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Event-Triggered Watermarking Control to Handle Cyber-Physical Integrity Attacks

  • Jose Rubio-HernanEmail author
  • Luca De Cicco
  • Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10014)

Abstract

The use of control-theoretic solutions to detect attacks against cyber-physical systems is a growing area of research. Traditional literature proposes the use of control strategies to retain, f.i., satisfactory closed-loop performance, as well as safety properties, when a communication network connects the distributed components of a physical system (e.g., sensors, actuators, and controllers). However, the adaptation of these strategies to handle security incidents, is an ongoing challenge. In this paper, we analyze the use of a watermark-based detector that handles integrity attacks. We show that (1) the detector is able to work properly under the presence of adversaries using non-parametric methods to escape detection; but (2) it fails at detecting adversaries using parametric identification methods to escape detection. We propose a new strategy that complements the watermark-based detector in order to detect both adversaries. We validate the detection efficiency of the new strategy via numeric simulations.

Keywords

Cyber-physical security Critical infrastructures Attack detection Adversary model Networked Control System 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge support from the Cyber CNI Chair of Institut Mines-Télécom. The chair is held by Télécom Bretagne and supported by Airbus Defence and Space, Amossys, EDF, Orange, La Poste, Nokia, Société Générale and the Regional Council of Brittany. It has been acknowledged by the Center of excellence in Cybersecurity.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jose Rubio-Hernan
    • 1
    Email author
  • Luca De Cicco
    • 2
  • Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro
    • 1
  1. 1.SAMOVAR, Telecom SudParis, CNRS, Université Paris-SaclayEvryFrance
  2. 2.Politecnico di Bari, Dipartimento di Ingegneria Elettrica e dell’InformazioneBariItaly

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