Abstract
Considering that access to information is one of the most important aspects of modern society, the actions of certain governments or internet providers to control or, even worse, deny access for their citizens/users to selected data sources has lead to the implementation of new communication protocols. TOR is such a protocol, in which the path between the original source and destination is randomly generated using a network of globally connected routers and, by doing so, the client is not identified as actually accessing the resource. However, if the ISP knows that the first hop is part of TOR or if it can identify the contents of the exchanged packages as being TOR packages, by using advanced detection algorithms, it can still perform it’s denial policies. These types of detection are circumvented by the usage of bridges (TOR routers which aren’t publicly known) and pluggable transports (content changing protocols, in order to pass through as innocent-looking traffic). The development of a didactic pluggable transport in a simulated TOR network is the main purpose of this paper, in order to investigate the current state of the art of TOR development and analysis.
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Acknowledgments
This work partially supported by the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research (CNCSUEFISCDI) under the project PN-II-PT-PCCA-2013-4-1651.
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Panait, IC., Pop, C., Sirbu, A., Vidovici, A., Simion, E. (2016). TOR - Didactic Pluggable Transport. In: Bica, I., Reyhanitabar, R. (eds) Innovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications. SECITC 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10006. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47238-6_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47238-6_16
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