Israel’s Behavior in the 1967 and 1973 Wars: Overall Findings

Abstract

Israel’s decisions, decision-makers, and the decision process during the two most significant crisis-wars within the Arab–Israel protracted conflict, the 1967 and 1973 Wars, are analyzed in this chapter in the following sequence: the prewar crisis period from 17 May–4 June 1967, in three phases: phase I: apprehension and mobilization (17–22 May); phase II: delay and diplomacy (23–28 May); and phase III: preemption (29 May–4 June); then, for the 1973 War, one day before the outbreak of war to its termination on 26 October 1973, in four phases: phase I: 5–6 October; phase II: 7–14 October; phase III: 15–23 October; and phase IV: 23–26 October. These verbal analyses are accompanied by Tables 7 and 8 on the Israel decisions and decision-makers for the 1967 War, and Tables 9 and 10 on the Israel decisions and decision-makers for the 1973 War.