard, states consist of citizens, interest groups, local authorities and government departments that are continuously competing with one another (Viotti and Kauppi 1999) • There is also no clear distinction between domestic affairs and international politics ; these realms are interdependent with the one influencing the other. States or any other political institution represents some subset of domestic society (Moravcsik 1997) • Cooperation within the international system between liberal democratic states is quite normal because the present international order is perceived as liberal (Stone 1994)
Neo-Realism (Realism)	Carr (1939), Morgenthau (1948), Waltz (1959), Krasner (1976), Bull (1977), Gilpin (1981, 1987), Geldenhuys (1984), Keohane (1983, 1986), Geldenhuys (1990), Huntington (1993), Nye (2004)	Positivist	International relations, comparative politics, security studies, international political economy	• The state is the most important actor in the international system and it is a permanent institution in international and domestic politics (Dunne 1997; Kegley and Wittkopf 1997; Du Plessis 2000). The state’s decision makers are afforded the same importance as states, but they are not as permanent as the state (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981) • States and the leaders governing states are rational and unitary actors when they are confronted with problems (Viotti and Kauppi 1999) • Non-state entities are of lesser importance because governments representing states are the only institutions that can formulate, implement and enforce laws (Viotti and Kauppi 1999). Because of this, realism focuses more on explaining the behaviour of states and pays less attention to individuals and transnational actors (Lynn-Jones 1999) • The international system is conflictual between states (Gilpin 1984; Archer 1992) • Power and security is a prime motivator in the motivations towards actions (Gilpin 1984; Archer 1992) • Power is unevenly distributed throughout the system (Gilpin 1981; Archer 1992) • Neo-realists, as opposed to realists, put some economic elements into their analyses (Archer 1992) • Apart from Keohane (1984), neo-realists believe that international organisations do not play such an important role as independent states in the shaping of the international system (Archer 1992) • Sovereignty must first be established before the non-state realm within states can start functioning. This means that power flows from the state to civil society and not the other way around (Dunne 1997) • States employ power to pursue national interests and achieve their goals (Brown 1997; Gilbert 1992) • The international system is anarchic of without any overarching sovereign or authority that can keep state behaviour in check and enforce laws. Because of this characteristic of the international system, states need individual power and exercise it to survive (Mastanduno et al. 1989; Lebow 1994; Brown 1997; Lynn-Jones 1999) • The results in states seeking to maximise their power to provide security within the international realm (Lynn-Jones 1999) and state survival must be the minimum aim of foreign policy and states are obliged to protect the physical, political as well as the cultural identity against the impositions by other states (Morgenthau 1978; Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1990) • A state’s survival comes first and cannot be compromised (Kissinger 1977). This means that morality should not interfere with policies (Dunne 1997) • Because the international system is regarded as anarchic, self-help is one of the most important principles in world politics since other entities cannot guarantee or accomplish the state’s national interest (Brown 1997; Kegley and Wittkopf 1997) • State policies are prioritised according to a fixed hierarchy of national interests, with the state’s security at the top with the rest following (Berejikian and Dryzek 2000)
Normative Commensalism	Meissner (2004, 2005)	Interpretivist	International relations	• Individuals are the initiators of change in political arrangements. Private and public individuals cause tipping points or trigger events (Rosenau 2003b) that reconfigure the composition of actors that are actively involved in a system (Meissner 2005). The cause is not in concert with the state, is initiated voluntarily and in an ad hoc manner because individuals no longer has such strong loyalties toward the state, and this loyalty is more dispersed throughout society and are attached to various non-state entities too (Meissner 2005) • Interest groups along with the state and its governing apparatus are key drivers of politics . These two entities, consisting of individuals, create norms to direct political processes in both the domestic and international milieu (Meissner 2004, 2005). Here discourses play an important role and are action-orientated. An identity informs an actor’s ideology, which influences the actors norm creating ability and this is how discourses come about (Meissner 2005) • Interest groups are more interested in influencing political processes than to confront each other in debates and try to dominate each other. The norm around which interest groups cluster