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Preventing Adaptive Key Recovery Attacks on the GSW Levelled Homomorphic Encryption Scheme

  • Zengpeng Li
  • Steven D. Galbraith
  • Chunguang MaEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10005)

Abstract

A major open problem is to protect levelled homomorphic encryption from adaptive attacks that allow an adversary to learn the private key. The only positive results in this area are by Loftus, May, Smart and Vercauteren. They use a notion of “valid ciphertexts” and obtain an IND-CCA1 scheme under a strong knowledge assumption, but they also show their scheme is not secure under a natural adaptive attack based on a “ciphertext validity oracle”.

The main contribution of this paper is to explore a new approach to achieve security against adaptive attacks, which does not rely on a notion of “valid ciphertexts”. Instead, our idea is to generate a “one-time” private key every time the decryption algorithm is run, so that even if an attacker can learn some bits of the one-time private key from each decryption query, this does not allow them to compute a valid private key. We demonstrate how this idea can be implemented with the Gentry-Sahai-Waters levelled homomorphic encryption scheme, and we give an informal explanation of why the known attacks no longer break the system.

Keywords

Adaptive key recovery attacks Lattice-based cryptography Levelled homomorphic encryption 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful advice and comments. This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.61472097), Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education (No.20132304110017) and International Exchange Program of Harbin Engineering University for Innovation-oriented Talents Cultivation.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Zengpeng Li
    • 1
    • 2
  • Steven D. Galbraith
    • 3
  • Chunguang Ma
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  1. 1.College of Computer Science and TechnologyHarbin Engineering UniversityHarbinChina
  2. 2.State Key Laboratory of Information SecurityInstitute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  3. 3.Department of MathematicsThe University of AucklandAucklandNew Zealand

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