Abstract
After having provided a reminder of the diversity of definitions religious indifference and atheism may have, this chapter aims to measure irreligion in many countries thanks to the EVS and ISSP international quantitative surveys. From 1990 to 2008, secularization evolved slowly but steadily. This process does not lead to a disappearance of religions and to complete atheism and rejection of God, but rather to a loss of interest in religion, which, for many people, is no longer important in life. This low level of interest often goes hand in hand with uncertain, floating and blurred beliefs. But for strongly unreligious people, the value system is very different from that of religious people. Nevertheless, countries differ considerably: some European countries remain very religious while others are almost completely irreligious.
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Notes
- 1.
A lot of thanks to Anna Jeannesson, an English teacher in the same Institute as me, who proofread my text.
- 2.
In the introduction of this recent collective book, Lori Beaman and Steven Tomlins speak of “explicit atheism, implicit atheism, negative atheism, positive atheism, practical atheism, pragmatic atheism, strong atheism, weak atheism and so on.”
- 3.
According to the philosopher Ronald Dworkin, it is possible to reject the idea of God for rationalistic reasons and nevertheless be awed by the mystery of cosmos.
- 4.
According to Dobbelaere, the secularization process works at three interrelated levels: societal, individual (weakening people’s religiosity), organizational (churches are affected by a process of internal secularization).
- 5.
The EVS is carried out every nine years, with waves in 1981, 1990, 1999, 2008 the fifth one being planned for 2017. The aim is to analyze the change in value systems with a long questionnaire (one hour of face to face interviewing) measuring attitudes in the main fields of life (sociability, family, work, religion, politics…). So it is possible to analyze if supporting particular values in one field entails particular values in another one.
- 6.
Only three small EU countries were missing in 1990: Cyprus, Luxembourg, Greece.
- 7.
The ISSP was created in 1985 with four countries at the beginning. One survey is fielded each year on a particular societal subject (the questionnaire lasts about 22 minutes when it is face to face but the administration mode differs according to country: post, drop-off given at the end of another questionnaire, face to face, internet…). The ISSP is not a purely European survey: the annual modules are now carried out in about 40 countries on the five continents. Religion was the subject chosen in 1991, 1998 and 2008 (which will be repeated in 2018). Here we only consider the religious modules of 1998 and 2008, the number of countries covered in 1991 being too low.
- 8.
In a French opinion poll (CSA) carried out in 2006, the declared Catholics were asked the main reason why they choose this affiliation. 55 % still answer “Simply because I was born into a Catholic family”, 21 % “because I have faith”, 14 % “because I am personally attached to certain values”, 9 % “by attachment to the culture and history of the country”.
- 9.
In many religions, belonging is theoretically defined by a ritual at birth or during the first years of life and normally religion is fixed for someone’s whole life. But in some religions or countries, religious belonging has to be “renewed” more or less regularly, for example in countries where Church members have to pay an annual Church tax. In some countries, membership is strongly linked to national identity, particularly in Scandinavian countries with Lutheran churches (except for Sweden since 2000). These practical differences in the process and the meaning of religious belonging cannot completely explain the enormous differences between countries which depend on each country’s religious feeling and level of secularization.
- 10.
The Czech Republic is the only Central European country where the number of non-religious people grew between the two dates. It is one of the most unreligious countries in the world.
- 11.
For the ISSP, religious affiliation is determined in the socio-demographic section. As a result there is incomplete homogeneity of the phrasing for the different countries, and in particular there is not always a filter question before asking about the individual’s religion. It is one of the methodological weaknesses of the ISSP: several modes of administration are authorized (face to face, mail, drop off) and the socio-demographics are not identical in the national questionnaires, as the ISSP survey is paired with another survey in some countries and so the socio-demographics are those of the basic national surveys (for example in Germany, the ISSP is linked with Allbus every two years). So there are understandable differences between the ISSP and EVS results. But, comparing Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3, only for Hungary is the difference very high for an unknown reason.
- 12.
Wohlrab-Sahr, Schmidt-Lux, Karstein explain that the RDA used to be in conflict with religions throughout society and repress religious people. Rationalist thought and disregard of religiosity was encouraged in education. The regime believed it was not possible to have “two masters”, the Church and the Party. Rituals were created to substitute for religious ones, i.e. the « Jugendweihe » to replace the Lutheran confirmation and produce good communist citizens.