is an inhibiting factor of conflict between a collectivity of interest groups and sustains the relationship between the interest groups. As such, interest groups are rational actors within political systems (Meissner 2005) • The political environment acts like a kind of laboratory for interest groups and states. They observe the environment, and the observations are transformed into different norms, which is then used for learning and influence (Meissner 2004, 2005) • Interest groups use the international environment as a resource pool in their efforts to lobby government policies. Interest groups use circumvention around state to gain access to the resource pool. Circumvention is a way through which relations are formed and expressed. The resource pool contains other states and interest groups that are willing to lend support, but also particular norms that the interest groups will use to influence policies. The resource poo also consists of the biophysical environment that provides clues to interest groups and states on how to develop arguments for or against actions that could potentially harm the environment. These clues are then translated into norms (Meissner 2005)
Political ecology or Green Politics		Interpretivist and critical/opportunity creation	International relations	• The theory rejects that the state system and other global political structures can effectively respond to environmental problems. The solution, according to the theory, is a global political transformation rather than the design and re-design of institutional structures and arrangements to respond to environmental problems (Paterson 2001). Political ecology acknowledges the increasing human production of the environment and the political forces controlling this production (Bryant and Bailey 1997; in Le Billon 2001). As such, political ecology is a radical critique of apolitical environmental research and practice (Le Billon 2001) and as such political ecology brings political debate to the science of ecology (Forsyth 2003). This means that change occurs in specific places as outcomes originating from the interaction between political and economic process at the local, national and international levels (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Rangan and Kull 2009) • Increased economic development through industrialisation damages the natural environment (Heywood 1997). During the production process of material goods, external costs are inflicted on society and the environment through environmental degradation (Toke 2000). Limits to growth go hand-in-hand with rapid economic and population expansion. These dynamics strain the earth’s carrying capacity and resources that will soon reach its limits. This means that society can only grow to a limited extent (Pepper 1984; Hayward 1998; Eckersley 1992; Paterson 2001) • Development is anti-ecological because it undermines sustainable practices that create inequality through enclosure or when common spaces are turned into private property. Enclosure is a global phenomenon (Paterson 2001) • Sustainable development is rejected by political ecologists because they believe it is just another way for the ruling elite to co-opt environmentalism (Paterson 2001). Because of this and alienation from the environment through economic processes and the division of labour, far reaching changes to political and social institutions are needed to reverse alienation (Atkinson 1991) • Political ecologists are anti-anthropocentric in that humans are part of nature and as such humans are elements of a world that is composed of various mutual and related living and non-living entities. This is seen an ethically correct and crucial for human survival (Baradat 2000) • To counteract this anthropocentrism of state action, political ecologists advance ecocentrism that acknowledges human and non-human interests (Naess 1973; Toke 2000). Because of this, political ecology embraces complexity thinking and rejects atomism • In order to take the political ecology agenda forward, the state’s political power should be decentralised and centralised at the regional and global levels and to achieve this, human communities should be downscaled. Political ecology challenges globalization because it is only through diversity that ecocentric ethical spaces can emerge (Paterson 1996). Because of this, non-state actors are also afforded political power by political ecologists
