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ML: DDoS Damage Control with MPLS

  • Pierre-Edouard FabreEmail author
  • Hervé Debar
  • Jouni Viinikka
  • Gregory Blanc
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10014)

Abstract

We present a DDoS mitigation mechanism dispatching suspicious and legitimate traffic into separate MultiProtocol Label Switching (MPLS) tunnels, well upstream from the target. The objective is to limit the impact a voluminous attack could otherwise have on the legitimate traffic through saturation of network resources. The separation of traffic is based on a signature identifying suspicious flows, carried in an MPLS label, and then used by a load-balancing mechanism in a router. The legitimite traffic is preserved at the expense of suspcious flows, whose resource allocations are throttled as needed to avoid congestion.

Keywords

Multiprotocol Label Switching Quality of Service Volumetric DDoS Amplification DDoS Network resilience Bloom filter 

Notes

Acknowledgement

This research is supported by the European Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) and by the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC) during the project NECOMA under grant agreement No 608533, and by the French research program Programme d’Investissements d’Avenir (PIA) during the project SIEM+ under grant agreement P111271-3583256.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pierre-Edouard Fabre
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Hervé Debar
    • 2
  • Jouni Viinikka
    • 1
  • Gregory Blanc
    • 2
  1. 1.6cureColombellesFrance
  2. 2.Institut Mines-Telecom, Telecom SudParis, CNRS Samovar UMR 5157EvryFrance

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