- 13.
Phil Zuckerman explains, on the basis of qualitative interviews and participative observations, that Sweden and Denmark are among the most secularized countries in the world. Though this is true for Sweden, it is more debatable for Denmark. Though only 46 % of Swedish people say they believe in God, 63 % of the Danish claim to be believers.
- 14.
When we cross-tabulate this question with indicators of religious practices or beliefs, the relationship is very strong: the more religious people feel, the more they practice and believe. The “neither nor” position is not outside this ranking. We do not observe many people with opinions in the middle not answering on other religious indicators while this ought to be observed if the “neither nor” people are really religiously indifferent.
- 15.
This dichotomous question appears in the EVS which also includes two more precise questions, one about the types of God in which people believe (personal, spirit or life force, they don’t know what to think, they do not believe in any kind of spirit, God or life force), another on the importance of God in your life used in Table 8.6.
- 16.
The four items are labeled:
“I follow a religion and consider myself to be a spiritual person interested in the sacred or the supernatural,
I follow a religion, but don’t consider myself to be a spiritual person interested in the sacred or the supernatural,
I don’t follow a religion, but consider myself to be a spiritual person interested in the sacred or the supernatural,
I don’t follow a religion and don’t consider myself to be a spiritual person interested in the sacred or the supernatural.”
- 17.
Here we reach the limit of quantitative surveys: it is not always easy to understand the logic behind answers. In this case, qualitative interviews are very fruitful.
- 18.
In Western societies, the values of individualization defined as a desire to be autonomous and original in one’s personal choices are rising. Consequently, even in the main religions, followers tend to be more individualized. They do not accept all the beliefs and moral positions of their denomination, and may even think they have their own way of connecting with the divine.
- 19.
This relationship varies in intensity according to country. But the dominant religion of the country does not seem explicative, nor does its level of modernization. Cramer’s V – a statistical coefficient measuring the strength of a link – is very high in Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Spain, Denmark, Estonia. The only area where the link is rather weak – but significant – is Northern Ireland (0.10).
- 20.
But the level of education also depends on generation. We will consider a little further the respective weight of the two variables, all things considered as equal for other dimensions.
- 21.
This variable (Western, Oriental, Northern, Southern Europe) only allows us to neutralize composition effects as income and education are linked to the economic situation of each country. So it is not presented in Table 8.12.
- 22.
To avoid making this paper too heavy, we do not present each scale in detail.
- 23.
Zuckerman aims to show (in an American context and in opposition to the Christian conservative right-wing rhetoric) – on the basis of very rich qualitative interviews – that atheists are as humanist as believers in God. And they do not have to face the awful question of evil which is ever-present for followers of the God of love. In fact, though it is true that irreligious people are very individualized and in favor of individual freedoms, our results show that they are not particularly humanist in terms of solidarity.
- 24.
Zuckerman underlines that the rather secularized Danes are the happiest in the world, but the survey data does not confirm the relationship between irreligion and happiness.
- 25.
For each gender, the level of religiosity differences are striking.
- 26.
For the same level of religiosity, women are slightly more in favor of gender equality, individualized values and a little less in favor of work values and right wing orientation.
- 27.
Checked by religiosity, age has no effect for some values: solidarity, political orientation, protest action.
- 28.
According to a wide-reaching survey carried out by the Association of Statisticians of American religious Bodies, counties could be divided into four equal categories (quartiles): though in about a quarter of counties, over 75% of people are affiliated members of a religion, the percentage in the other extreme quartile is 35 % and under (Glenmary Research Center 2000). But, in the previously quoted Pew survey, the percentage of non-affiliated people differs little over large areas, which are probably too heterogeneous: 19 % of the adult population in the South, 22 % in the Midwest, 25 % in the Northeast and 28 % in the West declare they have no religion.
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Bréchon, P. (2017). Measuring Religious Indifference in International Sociological Quantitative Surveys (EVS and ISSP). In: Quack, J., Schuh, C. (eds) Religious Indifference. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48476-1_8
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