Risk society	Beck and Ritter (1992), Giddens (1991), Beck (2007)	Positivist	Sociology	• Classical modernity was characterised by an industrial society, with the main distinction being the industrial revolution and its aftermath (Beck and Ritter 1992; Ritzer 2000) • The new modernity and its associated technologies are the characteristics of the risk society (Beck and Ritter 1992; Ritzer 2000) • We are living in an industrial and risk society. In other words, we are in a transitional period between these two civilizations with the society in which people live having elements from both worlds (Beck and Ritter 1992; Ritzer 2000) • The industrial society is modernising and this modernisation of the industrial society is called reflexive modernity (Beck and Ritter 1992) • The modernity is the reason why individuals and citizens are operating more independently as society becomes more classless (Ritzer 2000) • Risks and their enhancement are central to the new modernity. These risks can be either reduced or redirected. Safety is of the essence and in this sense citizens look towards the defensive goal of being spared from danger. Wealth as well as the creation and accumulation thereof, is producing risks in modern society (Ritzer 2000). A risk is defined as a large negative impact on various environmental and social systems with a small probability of occurring (Björkman 1987) • This creation of wealth fosters a culture of increased economic wealth, the disregard of natural resources as economic assets and the negative on the environment (Selin 1987). To be more precise, industrialism and the incessant accumulation of wealth produced by industrial processes are seen as the main sources of risks in modern society (Meissner 2004) • There is a connection between risks and class, with risks attaching to class patterns, but not in the way we think. Wealth is the norm at the top of the class structure, while risks are the norm at the bottom. With poverty come a large number of risks, while the wealthy (in terms of income, power or education) have the means at their disposal to purchase safety and freedom from risk (Beck and Ritter 1992; Ritzer 2000) • There are two types of risk: individual and collective. Individual risks are faced by individuals when they face the probability of getting hurt or even dying from a risk. Collective risks affect more than one individual, even large community or states as well as the human race are not spared (Selin 1987) • The source for alleviating risk is found in modernity itself. The risks produced by modernisation also have the capacity to provide the reflexivity needed to reflect upon modernity and the risks it creates. Here people are the main reflexive agents, and especially those affected by risks. They observe their environment gather information on risks and the effects of risk upon them. Through observation citizens become experts on risks. In this sense they critically look at modernity’s pace and the danger it holds for society (Ritzer 2000) • The advancement of knowledge is taking place outside government structures, not in opposition to it, but ignoring it (Beck and Ritter 1992). This has led to an erosion of the state and its main power base. This is called the unbinding of politics . Politics is no longer only the government’s responsibility: individuals, interest groups, rural communities, science councils, industry and other private sector institutions play an increasingly larger role in politics (Meissner 2004)
Social constructivism	Wendt (1992), Klotz (1995), Katzenstein (1996), Adler (1997), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 2001), Price and Reus-Smit (1998), Ruggie (1998), Meissner (2004), Jacobs (2009)	Positivist/Interpretivist	International relations, comparative politics, sociology	• Social constructivism attempts to explain and make sense of social relations by describing the construction of the socio-political world through human practice (Du Plessis 2000) • The theory argues that positivist theories have been exceedingly materialist and agent-centric. Positivists assume that International Relations is a product of agents (usually states), ‘which are imbued with ‘instrumental rationality’. This means that states seek their power or utility-maximising choices or interests, which is rejected by social constructivism (Hobson 2000) • States are constrained by social normative structures (Hobson 2000). The theory focuses attention on the core ideational elements of intersubjective beliefs (ideas, concepts, assumptions, and so on) that are widely shared by people (Jackson and Sørensen 2003) • State identities are constructed through norms, which define their interests. Norms have therefore an important function in that interests change as norms reconstruct identities leading to changes in state policy . In short, norms channel states along certain socially dictated conduits of appropriate behaviour, which means that norms are autonomous. Contrariwise, positivism sees norms as intervening variables situated between the basic causal variable (power actors) and international results (Smith 1997; Price 1998; Du Plessis 2000; Hobson 2000) • Social constructivism treats the domestic and international spheres as two facets of a single social and political order. The theory is it is concerned with the dynamics of global change, especially the rise and possible decline of the state. Because of this, it focuses on the mutually constitutive relationship between the global order and the state (Reus-Smit 2001) • Transnational state actors, like interest groups, are believed to exist as a community of political engagement in international affairs. They have a meaningful impact through networks that teach governments what is appropriate to pursue in politics (Price 1998) • Norms create agents from individuals. This is done by giving them an opportunity to act upon the world. Agents use all means at their disposal to achieve their goals. Onuf (1998: 4) comments on this by saying that: ‘These means include material features of the world. Because the world is a social place…rules make the world’s material features into resources available for agents’ use’ • Relations and understandings between actors are developed through the medium of norms and practices. If norms were absent, power and action exercises would be meaningless. From this, an identity is defined by constitutive norms. This is done by specifying the actions that will lead other actors to realise that identity and respond to it appropriately (Hopf 2000) • Social constructivism also notes that agents and structures establish and give existence (constitutive) to each other. That said, individuals and states create societies that reflect their identities and interests. These societies then influence as well as shape the interests and identities of individuals and ultimately states. The societies and actors continue to evolve through this interactive process (Lebow 2008)
Strategic adaptive management or Adaptive management	Holling (1978), Rogers and Biggs (1999), Pahl-Wostl (2007b), Roux et al. (2009), Pollard and Du Toit (2008)	Positivist	Ecology, organizational studies	• A central premise of strategic adaptive management is that the knowledge of ecological systems is incomplete and elusive (Stankey et al. 2005) • Developing knowledge through scientific enquiry will always be limited due to resources and time. If these limitations are linked with certain contextual conditions, such as resource scarcity, new ways for understanding and learning becomes necessary and also inform practice (Stankey et al. 2005) • The policy process is implemented through the process of experimentation with learning from these experiments and experiences being the way to improve the formulation and implementation processes (Lee 1993) • Strategic adaptive management rests on both sound scientific reasoning that does not make action dependent on extensive studies and an implementing strategy to improve systematic evaluation of actions (Stankey et al. 2005) • Strategic adaptive management rests on the assumption that the resilience of socio-ecological systems is threatened. The theory is a derivative of complexity theory, resilience and integrated management (Kingsford et al. 2011) • Past environmental resources management approaches have failed to deal with complexities and rapidly changing systems. To grapple with such changes and complexities learning by doing approaches or adaptive management approach is needed. In order to do this, natural resource systems need to be viewed as complex systems (Pollard and Du Toit 2008) • This strategy is seen as building rather than eroding resilience (Pollard and Cousins 2008) since co-learning and joint decision -making assist in producing mental models and advance the social dimension among various stakeholders (Kingsford et al. 2011) • Adaptive management requires having an initial adaptive planning process that is iteratively followed by an adaptive decision -making process. The adaptive planning process starts with all stakeholders agreeing on a ‘desired state’ that they should work towards. The reason behind the need for such an agreement is to ensure that decision-making identifies and influences factors that can contribute to achieving a desired future condition, rather than choosing between immediate alternatives. The ‘desired state’ is made operational by a set of objectives with well-defined measures and targets. These measures and targets are subsequently monitored, and depending on the results of the monitoring, adaptation (changing the ways things are done) may be required (Roux et al. 2009) • Decisive foresight and purpose is built into the planning process and because of this, adaptive management is strategic. It is also adaptive because of its strong learning by doing elements and it is participatory since it involves stakeholder involvement at various levels of society (Roux et al. 2009) • Strategic adaptive management is a departure from the command and control management style and is rather inclusive, strategic, adaptive and creative (Rogers et al. 2000) • Strategic adaptive management is also based on the traditional policy formulation strategies with strategic adaptive management setting the desired ecological condition, which is a future state to move towards, as the first step. Then management options, through prediction (e.g. scenarios and modelling) should be devised. These options must also be tested for acceptability and then the appropriate option should be selected. Operationalisation is the third step, where management options are planned, implemented and indicators for the advancement measured. The last step is evaluation and learning in terms of the outputs it produce, through communication and the outcomes are evaluated and if necessary a review of steps one to three should take place (Kingsford et al. 2011) • Knowledge management is a central pillar that is necessary to create a partnership between science , management and society so that the common vision can be attained (Roux et al. 2009) • Adaptive management is an off-shoot of ecosystem management and notes that prediction of influencing drivers in ecosystems as well as system behaviour and responses are limited (Pahl-Wostl 2007a, b) • Management as learning takes centre stage in this theory. This manifest in the slogan: ‘learning to manage by managing to learn’. This will increase the adaptive capacity of systems (Pahl-Wostl 2007b: 49) • Prediction and control are jettisoned in favour of a learning approach to management that must be adaptive and have the ability to change management practices based on new experiences and insights (Pahl-Wostl 2007b) • Even so, the scientific method is mimicked by highlighting uncertainties, specifying and evaluating hypotheses as well as setting up actions to test those hypotheses through field application (Stankey et al. 2005)
