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Circular Security Reconsidered

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Innovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications (SECITC 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10006))

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Abstract

The notion of circular security of pseudorandom functions (PRF) was introduced in Distance Bounding Protocols. So far, only a construction based on a random oracle model was proposed. Circular security stands between two new notions which we call Key Dependent Feedback (KDF) security and Leak security. So far, only a construction based on a random oracle was proposed. We give an algebraic construction based on a -DDH assumpsion. We first prove that a small-domain Verifiable Random Functions (VRF) from Dodis-Yampolskiy is a circular secure PRF. We then use the extension to large-domain VRF by augmented cascading by Boneh et al. This gives the first construction in the standard model.

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Acknowledgments

The first author was supported in part by NSF grant CNS-1453132.

We thank Dr. Reza Reyhanitabar for helpful discussions and valuable comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. State University of New Jersey, Rutgers, New Brunswick, USA

    F. Betül Durak

  2. Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland

    Serge Vaudenay

Authors
  1. F. Betül Durak
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  2. Serge Vaudenay
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Serge Vaudenay .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Military Technical Academy , Bucharest, Romania

    Ion Bica

  2. NEC Laboratories Europe , Heidelberg, Germany

    Reza Reyhanitabar

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Betül Durak, F., Vaudenay, S. (2016). Circular Security Reconsidered. In: Bica, I., Reyhanitabar, R. (eds) Innovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications. SECITC 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10006. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47238-6_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47238-6_1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-47237-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-47238-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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