Social learning and policy paradigms	Hall (1993)	Interpretivist	Comparative politics, policy studies, political economy, economy	• The most important factors that influence policy at a certain time are past policy and associated practices. Previous policy is the most important influence in the learning process surrounding policies (Hall 1993; Sacks 1980). Policy responds more to past policy than it does to social and economic conditions prevailing at a given time. Policy makers’ interests and ideals are shaped by policy legacies or the meaningful reactions to preceding policies (Hall 1993) • The central agents or actors that push for policy change are the experts in a given issue field. They work either for the state or government departments or give the government advice. This advice is given from a privileged position at the intersection between the bureaucratic apparatus and the epistemic communities. Politicians do not play the most important role in social learning. Instead, it is the officials or experts who specialise in a particular field that is more important (Hall 1993) • The capacity of the state to act autonomously from social pressures is emphasised by the theory (Hall 1993). Socio-economic development, elections, political parties and organised interest groups do not play a ‘primary’ role in the policy process. Elites have a great influence over the process (Heclo 1974). Social learning reveals state autonomy from societal pressures when formulating policy objectives (Sacks 1980) • Learning takes place when individuals accumulate new information. This information includes that based on past experience. Individuals then apply the new information to their succeeding actions. Social learning is therefore a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information. Learning shows when policy changes become visible because of such a process (Hall 1993) • We should note that the learning process takes different forms. Such different forms will depend on the types of changes in policy that are involved (Hall 1993) • To disaggregate the concept social learning we need to consider three variables in the policymaking process. The first variable is the overarching goals that guide policy in a particular issue arena. The second variable is the techniques or policy instruments that are employed to attain the goals. The third variable is the precise settings of these instruments (Hall 1993) • If, for instance, the policy ’s goal is to bring about equity in the South African water sector, the chosen instrument might be a reallocation of water to those who do not have access to water resources. The goal’s setting would be the volume of water at which the benefit is set (Hall 1993) • It then becomes important to distinguish the learning process associated with a simple change in the volume of water from that associated with potentially more radical transformations in the basic instruments of policy or its overarching goals (Hall 1993) • Based on these distinctions, there are three types of change in policy (Hall 1993) • The first type of change entails the levels or settings of the basic instrument in light of past experience and future projections. The overall goal of the policy ’s instrument remains the same. This is first order change (Hall 1993) • The policy instruments and their settings are changed in response to past experience although the overall goals of policy remain the same. This reflects second order change (Hall 1993) • Third order change happens when there is a radical alteration from one mode of policy development and formulation to another. That said, change takes place in all three components of policy: the instrument settings, the instruments themselves as well as the hierarchies behind the policy. This happens rarely and is an outflow of reflection on past experience (Hall 1993) • Ideas are central to policymaking (Hall 1993). In this regard, deliberation of public policy occurs within a realm of discourse. Policies do not fall out of the sky they are formulated with some system of ideas and standards which is comprehensible and plausible to the involved actors (Anderson 1978; Hall 1993) • Practitioners utilise a framework of ideas and standards that specify the goals of policy and the types of instruments that are applicable to get to the goals and the nature of the problems practitioners try to address (Hall 1993) • Such a framework is embedded in the terminology through which practitioners communicate with each other about their work. The framework is influential because it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole (Hall 1993) • The framework is called a policy paradigm (Hall 1993) • Once ideas associated with some actor or set of actors are adapted to the organization of a policy issue, the ideas get institutionalised into the procedures of an entity and formalised as a synthesis of some sort in standard texts around the issue (Hall 1993) • The ideas then specified the nature of the issue’s domain, how it needs to be observed, which goals are attainable through policy , and what instruments should be used to attain them. The ideas are the prism through which practitioners see the domain as well as their within it (Hall 1993) • Policy paradigms are much like the scientific paradigms that Thomas Kuhn had identified (Hall 1993) • Through this analogy a number of hypotheses are possible (Hall 1993). First and second order change can be seen as ‘normal policymaking’. It is normal policy making because of the process that adjusts policy without challenging the overall terms of a given policy paradigm, much like normal science (Hall 1993) • Third order change, on the other hand, entails radical changes in the overarching terms of policy discourse associated with a paradigm shift . Third order change is a disjunctive process associated with periodic discontinuities in policy changes preserve the broader contours of policy (Hall 1993) • It should be clear that first and second order changes do not automatically lead to third order changes (Hall 1993) • The nature of first order change is that of incremental change, satisficing and routinized decision making that are normally associated with policy making. Second order change of new policy instruments can move in the direction of strategic action. Third order change is more problematic (Hall 1993) • To explain this process, one must start with the nature and conceptualisation of paradigms . Paradigms are never fully commensurable or measurable by the same standard in scientific and technical terms. Each paradigm contains its own account of how the world facing practitioners face operates and each account is different. Because of this, it is often impossible for advocates of different paradigms to agree on a common data set against which a technical judgment in favour of one paradigm over another might be made. This has three important implications (Hall 1993) • 1. The process of paradigm replacement is more sociological than scientific . The views of experts are likely to be controversial, although the views may play a role. The choice between paradigms can therefore on rare occasions be made on scientific grounds only. The movement from one paradigm to another will then entail a set of judgements that have political tone. The outcome will depend on the arguments of competing factions and their positions within the institutional framework or structure. The outcomes will also depend on the ancillary resources they have at their disposal in the event of relevant conflicts as well as external factors affecting the power of one set of actors to impose the paradigm over others (Hall 1993) • 2. Authority issues are likely to be central to the policy paradigm change process. Since politicians are faced with conflicting expert opinions, they will b = have to decide whom to regard as authoritative, especially when it comes to issues of technical complexity. The policy community will become embroiled in a contest for authority over the issues at hand. That said, the shift from one paradigm to another could be preceded by significant shifts in the centre of authority over the policy (Hall 1993) • 3. Policy experimentation and policy failure play an important role in the dynamism from one paradigm to another. Anomalies can threaten a policy paradigm. Such anomalies can be in the form of developments not fully comprehensible and puzzles within the terms of the paradigm. As anomalies appear, ad hoc attempts are make to stretch the terms of the paradigm to cover them. Even so, this gradually undermines the intellectual coherence and precision of the original paradigm. Policymakers can also deal with such anomalies through experimentation to adjust the existing policy lines. However, if the policy paradigm cannot deal with the developments, the experiments are likely to fail that gradually result in policy failures undermining the authority of the paradigm and its advocates further (Hall 1993) • So, policy paradigm shifts entails the accumulation of anomalies, experimentation with new forms of policy as well as policy failures. These facilitate a shift in the locus of authority over policy and initiate a wider contest between competing paradigms (Hall 1993) • Such a contest is not confined to state boundaries and can flow into the broader political arena. The contest ends when the proponents of the new paradigm secure an authoritative position in the policymaking process and are able to reorganise the standard operating procedures and organisations of the policy process and in that way institutionalise the new paradigm (Hall 1993)